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ABSTRACT
This dissertation argues that there is a need for Christian theology to critically reexamine human existence through social and structural categories in response to the
current direction of globalization which threatens the humanization of human existence.
Specifically, there exists a need for a contemporary Christian theological anthropology
that is in dialogue with the social sciences and that attempts to develop an understanding
of human sin, grace, and redemption in structural and social categories in order to offer
an alternative vision of what it means to be human in light of the prevailing anthropology
that is at the heart of the current trajectory of the globalizing world. This alternative
vision of human existence will have to meet the challenge of a globalizing world that is
creating greater dependency and interconnectedness among peoples and nations and a
globalizing world that cultivates and encourages an anthropology of egocentrism and
radical individualism.
In order to contribute to contemporary theological anthropology which meets the
challenge of a crisis of being human within the complex context of a globalizing world,
this dissertation will draw on the theological anthropologies of two Jesuit theologians:
Karl Rahner and José Ignacio González Faus. This dissertation attempts to bring these
two theologians into a dynamic dialogue and ultimately offer a critical analysis of the
nature of sin, grace, and redemption in their respective understanding of human existence
in order to offer a more adequate theological anthropology for contemporary Christian
theology.
ix

In order to accomplish this task, this dissertation will be presented as follows.
Chapter one will first outline the situation of the current trajectory of globalization, with
particular concern about the underlying anthropology of the current form of globalization,
and of the problem of global disparity, and present various explanatory frameworks
which attempt to address the problem. It will then present various responses to the
problem from Catholic theology. It will finally conclude with the claim that Catholic
theology, and specifically Catholic theological anthropology, can offer a viable response
to the situation and problem by presenting an alternative vision of human existence.
After situating the problem in chapter one, chapter two will show how the
theological anthropologies of Karl Rahner and José Ignacio González Faus developed out
of their own historical contexts. It will do this by first presenting how the Catholic
Church responded to the challenges of modernity of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
It will then outline how the theologies and anthropologies of Rahner and González Faus
were shaped by the challenges of modernity.
After situating the problem and situating the thought of Rahner and González
Faus as sources to which this dissertation draws upon, chapters three through five form
the heart of this dissertation. First, chapter three will explore how Rahner and González
Faus address what Christian theological anthropology sees as the human predicament and
how they understand the theological category of sin in order to begin assessing the
theological anthropologies of both theologians in light of the current trajectory of
globalization and of global disparity. Then, chapter four will focus upon both
theologians’ soteriology. The fundamental guiding question of this chapter is whose
theological anthropology can best address the problem of historical and social salvation.

x

Finally, chapter five will explore the root metaphors of church that would arise from
these two distinct, but complementary, theological anthropologies.
Ultimately, I contend that the theological anthropology of González Faus best
offers an alternative anthropology to the prevalent anthropology at the heart of the current
direction of globalization, and can, therefore, adequately address the unsettling reality of
global disparity.

xi

CHAPTER ONE
SITUATING THE PROBLEM
In 1963 Bob Dylan wrote the following lines to his album The Times They Are aChangin'.
The line it is drawn
The curse it is cast
The slow one now
Will later be fast
As the present now
Will later be past
The order is
Rapidly fadin'.
And the first one now
Will later be last
For the times they are a-changin'. 1

These lines, which have often been used at protests and rallies for social justice, speak of
a radical shift in the structure of society. This shift is often understood as an
‘interruption’ whereby the poor and powerless are no longer poor and powerless.
This shift, however, has not occurred. Rather, poverty, and powerlessness due to
poverty, is still a grave problem today, and has reached global proportions. Though the
question of whether poverty has increased or decreased over the last four decades is

1

Bob Dylan, “The Times They Are a-Changin,’” The Times They Are a-Changin’, 1964, Columbia
Records.

1

2
debatable, the disparity2 between the powerful and the powerless seems to have only
gotten deeper and wider. 3 Yet, even though Dylan’s apocalyptic message may not have
come to fruition, the times, in fact, are a changin’.
Massive changes are occurring within the forms of human interaction, human
organization, and the utilization of power by particular persons and communities. 4 For
example, information is disseminated more quickly, and to a greater amount of people,
due in part to the rapid growth of cable and satellite television in developed countries, the
extent of international media, and the growth of the internet. Also, new innovations in
technology and medicine transcend nations, and are, to an extent, shared among nations
and countries. Educational systems and curriculums throughout the world, starting with
primary education, are also being affected by the massive changes in the world.
Furthermore, the health of local economies is more contingent upon global markets than
ever before. Finally, the possibility of environmental degradation is no longer a problem
of local communities, but can now affect all peoples. These are just a few examples of a
world in the process of transformation, and are the earmarks of a “globalizing” world.
From this context of a globalizing world, four concerns can be raised. First, is the
increasing interaction and interconnectedness of peoples throughout the world facilitating
2

For this dissertation, the term “disparity” will refer specifically to economic disparity in the form of
extreme poverty and the social ills that come with extreme poverty (e.g., lack of education, poor sanitation,
malnutrition, social unrest).

3

In terms of absolute, or extreme, poverty, there is general agreement that the gap between the richest and
poorest of the world has increased over the last decades of the twentieth century. See, for example,
“Divided World, Divided Nations?,” in The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the
Globalization Debate 2nd edition, eds. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003),
421. See also David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization (Cambridge: Polity,
2002), 79. Hereafter, this literature will be cited as GTR and G/A-G.
4

Throughout this dissertation I will use the term “power” to designate the ability of human existence to
create structures, systems, personal and social relationships, and human history.
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a greater sense of human dignity, equality and solidarity? Second, how is the world
going to be structured, with greater equality and opportunity or less? Third, how will
these structures define what it means to be human? Finally, whose interests are being
served, the global community or only the particularly strong and competitive
communities? In other words, how will human power be used, to enter into the struggle
for justice with those in society who suffer from powerlessness, or to dominate and
exploit those who are powerless?
It is stemming from these concerns that this dissertation contends that a reexamination of human existence through a Christian lens may offer a potential
framework to assess the current form of human interaction, human organization, and
human power. This point will be argued further in the last section of this chapter.

Globalization, Global Disparity, and Global Awareness
Defining Globalization
The term “globalization” is often used to name the process of a transforming
world. However, what exactly is globalization? David Held and Anthony McGrew offer
a workable definition of globalization that links the term to the current global order.
They claim that “globalization represents a significant shift in the spatial reach of social
relations and organization towards the interregional or intercontinental scale.” 5
They elaborate on this claim by pointing out that:
globalization denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding
up and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social
interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human
social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach
5

GTR, 3.

4
of power relations across the world’s major regions and continents.
However, as the rise of the anti-globalization protests demonstrates, it
should not be read as prefiguring the emergence of a harmonious world
society or as a universal process of global integration in which there is a
growing convergence of cultures and civilizations. 6
From this extended definition, two points of interest for this present project
emerge.
First, this definition makes the claim that there are real changes taking place in the
world with respect to the manner in which human persons interact and relate to each
other, to how human communities are organized and being organized, and to the way
human power is being utilized.
Second, it illustrates the fact that there is real concern about the direction of these
global changes, and that it cannot be assumed that the global changes are benefiting, or
are meant to benefit, all persons and communities. In other words, it cannot be assumed
that all peoples are benefiting from this global transformation, and that it is in fact a
possibility that there is an increase in extreme poverty, inequality, and injustice. 7 It is
this last point that is most relevant to this present project. This dissertation is concerned
with the question of what can be done, or what new approaches can be explored, in order
to address this disparity.

6
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Ibid., 4.

In the introduction to part five of their reader, Held and McGrew point out that the extract from the 1999
United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report offers the best evidence for the
argument linking growing world inequality and poverty with globalization. Even if the causes of global
poverty and the increase in the gap between rich and poor are debatable, “the UNDP extract produces
evidence to show that the numbers of people living in absolute poverty…have increased over the last
decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, it asserts that the gap between richest and poorest in the world
is now at historic levels,” Ibid., 421.
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The Globalization Debate
The global phenomenon of change and the term ‘globalization’ are raising
complex questions and thoughtful debates. An overly simplified assessment of the issue
would divide the debate among ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists.’ However, though the
extreme positions do exist, any productive evaluation of the present global condition will
not attempt to simplify the problem.
Held and McGrew present a helpful overview of the complexity of this
globalization debate. They argue that the globalization debate can be mapped around two
ideal-type constructions: the ‘globalists’ and the ‘sceptics.’ They argue that globalists
“consider that contemporary globalization is a real and significant historical
development.” 8 There are, however, skeptics on the other side of the debate who
“conceive [globalization] as a primarily ideological or social construction which has
marginal explanatory value.” 9 In other words, the skeptics view globalization as an
ideological construction, or a “necessary myth,” that legitimizes the neoliberal agenda,
whereas on the other hand, the globalists view globalization as a real “set of interrelated
processes operating across all the primary domains of social power.”10 This debate
between these two ideal-types is not a winner-take-all argument. For Held and McGrew,
much can, and should be, learned from both sides of the debate.

8

Ibid., 2.

9

Ibid., 2. Along with these two groupings, there is also a third group. This third group denies the very
existence of any real substantial changes taking place in the world, and see the talk over ‘globalization’ as
pure rhetoric and nonsense. For the sake of the argument and scope of this project, I will follow David
Held and Anthony McGrew’s lead, which attempts to engage in those positions that hold that there does
exist some real substantial changes taking place in the world and that these changes are intensifying daily.
10

Ibid., 5-6.
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Held and McGrew utilize these ideal-type constructions for heuristic purposes in
order to shed light on this very complex, and contentious, debate. As illustrated in their
reader, this classification of the debate into two general camps does not simplify the
matter at all, and it does not attempt to create any static positions. Instead, they underline
the complexity of the debate by pointing out that there are multiple sub-groups and subpositions that overlap and share similar stances.

Common Ground and Agreement
Along with the debate, there is also common ground and general agreement
among most theorists. Held and McGrew illustrate this common ground by highlighting
five points of convergence:
1. there is increasing “economic interconnectedness” in the world
2. global competition “challenges old hierarchies and creates new
inequalities”
3. the reality of transnational problems raises the question of the nature
and role of national government
4. “the expansion of international governance” raises the question of
what sort of new world order is being created and whose interests will
this world order serve
5. creativity and imagination are needed to respond to this new global
development 11
These five points of common ground point to the fact that there is a growing
world-wide web of relationships and interaction, that some longstanding human
institutions and structures are being challenged, and that human power may be used in a

11

Ibid., 38-39. For the purpose of this dissertation, I am interested specifically in points 1, 2, 4, and 5.
Even if point 2 is left out of the equation, and it is argued, as in the case from neoliberal circles, that the
economic standards of people’s lives are improving on a global scale, the question for this dissertation still
remains, does economic stability equate to greater humanization? Even arguing on pragmatic terms, does
economic equality, or even economic welfare, create a humanization that is illustrated in the biblical form
as the imago and similitudo dei?
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way that could create new injustices and promote a global form of social Darwinism in
which only some interests will be served.
There is also considerable agreement on the fact that disparity, in terms of
extreme poverty, exists in the world. This phenomenon of disparity takes the form of
people suffering from extreme poverty while simultaneously other people and regions of
the world, and particular sectors of society, enjoy a surplus of wealth far beyond their
basic needs.
Finally, there is considerable agreement on the fact that because of the deepening
and speeding up of social interactions on a global scale, there is greater awareness of the
reality of this disparity. Perhaps a hundred years ago it could have been argued, on the
basis of pure ignorance, that extreme poverty did not exist. However, with the advances
in global communications, and the facility and efficiency of moving ideas, images,
products, and peoples across the world, this can no longer be the case.
It is the combination of these two points of agreement that is most morally
troubling. The question is raised, if globalization has created greater awareness of the
disparity that exists in the world, why isn’t the eradication of extreme poverty a moral
priority? It is my contention that the reason for this discrepancy can be found in the
anthropology inherent in the current form of globalization. Throughout this dissertation,
the underlying anthropology that I believe needs to be unmasked and ultimately dealt
with in order to fundamentally address the current trajectory of globalization is one that
(1) sees the individual person as an autonomous self that is fundamentally egocentric, (2)
promotes perpetual consumption as an offer of hope and fulfillment, (3) sees the need for

8
instant and constant stimulation and gratification as the authentic way to happiness, (4)
creates deception in order to preserve the self and its own interests, (5) values other
persons insomuch as they benefit the maximization of profit and material wealth, and
ultimately (6) defines the person’s worth by their material possessions and economic
status. 12
This question and claim should not lead to a pessimistic outlook on the current
state of global affairs. Rather, as noticed in the last point of common ground offered by
Held and McGrew, there exists the possibility for a real positive response through
‘creativity’ and ‘imagination.’ 13 In other words, what is needed is a constructive
solution.

Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here?
Before constructing a possible approach to address the current problem, the
following section of this chapter will explore, and briefly outline, the various explanatory
frameworks of the ethical implications of this global disparity. These frameworks are

12

See Daniel G. Groody for a similar list. “Globalizing Solidarity: Christian Anthropology and the
Challenge of Liberation,” Theological Studies 69 (2008), 266.
13

After clarifying the positions, and pointing out the common ground, Held and McGrew offer their
interpretation of the current global phenomenon. They attempt to avoid limiting their theory to either a
skeptical argument or globalist one, but rather press both positions, and attempt to go beyond them. They
argue that there are valuable and compelling ideas that stem from both groups, and that both groupings can
aid in developing a different interpretation to the debate. Though they do attempt to develop a constructive
theory, their position on the matter appears to be much more reserved and ‘agnostic’ than many of the other
positions. In G/A-G, they claim that since the direction of the patterns of global change “remains
uncertain,” this interpretation “makes no claims about the future trajectory of globalization; nor does it
evaluate the present in relation to some single, fixed ideal-type ‘globalized world,’”(126). Ultimately, their
“transformationalist” position argues that what will be needed in the future to address this global
phenomenon is a “cosmopolitan outlook…characterized by overlapping communities of fate and
multilevel/multilayered politics,” GTR, 42.
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relatively recent philosophical reflections on the questions of poverty and economic
injustice, and the necessary moral responses by individuals and/or institutions.
The structure of this brief outline will be ordered on a sliding-scale from an
analysis that places moral responsibility solely on the individual to an analysis that places
moral responsibility solely on social structures and systems.
This section will then conclude with a brief look at how the Roman Catholic
Church has responded to this question of global disparity, and it will give the rationale for
the use of Catholic theology as a valuable and productive contribution to a solution.
The last section of this chapter raises the question of whether a theological
anthropology offers a necessary contribution to the solution to the problem of global
disparity. This question will take the form of two parts. First, what can theology offer as
a response to the problem? Second, why address the current problem via an examination
into the human condition?

Responses to Global Disparity
Explanatory Frameworks
In light of the change in human interaction, human organization, and human
power, and in light of the concern of global disparity and suffering, this section will
briefly outline a spectrum of philosophical frameworks of theories of justice. I will not
spend considerable time in the details of their arguments. The goal is to illustrate a few
possible methods of responding to the global disparity problem. In order to clarify the
diverse responses, I will present these various theories on a sliding scale beginning with a
‘neoliberal’ libertarian position, which places responsibility solely upon the individual,
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and concluding with a socialist position, which places responsibility upon social
structures and systems. The last framework that I will outline is that of the Roman
Catholic Church. Since the Church’s responses to globalization and global disparity are
multiple and complex, the outline on the Church’s response will not be an exhaustive
one.

Robert Nozick
The first framework that offers a possible response to the situation of a
globalizing world and the problem of global disparity is that of the American philosopher
Robert Nozick. Nozick’s theory comes out of a response to the theory of justice
promoted by John Rawls. He attempts to address Rawls’ theory of distributive justice,
and replace it with a theory of entitlement.
In his chapter on distributive justice in Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick argues
that any distributive theory of justice is misleading. He points out that in “[h]earing the
term ‘distribution,’ most people presume that some thing or mechanism uses some
principle or criterion to give out a supply of things” and that “[t]here is no central
distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how
they are to be doled out.”14 According to Nozick, a distributive theory of justice that
fundamentally attempts to make the poor of society no longer poor requires a
redistribution of wealth through the form of taxation or other means. This redistribution
of wealth would be an injustice because it impinges on an individual’s freedom and right
to own property. This redistribution would also require restrictions to be imposed on
14

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974), 149.
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individuals’ liberty. Also, a distributive theory is misleading because there is no one
central power that ‘distributes’ wealth for all persons.
In response to Rawls’ distributive theory of justice, Nozick argues for a theory of
“entitlement.” Nozick lays out three principles in this theory. First, in a free society,
shares of wealth are acquired by individuals by way of entrepreneurial means or by other
just means of appropriation of “non-held things.” Wealth is fundamentally generated by
individual creativity and market competition. Individuals who acquired these holdings
are morally entitled to this wealth because they have freely acquired it.
Secondly, an individual may choose to exchange this wealth for something else
by transferring this wealth to another individual, or the individual may freely give it to
someone without gaining anything in return. An individual has the right to do this
because it is his or her property.
Lastly, if any injustice occurs in either the act of acquiring wealth (e.g., stealing),
or in the transaction between individuals, then this violation needs to be set right. This is
the principle of rectification. These three principles fundamentally rest on the notions of
freedom, rights, and entitlement. When these three principles are maintained, then justice
in society is upheld.
Nozick’s theory of entitlement promotes a theory of justice based on self-interest,
individual freedom, and individual responsibility, and a theory whereby moral obligations
are relegated to the individual’s responsibility not to infringe upon another individual’s
rights to property or wealth. There exists no moral responsibility if some persons lack in
some form of property or wealth. It is solely the responsibility of the individual person to
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appropriate wealth. Any moral obligation to help the poor is non-existent. An individual
can help the poor if he or she so desires, but he or she is not obligated in any way.
In a globalizing world faced with global disparity, a theory of entitlement will
only perpetuate the gap between the wealthiest and the poorest of the world.

Peter Singer
The next framework is the theory of justice advanced by Peter Singer. Unlike
Nozick, Singer does make the case for helping others on moral grounds. Singer develops
his theory in his essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” by challenging certain
assumptions within contemporary moral theory.
Singer first raises the question of distance. He points out that in society there
exists the assumption that an individual’s moral obligations lessens the further away the
individual is in relationship to another individual. I am morally obligated to help the
needy, but that help is relative to my nearness to that person. In other words, as the
argument goes, I am more morally obligated to attend to the needs of my own child than
to the child that lives in another country. However, as Singer points out, the logic of
distance cannot be argued due to the changing nature of communication and
transportation.
After addressing the distance argument, Singer makes the claim that it is
universally reasonable to derive a duty of non-interference, that is, that an individual has
a moral duty not to harm another individual. From this rather reasonable claim, Singer
deduces that this moral duty can be extended to assisting another individual if that
individual’s life is in jeopardy. Therefore, for Singer, individuals ought to do what they
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can do to prevent any bad from happening to others without sacrificing anything that is
“morally significant.” 15 This is the well-known “Child-in-the-Pond” case. Individuals
“ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving
more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one’s dependents.” 16
Singer also challenges the assumptions made in the traditional argument of
distinguishing duty from charity. He points out that “because giving money is regarded
as an act of charity, it is not thought that there is anything wrong with not giving. The
charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned.” 17
For Singer, the person living an affluent life is not being charitable by giving food or
money to a starving person. Rather, it is the affluent person’s duty to give to those in
need. Furthermore, as a duty, the affluent person ought to give as much as possible
without falling into the same impoverished state. If the affluent person does not give to
the extent that he or she can, then that would constitute an injustice.
Singer’s theory of justice clearly moves beyond Nozick’s notion of justice.
However, the moral obligation to help the poor is still found with the individual person’s
response to those in need. In other words, this theory may encourage individuals and
nations to give aid to the poor, but the reasons for the perpetuation of global disparity are
never addressed. This framework does not inquire into the causes of poverty nor the

15

Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring
1972), 235.
16

Ibid, 234.

17

Ibid, 235.
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possible correlation between poverty and the structure of society, but remains at the level
of response by the individual person.
Martha Nussbaum
A transitional explanatory framework that can be employed to address the
problem of global disparity is the “capabilities approach” developed by Martha
Nussbaum. Nussbaum is critical of theories of justice that address poverty by way of
material resources. Furthermore, she is critical of economic-utilitarian approaches to the
issue of poverty that make generalized statements about impoverished nations and
people. These approaches are deficient, according to Nussbaum, because they overlook
distinct qualities of each individual person. Instead of understanding poverty as a lack of
things, Nussbaum advocates a more integral way of looking at poverty. Rather than
asking what the poor need in terms of material resources, Nussbaum reformulates the
question in terms of what a person is capable of doing and becoming.
In order to arrive at the question of human capability, Nussbaum, with the help of
the economist Amartya Sen, developed a formal anthropology, constituted by certain
human qualities that, she believes, transcend particular cultural, religious, and national
biases. These qualities come from an intuitive notion of the natural dignity of the human
being. Though they are formal, she argues that these qualities “are set in the context of a
type of political liberalism that makes them specifically political goals and presents them
in a manner free of any specific metaphysical grounding.” 18 These formal human
qualities are: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought;
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emotions; practical reason; affiliation; concern for and be in relation with other species;
play; and control over the environment.
Ultimately, the capabilities approach aims at getting individual persons, and
groups of people, to reach their capability “threshold.” Though there is a social element
in this theoretical framework to justice, it does not probe into the possibility that certain
social systems and structures could be unjust.

Jeffrey Sachs
The next explanatory framework of a theory of justice moves beyond the
individual as focal point for moral responsibility, to the responsibility of social structures.
Jeffrey Sachs, in his work The End of Poverty, places the moral responsibility to address
dire poverty upon the structures of national and global governing bodies.
Sachs’ theory is distinct from the others in that he seeks to uncover the causes of
extreme poverty, and finds these causes in structures and systems of society. He argues
that impoverished countries are stuck in a “poverty trap,” whereby factors beyond the
person’s ability to choose, play a decisive role. 19
As a possible solution to disparity, Sachs argues for a progressive economic
development of impoverished nations and regions, stimulated by help from wealthy
nations. Rather than advocating for traditional aid-relief that was prevalent two decades
ago, Sachs wants wealthy governments to focus on structural investments in poor
countries (e.g., investments in energy, transportation, communication).
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He argues that wealthy countries could provide the necessary help that the poorest
nations need. However, these wealthy countries have only allocated a portion of what
they actually have promised and could offer in order to help eradiate poverty. 20 For
development to work in impoverished countries, wealthy countries need to substantially
help poor countries make practical investments in their own countries, not just say that
they have helped or will help. This will provide the poorer nations the ability to break
from the poverty trap, and move towards economic development.
Sachs’ theory clearly breaks from the previous frameworks and reformulates the
issue. By arguing for the responsibility to be placed on structural entities, Sachs moves
his theory closer to a solution to a global problem. However, his theory remains at the
level of practical self-interest. He argues that for reasons of security it should be in the
interest of wealthy nations to help the poorest nations. According to Sachs, the major
cause of social instability and global terrorism is extreme poverty and inequality.
Therefore, a more economically stable world creates a more safe and secure world.

Thomas Pogge
The next framework, advanced by Thomas Pogge, continues the attempt to move
beyond individual moral theories towards a theory of justice that focuses on the structural
and systemic causes of, and solutions for, global disparity. He does this by first
addressing the various reasons for its perpetuation. With the reasons clearly presented,
he then makes the argument that what is needed is a theory of justice that promotes
structural and systemic change within society.
20
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One cause of the persistence of poverty, according to Pogge, is the form in which
help has traditionally been given. Pogge acknowledges the fact that the citizens of
wealthy nations tend to help out those who are impoverished. These individuals may
even recognize the moral obligation inherent in helping those in need. However, the help
that is promoted and carried out comes in the form of donations, aid, and redistribution.
Few question the reasons for the perpetuation of poverty.
Another cause of poverty’s perpetuation is that within wealthy nations there
persists an assumed belief in the reasoning why poor people are in that economic state.
He calls this belief the “Purely Domestic Poverty Thesis.” 21 This theory claims that the
reason for the existence of abject poverty in countries is due to internal causes (e.g.,
corrupt governments and the lack of entrepreneurial initiatives by the local people). This
theory is attractive to many, according to Pogge, because it offers logical explanations for
poverty, as well as practical solutions. However, this theory is problematic and leads to a
perpetuation of extreme poverty. One specific problem that Pogge points out is that this
theory never asks whether or not wealthy countries could be a part of the cause of dire
poverty.
A third cause for the perpetuation of poverty is the various frameworks that have
been promoted to address poverty. Pogge specifically sees the theories that are based on
positive moral duties, such as the theories offered by John Rawls, Peter Singer, and Peter
Unger, as lacking. Instead of arguing on the basis of positive moral duties, he approaches
the problem by way of negative moral obligations. Like Nozick, Pogge argues that
21
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wealthy countries do not have a moral obligation to help out those in need. However,
wealthy countries do have a moral obligation not to harm others, especially those in need.
This negative moral obligation is weightier than positive moral duties, and should be the
criterion for addressing the problem of extreme poverty. What is unique about Pogge’s
understanding of the principle of negative duties is that it can be applied to individuals as
well as institutions and social systems. Taking this negative moral obligation into
consideration, and applying it structurally, wealthy countries have a moral obligation not
to harm the poorest countries. This translates, for Pogge, into the notion that wealthy and
powerful countries have a moral obligation to help out the poorer countries of the world
because these wealthy countries have violated the negative duty to not harm others by
their political and economic policies.
After giving what he sees as the reasons for the continuation of extreme poverty,
Pogge applies the principle of negative moral obligation. He sees the current global
structural order as being the key contributor to the persistence of extreme poverty in the
world (e.g., the rules set by the World Trade Organization). Applying the negative moral
theory to this situation of the global order means that wealthy countries are obligated “not
to support and not to pocket gains from an unfair institutional order that foreseeably
contributes to severe deprivations.” 22 These affluent countries must challenge the global
economic and political policies of wealthy countries that contribute to global disparity
and suffering (e.g., unfair trade policies with poorer countries). Instead of providing
economic aid or redistribution as in the resourcist model of justice, or addressing the
natural disadvantages of individuals as in the “capabilities approach,” what needs to be
22
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done is a critique and reorganization of the present global order (e.g., creating more just
and fair rules for trade and exchange, levying a tax on natural resources in wealthy
countries where the proceeds go to the poorest countries).
Of the previous theorists, Pogge’s theory of justice presses moral responsibility
beyond individual obligation to structural and social responsibility and change. In a
globalizing world, this framework emerges as the more suitable framework for the
current situation.

David Schweickart
The last framework for a theory of justice is the theory put forth by David
Schweickart. Similar to Pogge, Schweickart argues for greater accountability and
responsibility on the part of social systems and institutions. However, Schweickart is
critical of Pogge for not delving further into the question of the cause of global poverty. 23
Though Pogge brings up important questions of the fairness of the interaction between
wealthy countries and poor countries, he does not, according to Schweickart, see the real
fundamental cause of poverty. For him, the fundamental cause of, and perpetuating force
behind, global disparity is laissez-faire capitalism. His post-script remark in his book
After Capitalism illustrates his sentiments clearly: “the events of September 11
demonstrate how desperately the world needs a progressive alternative to the ideology of
global capitalism.” 24
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In Chapter 4 of After Capitalism, Schweickart claims that capitalism is at core
unjust and compromises democratic ideals. In his critique of capitalism, he isolates six
particular problems with capitalism that he sees as sustaining an economic system that is
unjust. He argues that capitalism creates inequality, unemployment, overwork, poverty, a
polyarchy, and environmental degradation. As capitalism becomes the dominant
economic system in the world, these six problematic aspects of capitalism are extending
beyond particular nations to the global community.
In response to capitalism as the root cause of the increasing global disparity,
Schweickart proposes an alternative economic theory which he calls “Economic
Democracy.” Economic Democracy, according to Schweickart, is a market based
economy. Like capitalism, competitive markets are preserved. However, with Economic
Democracy, democratic ideals are brought to the workplace, and social control of
investment is advanced.
Prior to this scenario materializing, however, Schweickart argues that reform
needs to occur in the economic relationships between wealthy countries and poor
countries (e.g., fair trade). This reform would give poor countries “genuine autonomy
and freedom from exploitation (i.e., debt relief), control over locally based foreign
enterprises, and higher prices for raw materials and other products exported to rich
countries.” 25
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The Response from Catholic Theology
Voices within the Roman Catholic Church have also weighed in on the ever
complex debate over the meaning, nature, and effects of globalization, and on the
problem of global disparity. 26
In more contemporary times, the Church has responded to globalization and
global disparity via its social teachings. With Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum
(1891), the Church began to systematically respond to the social problems of economic
injustice and poverty due in part to the industrial revolution, the labor movement, and the
problems found in capitalism and socialism. 27 This initial response by Pope Leo led to
further papal encyclicals on poverty and social justice, and to various bishops’
documents. 28
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The Church has also responded to the social problems of poverty and injustice via
the multitude of political, liberation and popular theologies that took root within the
Church in the 1960s. Political and liberation theologies emerged not only as a critique of
neo-scholastic theology, but more importantly saw the victims of society as the locus for
theological reflection.
Out of third world liberation theologies, theologies of popular religiosity
developed as a response to the loss of local cultures due to colonization and
Europeanization. These theologies challenged the Westernization of religious practices
and traditions that had been nearly eliminated by European Catholicism and that had been
closely wed to the power structures that kept the poor and powerless at a marginal level.
These developments in Catholic theology can now be utilized to address the
problem of global poverty and disparity. Yet, these positive trends need to be further
developed beyond their localized vision and move towards a global outlook. However,
further development of these trends within the Church requires more reflection on the
world and the human person in the world.

Why Theological Anthropology?
After having traversed the contours of the contemporary situation and problem,
and, after mapping out the various explanatory frameworks and moral/ethical responses,
the question can be raised, what can a theological anthropology contribute to the debate?
Can a theological, and more particular Christian, anthropology offer anything different
than what has already been done?

23
A globalizing world can benefit humanity greatly, but a globalizing world can
also produce much destruction. As peoples become more interconnected and
interdependent, and as new social institutions and systems develop, the problem of
whether or not this new structuring of the world is going to facilitate the recognition of
the dignity of all humans, and whether or not this new structuring will create more
equality and solidarity or less equality and solidarity is significant. Therefore, raising the
question whether a Christian anthropology can substantially contribute anything to a
solution to the problem is essential. This question will have to be addressed in two parts.
First of all, why theology? Second of all, why address the problem through an
exploration into human existence?
Prior to addressing this two-part question, it is important to note the obvious fact
that many theorists see theology as contributing very little to the debate. This deepseated drive to exclude religion from civic debate has its roots in the Enlightenment and
post-Enlightenment Europe, and this trend continues today. The well-known theorist on
social justice, John Rawls, made the claim that it is more productive in any debate on
justice to detach the religious response from the debate and argue on the basis of
reason. 29
For Rawls, the plurality of religious views, as found in modern liberal cultures
such as the United States, creates conflicting views on what is moral and just, and thus
religious and theological reflection should be left out of public discourse on justice. This
position rests on the argument that the most valuable and adequate understanding of
29
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justice can best be attained by way of autonomous reason divorced from any other
epistemological modes (e.g., art and narrative). 30
Richard Falk, however, argues that secular voices and responses have reached a
limit and that the divide between politics and religion must end. He claims that “[t]he
best of secular thinking falls short of providing either a plausible path to travel in pursuit
of humane global governance or a sufficiently inspiring vision of its elements to mobilize
a popular grass roots movement for drastic global reform.” 31 According to Falk,
religions can contribute positively to the global problem because “(1) They take suffering
seriously, and respond to real people who suffer; (2) They tap into a civilizational
resonance, striking deep roots in popular culture; (3) They anchor an ethos of solidarity;
(4) They provide normative horizons based on a transcendent ethic; (5) They rely, in
overcoming pessimism, on the transformative power of faith; (6) They foster a sense of
limits (and human fallibility); (7) They provide rooted identities in a runaway world; and
(8) They believe in both justice and the need for reconciliation.” 32
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Why Theology? 33
I fundamentally agree with Falk in his assessment of the relevance of religions in
public discourse regarding questions of social justice. What can Catholic theology
contribute to the debate and problem? Catholic theology is a needed voice because of
seven constitutive aspects characteristic to Catholic theology: its long tradition and
history, its authoritative voice, its reflection on suffering and its preferential option for
the victim of society; its prophetic nature, its reflection on sin, its imaginative and
creative approach to reality, and its radical vision of human existence.
The first reason Catholic theology can offer a valuable perspective on the debate
and problem is because of its long history and tradition. The long and deep history of
Christian theological reflection, especially found within the Catholic tradition, on human
life and the human condition grants it a special place in the history of ideas. It has not
only reflected on perennial individual and social questions, it has been the precursor to
many contemporary Western ideas on the person and society. 34
The second reason is that Catholic theology offers an authoritative voice. Though
some argue that religious thinking perpetuates societal and global problems, rather than
offering valuable responses and solutions (e.g., Richard Dawkins and Christopher
Hitchens), Catholic theology, since it is located within a global institution, still maintains
33
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an authoritative role for a substantial amount of people in the world (i.e., at least a
substantial portion of the Catholic Church’s one billion members). It is not only
authoritative in the sense of commanding respect due to its religious nature, and offering
some ultimate meaning to a person’s life, but it is also an authoritative voice in the way
that rigorous academic disciplines that authentically search for responses to problems
raised by persons and society constitute an authoritative element.
Third, the Church offers a concrete reflection on suffering, and it is now
committed to taking the side of the victim of society. The Church’s reflection on
suffering takes the crucifixion of Christ as its primary and ultimate model. Though
Catholic reflection on suffering has at times focused too narrowly on individual
atonement for the sins of the world, political and liberation theologies have challenged
the individualistic understanding of suffering and extended the vision of suffering to the
social sphere of human being.
The fourth reason why Catholic theology is pertinent to the problem is that it is a
prophetic discipline. It is prophetic in two ways. First, Catholic theology can challenge
assumed ideological worldviews of cultures and peoples. It is obvious that ideologies are
intimately connected to, and influence, political policies, and economic and social
systems and structures. Many of these ideologies go unrecognized or unchallenged. As a
prophetic exercise, theological reflection can challenge the assumptions, the logic, and
raison d’être of these ideologies.
Secondly, theology offers a prophetic voice to those in society who go unheard. It
can, and often does, speak on behalf of the marginalized, and the “non-persons” of
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society. Apart from political and liberation theologies, the “official” theology of the
Magisterium claims to be at the defense of marginalized and oppressed peoples.
A fifth reason why Catholic theology is a valuable resource in addressing global
disparity is its reflection on the concept of sin. Unlike secular theories of justice,
Catholic theology can explicitly and reasonably speak about sin and the role it plays in
the current global problem. Within contemporary secular theories of justice, the nature
and role of sin in the world is either ignored outright or subsumed into categories of civic
law. Even if the notion of sin is permitted to enter into the conversation by secular
theories of justice, it is likely understood strictly as an individual offense against God
rather than understood in historical and social categories as presented in the theologies of
liberation.
The sixth reason is that theological reflection is a creative and transformative act.
Theology, by its nature, offers a transformative way of envisioning the world. 35
Theology is in fact a disciplined process of creative (i.e., poietic) 36 reflection on, and
interpretation of, the Christian scriptures and history, and of a contemporary situation in
hope of personal, social, and global transformation. 37 This form of interpretation invokes
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creative thought and imagination about how the world and human existence could be. It
can be argued that many of the atrocities found within human history could have been
avoided with the creative imagination that theological reflection evokes. A lack of
poietic imagination, and resigning a vision of the world to an instrumental realism, could
in fact lead to the rationalization and justification of atrocities. 38
Finally, theology, because it reflects on the transcendent, sees the human person
in terms of the ‘more,’ and because of this, speaks of the possibility of God acting in the
world (i.e., an articulation of a theory of grace and a pneumatology). Theological
reflection, by its very nature, challenges any reductionistic theory of the human person.
Often times, reductionistic views of human being lead to some form of social Darwinism.
In addition, many contemporary “scientific” theories of human existence either struggle
to reconcile the theoretical predicament of either understanding the person as selfdefining and determining or understanding the person as defined or determined by
society, or presenting an either/or dichotomy. In other words, there is a danger in the
reduction of the human person to being either an individual who serves the demands of
the person’s own interests or an individual who is born into a society of other persons,
and influenced by social customs and norms. However, theological reflection on human
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existence can offer something more to this problem as it acknowledges the
characteristically personal, and thus divine, nature of human existence, and articulates a
theory of the possibility of God’s self-communication to this creature through the life and
history of a community.

Why Theological Anthropology?
If theology can be an adequate resource in addressing global disparity, the
question remains, why address this problem by way of an exploration into human
existence? Perhaps a reformulation of the current social theory and teachings of the
Catholic Church would be a better approach to the problem. 39 Perhaps Catholic theology
can move towards greater collaboration with the construction of a global ethics (e.g.,
Hans Küng’s work on the “Declaration of the Religions for a Global Ethic”) which would
better suit the current problem.
It could also be argued that an exploration into human existence as a potential
response may only lead to the construction of an ontological anthropology of a
disengaged self, which would then perpetuate an individualistic framework that
undervalues or ignores any call to challenge global structures and systems in the pursuit
of global justice. This is a very important point that should be visited often when
articulating a theory of human existence, but it should not deter the theologian from
pursuing a re-articulation of Christian anthropology.
An examination into contemporary Catholic Social Teaching and the construction
of a global ethics are definitely necessary pursuits in today’s globalizing world.
39
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However, social theories oftentimes assume that a social theory can stand alone in its
investigation into questions of human relationships, human structures, and human power
without a foundational investigation into the human condition. Without acknowledging
that there is an implied anthropology in any ethics or social teaching, a reinterpretation
may be purely superficial. Catholic Social Teaching in particular must acknowledge the
fact that God’s Word became incarnate in human history as foundational to any Christian
teaching, and that God’s Word continues to take root in human existence and corresponds
to human values and human hope.
Furthermore, concern that an anthropological approach to the current problem
may lead to further individualistic ideologies that already exist and that are exacerbating
the current problem is also important. A dialectical tension between anthropological (i.e.,
a philosophical exploration into the human person) and social inquiries must always be
maintained if any form of theoretical “gnosticism” or ghettoization is to be avoided. This
dialectical tension between an understanding of the human person as embedded in history
and interlocked in social relations is essential to Catholic theological anthropology in
particular with its attempt to be empirically sound (i.e., that humans are historically
constituted, social creatures), biblically authentic (e.g., Gen. 2:18), and careful to avoid
any anthropologies that represent an ontologically disengaged, and individually
constituted spiritual or metaphysical self or social theories that disregard the individual
person. Therefore, any inquiry into the human person from the perspective of a Christian
anthropology should necessarily include the historical, social, and interrelational spheres
of human existence. In other words, a viable Christian anthropology recognizes an
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intrinsic connection between the individual person, his or her historicity, and a
community. 40

Concluding Remarks
In recent years, there have been many grass-roots initiatives to address the
economic, political, and social crises that are present in poor countries. I argue that a real
grass-roots initiative would begin with a radical (i.e., radix, root) analysis of the root of
society (viz., human existence). Among the plurality of approaches to an understanding
of human existence, I maintain that a theological anthropology can offer a creative and
productive approach to the problem. More specifically, I believe that a Christian
anthropology articulated from within the Catholic theological tradition can be beneficial.
However, the current theology of human existence within Catholic theology needs to be
re-examined and re-articulated.
What is first needed within theological anthropology is a conversation with the
social sciences and the appropriation of the social sciences’ methods of analysis. Though
many Catholic theologians are engaged in a critical dialogue with the social sciences and
are using methods from the social sciences, there is still much unfamiliarity among many
Catholic theologians with the social sciences and how they might be fruitfully employed
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in theology. This move towards a real and serious in-depth dialogue with the social
sciences will be an essential step in addressing the crisis that humanity faces.
Karl Rahner and José Ignacio González Faus are two Catholic theologians who
have taken up the challenge to engage in conversation with the social sciences. However,
it will be shown that their social scientific methods are quite different. The following
chapter will offer a brief biographical sketch of both theologians. This sketch will
highlight the differences and similarities in their theological projects due to their
particular context and background, and the good reasons for choosing these two will be
addressed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER TWO
SITUATING THE THEOLOGIANS
Karl Rahner, in a 1979 interview with Leo J. O’Donovan, stated, “I am, if you
want to put it that way, like every other human being, the product of my environment, but
really more the product of a diverse, a perhaps anonymous and symmetrical environment
that worked on me from different sides.” 1 These words by Karl Rahner speak of the
importance of situating any influential thinker in their proper life-context.
The aim of this present chapter is to outline the contexts out of which Karl Rahner
and José Ignacio González Faus developed their theological projects. It will attempt to
situate their thought on the human condition within a larger theological history, and more
particularly it will illustrate how their anthropologies were influenced by their particular
life-situation. 2 This contextualization will serve as the background for a dialogue
between these two theologians on the topic of their theological anthropologies, and the
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necessary to devote a substantial amount of time in introducing his life and his philosophical and
theological resources. At the end of this chapter, I have included a brief life chronology of both Rahner and
González Faus.
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adequacy of their anthropologies in light of the contemporary situation of globalization
and the growing global disparity.

The Challenge of Modernity and the Response from the Catholic Church
To grasp the theological projects of these two Jesuit theologians, it is important to
have some understanding of the intellectual challenges that the Catholic Church and
Catholic theology faced in Europe during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These
challenges arose out of the intellectual revolutions spanning from the 17th to the 18th
centuries; a time that is often called modernity. One particular challenge that the Church
faced came from the thought of Immanuel Kant with its epistemological turn to the self,
and its challenge to classical metaphysics. 3
The Catholic hierarchy, and many Catholic theologians, responded to the
emerging ideas of modernity in varying ways. On the one hand, the Church hierarchy
viewed modernity with suspicion, and developed a manualistic form of theology in an
attempt to counter the rationalism of modernity and to justify many of the Church’s
teachings. On the other hand, some theologians engaged in modernity constructively,
and found creative ways to address the questions and issues raised by modernity.

3
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Immanuel Kant
Kant’s critique of classical metaphysics, and more particularly the critique of
theoretical and rational theology, began by challenging the foundation of classical
metaphysics. By shifting the starting point of philosophical inquiry from ontology to
epistemology, Kant’s thought not only shook the foundation of Western philosophy, but
it shook the philosophical underpinning of the Catholic Church’s scholastic theology.
Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy began with his work Critique of
Pure Reason. This ground-shattering work was a response to David Hume’s
epistemological skepticism. Hume forced Kant to awaken from his philosophical
slumber, and his skepticism pushed Kant to reformulate the problem of human cognition.
Instead of resigning to a Humean skepticism, Kant found the key to the
philosophical impasse between Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism by shifting
the question from the objectivity of the being of things to the subjectivity of the thinking
person. Rather than asking the question how the human person can arrive at objective
knowledge about the external world, the question for Kant became how the subjective
person perceives and judges the world. In other words, the operative question was, what
can the human subject know about the world, and by what means does this subject come
to know this world?
This epistemological shift put the observer in motion with regard to human
knowing. Kant recognized that the appearance of the external world depends, in some
measure, upon the position and perception of the human subject. According to Kant, the
person can only know the world “as it appears” (i.e., the phenomena), not “as it is in
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itself” (i.e., the noumena). The person comes to know this world through a cognitive
process of intuition, understanding, and reason. The ‘transcendental’ structure of the
active mind perceives sense data of the phenomenal world, and actively conceptualizes
and categorizes the data.
This inquiry into the human subject led Kant to probe the very conditions for the
possibility of any human knowing. This became the basis for his transcendental critique
of classical epistemology and metaphysics, and the construction of his transcendental
idealism. The radical nature of this transcendental critique was not just that it placed the
human subject at the center of reality, but that it placed constraints on all human
knowing. The notion that human cognition is limited challenged the classical belief that
the human intellect can have some knowledge of the ontology of beings. Thus, for Kant,
any questions probing into the nature of things beyond human existence (e.g., God, sin,
revelation) is beyond the powers of reason, and therefore impossible to be known and
spoken of.
With this challenge in place, Catholic philosophy and theology needed to
respond. 4

The Response from the Catholic Church
The Church’s response to the rise of modernity and the Kantian critique of
metaphysics was anything but uniform. The responses varied depending upon the
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country, diocese, religious order, bishop, cleric, and theologian. The responses also
differed depending on the time period. 5 By the 19th century, the responses by the Church
created the context for the theologies of Rahner and González Faus.
One response that was relatively uniform was that of the Vatican. 6 The responses
by the Vatican came in the form of outright resistance to the ideals of modernity, as well
as a renewed interest in reviving the intellectual integrity of Catholic theology by
returning to earlier theological sources. Many of the popes of the 19th century and early
20th century formulated official documents as a response to the spread of the modern
spirit. Three of the most dominant responses came from Pius IX, Leo XIII, and Pius X.
The first official Vatican response came in 1864 when Pius IX introduced the
Syllabus of Errors within his encyclical Quanta Cura. This document condemned much
of the philosophical ideals of modernity. It was concerned specifically with three themes:
Pantheism and naturalism, “the various forms of rationalism that tended to identify the
act of faith with the processes of human reason,” and “the fruits of political liberalism as
they affected the civic prerogatives of the Church.” 7
The second official response was Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879).
This encyclical offered a renewed look at scholastic theology, especially the thought of
Thomas Aquinas. It presented the Church with an alternative method to engage the
5
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culture of the time rather than employing the philosophies of modernity to engage the
culture. This encyclical mandated a renewal in Thomistic philosophy and theology, and
mandated the formation of seminarians, ecclesial officials, and Catholic philosophers and
theologians in the thought of Thomas.
The third official response came from actions by Pius X. In 1907, Pius X
condemned certain ideas associated with modernity with the decree Lamentabili and the
encyclical Pascendi Dominici gregis insofar as he saw them present in the Church itself.
In 1910, with another stab at modernity, he introduced an oath against Modernism by
which all theology teachers and clergy had to swear. This oath was an effort to quell the
spread of what Pius saw as a mounting heresy within the clerical ranks.
Together with these papal efforts to tame modernity, ultramontanism was another
response to modernity that was closely tied to the official responses by the Vatican. It
became the dominant force within European Catholicism during the latter half of the 19th
century. The rise in ultramontane piety, and the strict adherence to classical scholastic
theology, was due in part to the uncertainty arising from new political movements and
new ideologies. Ultramontanism had a great influence on mapping out the constitution
Pastor Aeternus at Vatican I.
These attempts by the Vatican, and the growing ultramontane trends, seemed to
seal the fate of any dialogue between Catholic thought and modernity. 8
8
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Neo-Thomism
The revival of scholastic theology, initiated by Leo XIII, was a theological
response in the Church’s attempt to address the intellectual challenge of modernity. The
recovery of Aquinas’ thought, and the research done on his historical context, was meant
to restore the integrity of Catholic theology and philosophy amidst a milieu of
increasingly secular philosophies. As James C. Livingston points out
The Thomists sought to show that the philosophia perennis, as classically
formulated by Thomas Aquinas, alone can meet the crisis of modern
thought which is the result of subjectivism and relativism. At the same
time, these Neo-Scholastics contend that Thomas Aquinas is supple and
resilient enough to incorporate those genuine truths which modern
philosophers have brought to light but have either exaggerated or have
failed to integrate into a larger and more adequate conceptual scheme. 9
This neo-Thomism that Catholic theology generated was not a monolithic system
of thought, but rather consisted of varying interpretations of Aquinas. 10 Within this
broad neo-Thomistic movement, three Jesuits, Pierre Rousselot (1878-1915), Joseph
Maréchal (1878-1944), and Erich Przywara (1889-1972), are particularly noteworthy.
These three theologians were influential in the changing atmosphere within Catholic
theological circles of the early 20th century, and eventually influenced the thought of Karl
Rahner, and, via Rahner, José Ignacio González Faus.
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The chief contribution of Pierre Rousselot was his reintroduction into Catholic
theology of the medieval themes of the mystical and experiential. He claimed that these
themes had been lost with the neo-Scholastic theological trends of his time, and that they
should be re-appropriated back into theology. 11
Along with the re-appropriation of these themes, Livingston points out that the
novelty of his thought came by way of three endeavors. He attempted to argue for the
credibility of the subjective experience of faith, for the unity between human reason and
the content of faith, and for the significance of love and human knowing. 12 These
endeavors are also clearly discernable in the thought of Rahner and González Faus.
In the neo-Thomism of Joseph Maréchal, there is an attempt to respond to Kant’s
epistemological constraints to human knowing, and Kant’s critique of special
metaphysics and rational theology through a reinterpretation of the epistemology of
Aquinas, and employing the thought of Maurice Blondel.
According to Francis Schüssler-Fiorenza, Maréchal argued that Kant’s critique of
metaphysics fell short in its probing for the very condition for possibility of human
knowledge because of an epistemological oversight with regard to human judgment, and
human judgment’s ontological characteristic in which it “anticipates the unconditional
reality of God.”13 Maréchal saw, in Kant’s epistemology, the beginnings of a dualism of
phenomenal and noumenal spheres of being. For Maréchal, this dualism could possibly
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result in an understanding of being that is, in essence, contradictory. Being, if it is to be
absolute being, cannot comprise of duality.
To respond to this potential dualism in Kant, Maréchal argued that in Aquinas’
epistemological arguments, human knowledge of the phenomenal world presupposes a
grounding structure in being. The human intellect actively makes judgments about the
world. In this activity of judgment, the human intellect actively seeks for statements of
truth, and it is this pursuit of truth that presupposes a foundation in truth and being. This
Marechalian Thomism will ultimately be the inspiration for the young Karl Rahner to
write Spirit in the World.
The last notable neo-Thomist was Erich Przywara. His interpretation of Aquinas
offers a different response to modernity’s challenge to metaphysics and the question of
God. One important influence that Przywara had on the neo-Thomism of his time was
his emphasis upon the role of mystery in theology, and highlights the notion of the
incomprehensibility of God in Aquinas’ thought.
A second important influence of Przywara’s theology was his distinct way of
synthesizing a theory of analogy and a theory of the dialectic when speaking of God. It is
in his most recognized work, Analogia Entis, where he uses this synthesis of an
analogical approach and a dialectical approach in order to address the relationship of God
and creation. For Przywara, this method is essential in establishing a reasonable “bridge
between the human and the divine.” 14
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In addition, the dialectical nature of Przywara’s theology allowed him to enter
into conversation with the thought of Augustine, Aquinas, John Henry Newman, and
many of the German phenomenologists. 15 As O’Meara states, “One characteristic of his
intellectual life is the arrangement of thinkers into types and directions, a search for the
relationships of philosophers and theologians over two thousand years to illuminate
contemporary directions in the life of faith and intellect.” 16
Along with seeing theological statements as analogical ones, and using dialectic
as a theological method, Przywara was able to bring Ignatius Loyola into conversation
with the great thinkers of Western tradition. This effort by Przywara influenced many
Jesuit thinkers who followed him, especially Rahner.
Each of these theologians responded to the challenge set forth by Kant, and to the
call of the retrieval of Aquinas by formulating a critical conversation and dialogue with
Aquinas, Kant, and contemporary problems and questions. They did not, however,
remain content to see Thomas as the panacea for contemporary problems. Instead, they
offered constructive critiques of neo-Thomism. These critiques laid the groundwork for
Rahner’s transcendental Thomism.

Karl Rahner: Context and Theological Foundations
The spirit of critical and creative dialogue with a contemporary situation (viz.,
modernity) did not end with the theologies of Rousselot, Maréchal, and Przywara. Karl
Rahner became one of the most prominent of the next generation of theologians to face a
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contemporary situation in a way that was not reactionary. His theological program points
to the fact that he highly valued the idea that theology and the theologian must engage in,
and be relevant to, any contemporary situation. This idea was one of the many
contributions he made to post-Vatican II Catholic theology. 17
To better understand how Rahner engaged in his own contemporary situation, and
constructed his own theological project, it is important to gain some insight into his
German Catholic context. His own theological project can be situated in a larger German
context of creative dialogue between Catholic theology and the emergence of modernity
in Germany.
German Context: The Church and Modernity (19th Century)
The German Church of the 19th century was not hesitant to engage in a dialogue
with modernity. It at times saw the project of modernity as an amiable partner while at
other times a hostile enemy.
Thomas O’Meara illustrates the complexity of the German Church’s response to
modernity in the 19th century in his work Church and Culture: German Catholic
Theology, 1860-1914. His book particularly addresses the role that German Catholic
theology played during this time of uncertainty. He divides the theology of this period of
German history between the “Old Theology” of Catholic Romantic Idealism (dominating
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the first half of the 19th century), and the “New Theology” of neo-Scholasticism
(dominating the latter half of the 19th century).
O’Meara claims that by the middle of the 19th century the Church’s shift in
approach, from open dialogue with modernity to an embattled stance, came with the
growing conservatism within the Church hierarchy (viz., the Vatican), and changes in
German politics and society. He points out that by mid-century German Catholicism
witnessed “conflicts over modern theology and traditional piety, a Vatican on the
offensive, a breakdown in various principalities of the union between throne and altar, an
alienation of liberals from religion and of Protestants and Catholics from each other.” 18
The Church’s amicable relationship with modernity as a whole began to dissolve as both
the modern state and the Church hierarchy became more suspicious and cautious of one
another. 19
The growing conservativism in Catholic theology and church life became a wedge
driven between the German Catholics and the new modern Germany. This development
became most clear with Pius IX’s Syllabus of Errors and the constitution Pastor Aeternus
at Vatican I.
The worst of the German Church’s fears arose between 1874 and 1878 with
chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s Kulturkampf. This cultural struggle, initiated by liberal
officials in Bismarck’s government, was an attempt to minimize the influence of the
Church in Germany. This move by Bismarck and his government ultimately backfired.
18
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With the growing conservativism and Ultramontanism within the Catholic Church at this
time, Bismarck’s move gave fuel to an emerging reactionary Church within his new
Germany.
This mounting division between the Church and the new Germany left many
Catholic theologians uncertain of their roles in church and society. As O’Meara points
out, “While creative theologians were in danger of being rejected by Rome for any
thinking which was not blandly neoscholastic, they were accused by the state as being
un-German.” 20 This feeling of uncertainty did not, however, quell the creative thought of
theologians such as Herman Schell and Carl Braig.
By the latter half of the 19th century, two theological trends emerged within the
Catholic Church in Germany. One trend was a romantic idealism based on
transcendental philosophies and represented by the universities of Tübingen, Munich, and
Freiburg. The other was the neo-Scholasticism represented by the universities of
Münster and Mainz.
By 1900, a new German Catholicism began to form. With mounting pressure
from the Vatican, and economic and political growth of the new Germany, “Catholic
dialogue with modernity shifted away from the speculative toward the practical, toward
the social and the political.” 21 A “Reform Catholicism” emerged, which became the
response to the ghettoization of Catholicism since the Kulturkampf. Reformkatholizismus
was fundamentally a “network of movements espousing engagement with culture,
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advocating presence in society and culture, and modernity’s intent upon reforming the
church.” 22
It was out of this unique context that the seeds for Rahner’s theological program
were sown.

Biographical Sketch: Theological Foundations
Karl Rahner was born into this German milieu on March 5th, 1904 in Freiburg-imBreisgau. As Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines point out, “[h]is family was middle
class and thoroughly Catholic, though not overly pious.” 23 His father worked as a
professor at a local teacher’s college, and his mother cared, and created a positive
Catholic environment, for her husband and their seven children. 24
Karl entered the Society of Jesus in 1922, three years after his older brother Hugo
entered the order. During his first two years within the order, Rahner was immersed in
the Ignatian tradition of the Jesuits by making the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, and
becoming familiar with Ignatian ideals and spirituality. Philip Endean, in his seminal
work Karl Rahner and Ignatian Spirituality, argues that it was at this time that the
foundation for Rahner’s theology was created. He claims that this early familiarity with
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Ignatian ideals and spirituality was more foundational to his theology than the thought of
Maréchal or German phenomenology. 25
Between 1924 and 1927 Rahner studied philosophy at Feldkirch and
Berchmanskolleg in Pullach near Munich. Most of his studies at this time focused on the
officially sanctioned neo-Scholastic philosophy, though he was also introduced to the
thought of Kant and to German idealism. He soon became captivated by a rethinking of
Aquinas through the new philosophical methods that Rousselot and Maréchal developed.
It was at this time that Rahner became specifically interested in Maréchal’s
transcendental methodology.
After philosophy studies, Rahner studied theology at Valkenberg in Holland from
1929-1933. The theological formation that he went through at this time was based on a
late neo-Scholastic method that addressed contemporary problems by way of doctrinal
manuals. For Rahner, as well as many of his contemporaries, this way of doing theology
was unsuitable for the modern world. It did not lend itself to helping Rahner formulate a
response to contemporary problems and questions. Instead, for Rahner, it led to stale
propositions divorced from human life. With this concern in mind, Rahner set out to
rethink theology in a manner more relevant to his contemporary situation.
In 1932 Rahner was ordained to the priesthood, and in 1934 he began doctoral
studies at the University of Freiburg. It was at Freiburg that much of the philosophical
foundations for his later theological program took root. Here the conversation between
Catholic theology, contemporary philosophical currents, and the contemporary situation
that Rahner was looking for began to form.
25
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Influence of German Phenomenology
Though Rahner’s philosophical thought was first and foremost influenced by the
neo-Thomism of Rousselot, Maréchal, and Przywara, the German phenomenological
tradition at the University of Freiburg also contributed, to an extent, to the uniqueness of
Rahner’s thought. One particular thinker in this tradition who stands out the most is
Martin Heidegger. 26
In 1934, two years after his ordination to the priesthood, Rahner began graduate
studies in philosophy at the University of Freiburg. It was during this time that he
attended four of Heidegger’s semester seminar classes in philosophy. While attending
Heidegger’s seminars, Rahner began writing his dissertation with the aim towards
exploring the metaphysics and epistemology of Aquinas in light of questions raised in
contemporary philosophy, particularly those raised by Kant and Heidegger. His
dissertation was ultimately rejected by his director Martin Honecker for his interpretation
of Aquinas through a Marechalian approach, and “for being too inspired by Heidegger.” 27
There is much debate on whether or not Rahner’s philosophical underpinnings
are, in nature, Heideggerian. What is undisputable is that Rahner, by attending
Heidegger’s seminars, gained a questioning spirit. In an interview, Rahner acknowledges
that it was the early Heidegger of Being and Time (perhaps a Heidegger who was, at this
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time, sympathetic to metaphysics) that influenced him. He states, it was this early
Heidegger
with whom I learned to think a little bit, and for that I am grateful to him.
Insofar as it is philosophical, my theology does not really show the
systematic and thematic influence of Heidegger. What he communicated
was the desire to think, the ability to think…I would say Martin Heidegger
was the only teacher for whom I developed the respect that a disciple has
for a great master. That had little to do with individual questions or
individual formulations of my theology. 28
What Rahner also learned from Heidegger was a hermeneutical framework that
helped him interpret a text and the context of earlier thinkers. In his words, what Rahner
learned from Heidegger was “how to read texts in a new way, to ask what is behind the
text, to see connections between a philosopher’s individual texts and his statements that
wouldn’t immediately strike the ordinary person…” 29 Rahner was now able to
contextualize the text in a way that offered him insight into the world of the writer. This
interpretive move allowed Rahner to speak of the thinker’s existential historicity in
relation to all of reality. This new method of interpretation that Rahner adopted from
Heidegger contributed to Rahner’s own reading of the whole of Christian tradition and
Christian thought.
The early influences of neo-Thomism and German phenomenology are clearly
noticeable in Rahner’s theological program. He did not just reformulate the themes and
methods of these influences in a Rahnerian way. Rahner’s work is truly distinctive.
These influences ultimately gave him the inspiration and a framework to enter into
conversation with his Catholic Christian tradition, contemporary philosophical trends,
28
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and his contemporary context, and allowed him to construct a theology that was
distinctive to his thought. In other words, as much as he learned from his predecessors,
the uniqueness of Rahner lies in the extent to which he pressed these conversations
further in directions that his teachers did not take.
Epistemological Shift: Rahner’s Transcendental Method 30
Like his neo-Thomistic predecessors, Rahner responded to the challenge set forth
by Kant by creating a conversation between Aquinas and Kant through a transcendental
method. It was in Rahner’s seminal work Spirit in the World that this conversation took
place.
With the help of Marechal, Rahner found in Kant a method that could respond to
Kant’s critique of classical metaphysics, and argue for the possibility of metaphysics.
However, unlike Marechalian Thomism, Rahner did not attempt to appeal to “those
philosophical positions which maintain that a metaphysics of transcendence is possible
because of a special innate idea or because of a specific and immediate intuition of a
metaphysical object, be it an eternal truth or an objectively conceived absolute being.” 31
In other words, Rahner did not recreate a Marechalian transcendental theology, which
appeals to a metaphysics that posits some objective concept or knowledge of God, as
though that objective content about God can be understood separate from the questioning
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person. Rather, according to Schüssler-Fiorenza, Rahner went beyond Maréchal’s
critique of Kant, and his defense of metaphysics, by way of the insights of Heidegger. 32
The uniqueness of Rahner’s transcendental method is its anthropological turn.
Rahner’s transcendental method offers “a transcendental understanding of God, who is
not known by man as an object of reality, but as the principle of human knowledge and
reality.” 33 Thus, for Rahner, the ground of all human knowing and reality is God, and the
starting point for any philosophical inquiry about reality, and about God, is the human
subject. It is the human person, as a questioner, that is fundamentally constituted towards
being and thus constituted toward God. In other words, theological inquiry must begin in
human experience, rather than in cognitive propositions. This insight that any knowledge
of the incomprehensible God is grounded on the questioning subject rather than on
human judgment moved Rahner beyond any Marechalian transcendental Thomism.
In this move to the human subject, Rahner was not attempting to do away with
centuries of theological tradition that had contributed to the arguments set forth by neoScholasticism and neo-Thomism. In fact, Rahner believed that the theology of Aquinas
is indispensable for contemporary theology. He saw Aquinas as holding a “unique” role
within theology. 34 For Rahner, the questions and problems that Aquinas addressed were
not unlike those of Rahner’s time. More importantly for Rahner’s own project, he
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claimed that Aquinas’ importance lies in the fact that he “is one of the initiators of the
anthropocentric approach.” 35
This epistemological shift that Rahner undertook, from reified propositions to the
structures of the human person, became the foundation for his transcendental method in
doing theology. It also allowed him to reconnect theological inquiry with ordinary
human experience, and to talk about the reality of God, grace, and sin without falling into
any theological extrincisism.

Changing Contexts and New Challenges
After Vatican II, the various theological trends that built on Rahner’s theology are
testaments to the fact that Rahner had achieved his endeavor to make theology relevant to
the Church’s contemporary context. However, the new context of a drastically changing
world presented Rahner with new challenges.
In the wake of World War II and the Holocaust, a new generation of Catholic
theologians began to question the nature, role, and method of theology. This generation
raised further questions as they witnessed the emergence of new problems in the sociopolitical sphere with the eruption of student protests, and popular revolutions and
movements in Europe and Latin America.
By the late 1960s and into the 1970s, as Rahner’s theology became more widely
accepted, this new generation of theologians began to critique his theology as an
inadequate response to the emerging questions and problems. Though some felt that his
theology went too far beyond Catholic doctrine, and therefore succumbing to the
35
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contemporary situation (e.g., H. U. von Balthasar), others attempted to press his theology
in new directions in order to better respond to the contemporary questions and problems.
From these changing contexts, two particular challenges confronted the thought of
Rahner. The first challenge was the emergence of a pluralism in Roman Catholic
theology. The second challenge was an outgrowth of the first. The political and Latin
American liberation theologies that appeared after Vatican II offered the strongest
challenge to Rahner’s theological program. One particular theologian, Johannes Baptist
Metz, Rahner’s former student and friend, not only helped Rahner emphasize certain
aspects of his theology that remained latent but also offered a corrective to Rahner’s
theology.

Pluralism in Theology
After Vatican II, theologians in Latin America, Africa, and Asia saw the need for
Catholic theology to move away from its Eurocentric tendency. They believed that this
necessary shift would help Catholic theology respond more adequately to the changing
world context. These theologians began to construct theologies that appropriated the
ideas and concepts inherent in their own cultures and traditions. They also saw social
justice as theology’s main issue with which it had to grapple.
At the same time that these non-European theologies began to emerge, many
Catholic theologians in Europe and North America began to dialogue with non-Scholastic
philosophies. For example, some European Catholic circles in the 1950s and into the
1970s began to find relevant philosophical methods in the critical theory of the Frankfurt
School and in Marxist social analysis.
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Rahner saw this growing pluralism within theology with both concern and hope.
In Volume 21 of his Theological Investigations, Rahner addresses this apparent problem
of pluralism in Catholic theology. After mentioning the deficiencies of neo-Scholastic
theology, and what the “new theology” (i.e., the transcendental theologies of Rahner’s
generation) offers, he discusses the current problem of pluralism in Catholic theology.
He characterizes this current state of theological affairs as the “second period” of the new
theology. 36
This second phase of the new theology raises some concerns for Rahner. He
states that in this new phase “everything has become a little pallid” and that “there is a
little less brilliance in this stage.” 37 Also, many priests, bishops and theologians, who
could be contributing to an already established Catholic theological tradition, are instead
leaving behind the scientific discipline of theology altogether in the pursuit of other
academic disciplines.
In the face of these challenges, Rahner attempts to outline a solution to the
problem. First, he articulates what he sees as the task of theology. He argues that
theology “must serve as a science of proclamation of the gospel and must serve the
people of our time.” 38 Furthermore, he states,
Without becoming rationalistic, theology must expound ever anew and for
every question of dogmatic theology that the article of faith in question is
indeed credible and can be lived out in a genuine way; that it truly fits into
36
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the fundamentally simple structure of faith, and that it is part of an
authentic answer to those questions which human beings find in the center
of their existence without the ability to answer them of their own accord. 39
In other words, theology must consist of a dynamic conversation between what the
Church teaches and a contemporary situation, and in that conversation theology must be
able to articulate, in a believable way, an adequate response to the problems and
questions that arise in that contemporary situation.
After establishing the task of theology, Rahner raises the question of how
theology can maintain the unity of Christian faith in light of a theological pluralism.
First, he argues that this theological pluralism is not necessarily something detrimental to
theology. In fact, this phenomenon has always existed in the Church, and the
Magisterium has even at times officially tolerated competing theories. Therefore, any
pluralism within Catholic theology can be seen as a part of the Catholic tradition.
This pluralism, though, does not mean that there is no flagship theology that
guides all the rest. Rahner claims that there is a theology that unifies and guides all of
Catholic theology. He calls this theology “European Theology.” What Rahner means by
this is the “concrete theology of the concrete Roman teaching office.” 40 Though there
may be many theologies in the world, “the fact remains that Europe along with its
theology is the ‘elder daughter’ to most of the other churches in the world and their
theologies.” 41
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Furthermore, Rahner claims that it is likely that this European theology has
contributed to the contemporary problems in the world, and thus has an important role to
play in engaging these problems. Rahner states that
It is beyond question that this modern global civilization with all the
threats it poses to an authentic realization of humanity owes its origin and
its existence to the European mentality and history in which Christianity
has been and continues to be an essential factor…European theology must
ask itself if it has not perhaps contributed to these developments –
culpably or inculpably – by presenting a view of humankind (along with
its ideological distortions) which in truth can find no legitimation and
acceptance in Christianity. 42
One of the aims of theology, then, according to Rahner, is for it to be self-reflective. This
is the goal of political theology. When it comes to political theology, its proper task is
to reflect on the sociopolitical implications of the whole of Christian
theology and in the light of the pure gospel message to make a critical
inquiry as well into the social and cultural realities which a false
ecclesiastical conservatism passes off in an all too facile way as genuine
Christian achievements.” 43

J.B. Metz and Latin American Liberation Theologies
The second major challenge that Rahner faced in his later years was the growing
critiques of his theology by the new political and liberation theologies. Critiques of
Rahner’s theology were nothing new. Hans Urs von Balthasar had critiqued Rahner’s
theology as overly anthropocentric and reductionistic to the point of compromising the
uniqueness of Christ and Christianity. He fundamentally attacks the use of the
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transcendental philosophy of Kant as merely a theological form of Kant’s transcendental
philosophy. 44
The critique that concerned him the most came from Johannes B. Metz. In the
Foreword to Spirit in the World, Metz first points out that this present work of Rahner’s
“uses a Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge explained in terms of transcendental and
existential philosophy to define man as that essence of absolute transcendence towards
God.”45 He lauds Rahner’s effort to take an “anthropologically oriented theology out of
the forest of scholastic objectivism.” 46 However, he raises the question, “does not such a
transcendental-existential approach…concentrate the necessarily historically realized
salvation of man too much on the question of whether the individual freely accepts or
rejects this constitution of his being? Is there not danger that the question of salvation
will be made too private and that salvation history will be conceived too worldlessly,
breaking too quickly the point of the universal historical battle for man?” 47
Metz’s critique goes right to the heart of Rahner’s transcendental theology. For
Rahner, the human person is fundamentally constituted by what he calls human
44
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existentials (e.g., subjectivity, freedom, dependence, historicity) that orient and open the
person towards God. It is from these existentials that the person has the possibility of an
immediate experience of God. Metz sees this immediate experience as fundamentally
bypassing the mediation of history. 48 Rahner’s theology does uphold the historicity of
human existence as an existential within the human being. However, Metz and many
liberation theologians have critiqued this understanding of human historicity as a formal,
and less concrete, understanding of historicity 49

José Ignacio González Faus: Context and Theological Foundations
As with Rahner, a contextualization of González Faus’ life will be helpful in order
to grasp his theological project. The early influences on his theological project can be
traced to a period of transition in Spanish politics and life, and in the Spanish Church
during the latter part of the 20th century. He is from a generation of Roman Catholic
theologians who benefited from the new theological direction set forth by the thought of
Karl Rahner and his generation. 50
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Spanish Context: The Church and Modernity (19th and 20th centuries)
González Faus was born during a tumultuous time in Spain. It was a time in
which, since the emergence of modernity in Spain in the early 19th Century, the
relationship between Church and State reached a breaking point.
The role of the Catholic Church in Spain is one of the richest and most
controversial histories of the Church and of Europe. Since the early days of the Church
in Spain, the lines between Church and State were blurred. Even during the 18th century,
when the ideas of modernity began to challenge the status quo in European nations, the
Spanish Church enjoyed stability and clarity in its role in Spanish life.
However, with the rise of modernity in Spain in the early 19th century, the
Church’s role in Spanish politics, culture, and life became ambiguous at best. Fissures in
the relationship between Church and State began to form. The tensions between Church
and State, especially over the emerging liberal ideas nascent in modernity, eventually
reached its highest level with the Spanish Civil War. With the rise of Francisco Franco to
power, and the emergence of a new form of National Catholicism, the Church would
once again collaborate closely with the Spanish State, and would have a significant part
in Spanish life. 51 Ultimately, with the death of Franco and the death of National
Catholicism, the Church would once again have to redefine its role in Spanish life.
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It would be an oversimplification to state that the Church was a monolithic force
of conservative thought that felt threatened by, and closed itself off from, the growth of
modernity in Spanish politics, culture, and life. Some theologians, bishops, clergy, and
influential laity within the Church responded positively to modernity’s presence in Spain.
It would not be an oversimplification, however, to point out that the Church in Spain was
much slower and more hesitant in appropriating the values of liberal modernity than in
other Western European nations. 52
This somewhat ambivalent and cautious response by the Spanish Church to the
expansion of modern ideas fundamentally changed to a reactionary one in the 1930s with
the appearance of more radical forms of liberalism. This was the beginning of a new
relationship between the Spanish Church and the Spanish culture, one that ultimately
became the context for González Faus’ theological project.
In 1931, just two years before González Faus was born, the seeds of the deep
divide between the modern Spanish State and the Church were sown with the rise of the
Second Republic. Callahan points out that the Second Republic “disestablished the
Church, destroyed its financial and legal privileges, and converted the State into a
powerful agent of secularization and cultural change.” 53 Strong anticlerical sentiments
began to appear among the supporters of an absolute separation of Church and State. As
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animosity towards the Church grew, the Church became more entrenched and suspicious
of anything reflecting liberal or modern ideas.
In 1932, the liberal government took strong actions against the Church. It
secularized cemeteries, legalized divorce, removed religion as a subject in public schools,
and substantially reduced the portion of the state budget that went to the Spanish Church.
Even more significantly, and perhaps as a strong symbolic strike against one of the most
influential institutions within the Spanish Church, the Spanish government suppressed the
Jesuit order and nationalized its property. 54
By May 1933, the Republic passed the Law on Religious Confessions and
Congregations, which enforced an absolute separation of Church and State. This law not
only created an absolute separation of Church and the modern State, but it also appeared
to justify the anticlerical sentiments found among liberal leaning parties. 55
These anticlerical sentiments were met with suspicion and admonition by the
Spanish Church. As Callahan points out, because of continual attacks on the Church,
“Socialism and Catholicism were seen as fundamentally incompatible.” 56 Anything
appearing to contain Marxist ideas was considered, at best, antithetical to Church
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teaching, and, at worst, a danger to the salvation of the soul of Catholic Spain. Thirty
years later, the Church hierarchy’s greatest fear came true with the amicable relationships
and collaborative efforts emerging between a small group of Spanish clerics and
theologians, and Socialists, Communists and Marxists.
Ultimately, the battle-lines between the Church and the modern State solidified
during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). This became the setting for the Church’s future
collaboration with the Nationalists.
Many within the Church hierarchy saw the Spanish Civil War as embodying a
cosmic battle between absolute good and absolute evil, and as thus having
“transcendental importance.” 57 The Church hoped that the Nationalists would not only
end any anticlericalism present in Spain, and eliminate all forms of Marxism, but that the
Nationalists would help re-Christianize Spain and legitimize the political role of the
Church in Spanish political life. 58
The reunification of the Church with the Spanish State was once again complete
due to anticlerical violence, and enormous destruction done to religious buildings and
symbols, in Republican territory.

Franco, National Catholicism, and Signs of Change
The history of the relationship between the government of El Caudillo (Franco)
and the Spanish Church is a complex, as well as a highly contested, one. There are as
many opinions and theories about this time in Spanish history as there are written works
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on the topic. For González Faus, this was an embattled time for democracy and social
justice. 59
According to Callahan, Franco believed that his ascendancy to national Caudillo
was a call from God to save both the Spanish nation and the Catholic faith. 60 He points
out however, that “[a]lthough Franco’s religiosity was sincere enough, it took the form of
that popular, ultramontane piety characteristic of Spanish Catholicism during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.” 61
During early years of Franco’s leadership, the supporters of a National
Catholicism felt a sense of jubilation due to the Church’s freedom from anticlerical
attacks and the attempt by the State to eradicate the spread of liberal ideas. They felt that
the Church could now freely set forth to re-Christianize Spain and move aggressively
towards the eradication of all that was considered liberal. 62
However, by the late 1940s and early 1950s, this feeling of triumph would begin
to die down as there were growing signs of rupture within the National Church. Ideas
born from modernity began to creep into the Spanish Church by way of clerics and
theologians who were introduced to these ideas during their studies in France and
Germany. Many of these clerics and theologians became highly critical of National
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Catholicism, and they began a struggle to reform the Church from within. What these
young progressive clerics and theologians called for was a commitment on the part of the
Church to social justice issues, and a recovery within theology of the social gospel.
This new generation of priests and theologians saw the need for the Church to
redefine its relationship to the working class. Catholic organizations aimed at ministering
to, and working with, the working class began to form. Many of these Catholic labor
groups began to organize strikes and work towards social change. 63 The HOAC
(Hermandades Obreros de Acción Católica) and the JOC (Juventud Obrera Católica)
were two of the most influential Catholic labor groups of the time. Also at this time,
there emerged clandestine Catholic labor activist groups that moved towards the idea of
class struggle as essential to responding to social conflict and cooperated with other trade
unions. 64
Other changes within the Spanish Church during the middle part of the 20th
century began to slowly chip away at the edifice of National Catholicism. Progressive
theological journals began to appear. The writings of Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset
could now be found in theological works. There emerged greater collaboration with the
laity on the part of clergy and bishops. These changes, among others, all became clear
efforts that led to the ultimate demise of the National Church in Spain. The changes
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taking place within the larger Catholic Church with Vatican II only legitimized the slow
breakdown of the National Church.
The final thrust against National Catholicism came between 1966 and 1969.
During this period a wave of protests aimed at Franco’s government and the Church
hierarchy emerged from among young idealistic clergy and theologians who were
concerned about issues of civil rights and social justice. 65 The clerical marches and
demonstrations that appeared were most prominent in regions that sought independence
from the government in Madrid (e.g., the Basque and Catalan regions). In 1966,
hundreds of clergy in Catalonia, during two separate instances, demonstrated against the
Franco regime and the Church hierarchy. This, and the death of Franco in 1975, was a
clear sign that change within the Spanish Church was inevitable.

The Spanish Church after Franco
For the Church, the political and cultural changes after Francoism presented both
challenge and opportunity. The move towards greater democracy occurred at an
opportune time for the Church. With the end of National Catholicism, and the desire for
political as well as ecclesial reform on the part of the majority of bishops, priests and
laity, the Church became a legitimate contributor to the changing cultural landscape.
The Church also faced new challenges that it had never before confronted. As
Spain began to move closer towards the new millennium, it began to mimic other
Western European countries in its cultural shifts. Capitalism became the dominant
economic paradigm in Spain, and played an important role in the shift in the culture of
65
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Spain. A dominant youth culture looked towards new ways of being Spanish. At the
same time, the traditional notion of what it meant to be family began to change, and a
privatization of individual life and faith became more widespread.
Within the Church, a clear divide grew between conservative and traditional
clergy and theologians who became nostalgic for a Spanish Church that once claimed a
significant part over the formation of Spanish culture and life, and progressive clergy and
theologians claiming a reformed vision of Spanish Catholicism within an ever growing
pluralistic and globalizing society.
The most notable of groups that pressed for radical changes within the Spanish
Church was the Society of Jesus. For centuries the Vatican had seen the Jesuit order as
one of the Church’s strongest defenders against attacks on the Church. However, with
the reforms initiated by the Basque Father General Pedro Arrupe, and the 32nd General
Congregation of the Society of Jesus (1974-75), the order was now being watched closely
by Vatican officials. The radical shift within the Jesuits created fertile ground for
González Faus’ theological project to take root.

Biographical Sketch: Theological Foundations
It was within this tumultuous context that José Ignacio González Faus was born
and developed his philosophical and theological ideas. He was born on December 27th,
1933 in Valencia one month after the last parliamentary elections of the pre-Civil War
Republic. His family was a traditional Catholic family from the lower middle-class.
His father, José González Huguet, worked as a telegraph operator during the day,
and at night worked as a Math teacher at the local Jesuit colegio. As with most Spaniards
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who associated with the Jesuits of this time, José Ignacio’s father was “very Catholic, and
conservative.” 66 His mother, Josefa Faus Fenollera, stayed at home to care for their five
children.
It was in this conservative Catholic climate that the González Faus children were
raised. 67 However, like many Spanish children who lived through Francoism, two of the
daughters became atheists. They remain atheists today due to the identification of the
Church with the Franco government.68 The third daughter, José Ignacio’s twin, was
strong in her Catholic identity until her death from cancer in 1951.
As a young man, José Ignacio attended the Jesuit colegio in Valencia. It was
there that he became familiar with the Society of Jesus and received a classical Jesuit
education that was guided by traditional Catholic teachings. He attended this school until
he entered the Society of Jesus in 1950.
González Faus entered the Society of Jesus at the beginning of a major turning
point within the Spanish Church. As Callahan points out,
The 1950s saw the inevitable emergence of the inner contradictions of
Spanish Catholicism made dormant for a time by the special
circumstances prevailing in the years immediately following the Civil
War. In retrospect, the decade of the 1950s formed a prelude to the
intense conflicts that developed within the Church during the 1960s, when
the contradictions that had already emerged burst into a full-blown internal
struggle the like of which was unknown in the Spanish Church’s modern
history.” 69
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Though change was underfoot in Spanish Catholicism, González Faus’ early
philosophical and theological studies as a Jesuit were neo-Scholastic in content and in
form. This was not unusual for scholastic studies at this time. Like Rahner’s generation,
González Faus’ theological training consisted in the familiarity with the neo-Scholastic
manual theology. It was this theological method that became the only resource he had to
respond to contemporary questions and problems.
For González Faus, this way of doing theology was something lifeless, and
therefore useless. At a time when he was going through a “crisis of faith,” this form of
theology provided him with no answers and thus proved to be inept. 70 This confirms
Callahan’s claim that,
[t]he academic preparation given candidates for the priesthood did little to equip
them for work in the pastoral trenches….Neo-scholasticism dominated a formal
curriculum largely untouched by the new theological currents already circulating
within Catholicism elsewhere, especially in France and Germany, while
traditional ideas of spirituality based on the models of Saint Ignatius and the great
masters of the sixteenth-century Spain emphasized a heroic, personal asceticism
more in accord with a monastic life than with the difficult contemporary world
that future priests would face in urban and rural parishes. 71
By the 1950s and 1960s, the new theological trends coming out of France and
Germany appeared in the seminaries and theologates of many religious orders in Spain.
The Jesuit theologates and house of studies, despite their long tradition of conservative
neo-Scholastic thought, were no exception.
González Faus was first introduced to these new theological trends, specifically
the thought of Karl Rahner and Yves Congar, informally during his first theological
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studies at Sant Cugat del Vallès (1960-1963). It was during this time that he “had been
suffering from a serious crisis of faith.” In the writings of Rahner and Congar, he was
able to find a solution to this crisis. 72
Immersing himself in these new theological trends, González Faus recognized the
need for a teología nueva in the Spanish Church. It was out of this need for a ‘living
theology’ that the theological review Selecciones de Teología came to fruition in 1962
with González Faus as its first secretary. As he recalls, this review was founded not only
to help others but to show that another theology, beyond the officially recognized
theology, existed. 73
As he began to explore these new theological trends as a new way of doing
theology in a Spanish context, González Faus found the thought of Rahner particularly
appealing. He recalls that Rahner was particularly influential on three levels. First of all,
Rahner had a particular “way of moving beyond a useless scholasticism that we studied,
and to critique it with authority.” Second of all, he “was never afraid of engaging a
problem, because he not only did theology in context, but he did it with his own tradition
as a response to the context.” Finally, Rahner was influential on González Faus
“because…he brought spiritual experience to theology.” 74
Beyond the new theological trends of the time, González Faus also began to
explore non-Scholastic philosophies of the time. He became particularly interested in the
thought of Maurice Blondel, Albert Camus, and the Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri.
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The insights of these thinkers provided him with new philosophical questions and
methods.
After Third Probation in 1965, González Faus was introduced to the extensive
research done in biblical and Patristic studies at the Pontifical Biblical Institute in
Rome. 75 He saw in this new research another way to move beyond the medieval neoScholasticism so prevalent in Spanish theology at the time. It was through this new
reading of scriptures that he became “existentially” familiar with the God of revelation.
As Josep Vives points out, “faith in the God of revelation made him discover that God is
passionate about us, and that that discovery points to the fact that we are faithful to God
only insofar as we participate in God’s passion for us. 76 In other words, González Faus
came to the realization that the God of revelation is fundamentally concerned about
concrete problems in the world, and that to believe in that God means to also be
concerned about concrete problems.
From 1966 to1969, he became more familiar with the new theological trends in
the Church while doing graduate studies in theology at Tübingen and Innsbruck. Having
found interest in the new biblical and Patristic research, he began to write his doctoral
dissertation on the Christology of Irenaeus of Lyons, which later became the foundation
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for his own work on Christology, and later, his theological anthropology. 77 It was from
these new theological trends and research, as well as the influence of a young professor
named Joseph Ratzinger, that González Faus found new life in Catholic theology and
Christian faith. 78
As much as González Faus benefited from, and appreciated, this new direction in
theology, he believed that these bold and original thinkers did not go far enough. He
looked critically upon the accomplishments of the previous generation of theologians,
and hoped to press these accomplishments further.
González Faus’ thought may have been marked by the new trends in theology
emerging from the 1950s and 1960s, but it was his own personal experiences of social
and political upheaval, and witnessing the suffering of many due to social injustices that
became the primary force behind his ‘epistemological shift.’

Epistemological Shift: Experience of the Poor and Oppressed and a Turn to the Victim
Similar to Rahner, González Faus’ own understanding of the nature of theology,
the nature of being a Christian, and the nature of being human, came with an
epistemological shift in his theological foundations. Like Rahner, the theologian must
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begin theological reflection with his or her context and historical situation. However,
going beyond Rahner, González Faus attempted to make this context and situation more
concrete and particularized.
For González Faus, the theologian must begin theological reflection with the
politically concrete turn to the marginalized of society. In other words, González Faus’
theological project begins with the particular experience of poverty, oppression, and
exclusion. This shift in theological starting-points was an open challenge to the officially
accepted methods in Catholic theology. Thus, for González Faus, the challenge to
Christian theology is not strictly a theoretical nor a pastoral one, but rather a sociopolitical one. The theologian is not faced with the question of how to do theology after
Kant or in light of atheistic existentialism as was typically the concern of European
Catholic theology. Rather, for González Faus, the challenge to theology and the
theologian comes from the daily life of those who struggle with poverty, social
marginalization, and political oppression. 79
This conviction that theology must begin with the poor and oppressed arises out
of three defining experiences from González Faus’ life. The first experience was his
experience of the life of the economic poor and the socially excluded, and the
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introduction to the idea of social justice during his first studies in philosophy as a Jesuit
scholastic. The second experience was the awareness of the corrupted expression of
power in the political sphere, and witnessing the responses to corrupted expressions of
political power by social and political protests in the late 1960s. The third experience
was seeing the lack of adequate response by the official Church to the growing social
problems in Europe and in Latin America.
His first experience of the poor was during his early philosophy studies from 1956
to 1960 at Sant Cugat del Vallès in Barcelona, and at the Facultad Civil de Barcelona. It
was during these years that he taught ‘catechism’ to immigrant workers from the southern
part of Spain in the poor neighborhood of Torre Romeu in Sabadell. This was an activity
of which many of his Jesuit professors disapproved. Also during these years, he was
given the analytical tools to make sense of this experience by the Jesuit rector Pedro Vila
Creus. 80
Later, after theological studies in Tübingen, Innsbruck, and Rome, González Faus
returned to Sabadell to become a member of a local base community for the next ten
years. His commitment to the poor eventually solidified during those years, and became
much more heightened with his travels to Latin America and his growing relationships
with the theology of liberation.
The second defining influence on González Faus’ thought was his experience of
the corrupted expression of power in the political sphere, and of the political protest
movements throughout Europe during the 1960s. His experience living under the Franco
80
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government in Spain, and witnessing the student revolts in Germany in 1968, formed a
lasting awareness of the political nature of the gospel and of Catholic theology.
His involvement in the anti-Franco struggle began during the early 1960s while
studying theology in Barcelona. 81 It was in the base community of Sabadell where he
came in contact with many sympathizers of the anti-Franco movement. He points out
that everyone in this base community was politically and socially active. Even the priests
of the community were members of “clandestine political parties” that fought against
Francoism. 82 This experience of associating with a politically and socially active
Christian community left a definitive mark on his life and his theological project.
The last experience that defined his theological project was the lack of adequate
response by the leaders of the Church, and by official Catholic theology, to the growing
social problems of the time. He witnessed a divided Church on matters of social justice
in Spain’s National Catholicism of the 1940s and 1950s, and the rupture within the
National Church during the 1950s.
During his final years of studies in Germany, González Faus witnessed the
student protests of 1968. These protests were responses to a century of conservative and
authoritarian tendencies within university life, and responses to the growing awareness of
injustices in German society.
For González Faus, this active engagement in society via protests and
demonstrations by the students contrasted with a theology that appeared to disregard
social realities. This chasm separating academic theology and its historical context
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needed to be bridged. He believed that the status quo in theology could no longer be
acceptable as a response to the changing times. He became critical of many of his
professors who he believed had forgotten the imperative question for theology, namely,
“How can we do theology after Auschwitz?” 83 This axiomatic question became
applicable, for González Faus and others of his generation, to the reoccurring genocides
throughout the world, and more generally to the slow and often less discernable genocide
of social and economic injustices. For González Faus, forgetting “Auschwitz,” (i.e.,
forgetting about the victims of society) is like forgetting the gospel message of
salvation. 84
These three important experiences were formative in his theological project. It
became apparent to him that there was a growing need to create a dialogue between
Catholic theology, the social sciences, and the victims of oppression in order to construct
an adequate response to the changing nature of the world. He found elements of this
response within the emerging theology of liberation, and the Frankfurt School of critical
theory. 85

Socio-Political Critique as Method
González Faus’ formal encounter with the philosophies of social and political
critique can be traced back to his early theological studies at Tübingen. Having been
introduced to the philosophies of Hegel and Marx, and to the emerging Marxist-Christian
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dialogue, González Faus found Ernst Bloch’s “philosophy of hope” as particularly
appealing and helpful in making sense of the reality of marginalization and oppression.
He recalls once having attended a particularly interesting ‘roundtable discussion’ between
Bloch and Wolfhart Pannenberg. 86 This interest in these three philosophers and the
Marxist-Christian dialogue grew stronger with his return in 1969 to the Spain of Franco.
The critical nature of Marxist social analysis took on a new dimension of meaning
for him as he found himself in contact with underground groups whose goal was to
subvert the political power of Francoism, and who hoped for a more just Spanish
society. 87 Out of this context, the dialectic of theoria and praxis came to fruition for
González Faus.
In 1969, as Professor of Systematic Theology at the Facultat de Teologia de
Catalunya in Barcelona, González Faus was introduced to the Frankfurt School of
Critical Theory by one of his German students. This new philosophical insight resonated
with his own thought and experience that he eventually dedicated a year to studying it
more completely. 88 It was through his reading of Horkheimer and Adorno that he
constructed a critical conversation between contemporary social and political reality, and
Catholic theology. The use of the critical theory continues to influence his work with his
recent interest in the thought of Walter Benjamin.
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An equally important mark present in González Faus’ theological project comes
from Latin American liberation theology. Fostering friendships with Ignacio Ellacuría
and Jon Sobrino, and his first visits to Latin America in 1977 and 1979, left lasting marks
on his theology. 89 From this encounter with liberation theology, he has seen his own
project as a bridge between European theology, especially political theology, and Latin
American liberation theology. He makes the claim that “Liberation theology has
recovered...the best, and the most Christian of European Christianity that we had forgotten:
Bonhoeffer, Mounier, Simone Weil...(and, at least for Spain, Bartolomé de las Casas).” 90
Furthermore, what liberation theology has done has been to bring others into solidarity
with the oppressed victims of society. 91
In his own theological project, González Faus has attempted to bring into fruitful
dialogue various philosophical and theological perspectives in an attempt to incarnate
what the prophet Jeremiah proclaimed: to know God is to practice justice. 92 Currently, as
director of the Centro de Estudios ‘Cristianisme i justicia’ in Barcelona, and through
many articles, television, radio and internet interviews, and books, he continues to
struggle for justice, and to opt for the victims of society. His dialectical method of the
experiential and the narrative with the analytical and systematic allows for his work to
challenge modernity’s attempt at glorifying instrumental reason, and postmodernity’s
attempt at deconstruction.
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Concluding Remarks: The “Ignatian Vision”93
As Jesuits, the theologies of Rahner and González Faus are marked by the
theology and spirituality of Ignatius Loyola and the “Jesuit tradition. 94” There are many
noticeable Ignatian themes present in the thought of both theologians. For example, the
themes of the experience of God; the experience of grace as gift; the mysticism of
everyday life; the notion that God is semper maior; the notion of Ignatian “indifference”
as leading to the possibility of finding God in all things; the incarnation of Christ;
contemplation in action; and Ignatian election and discipleship can be found in the
theological projects of both theologians. 95
On a personal level, González Faus states that he has learned three things from
Ignatius. First, it is “the advice that we humans should have some sense of selfknowledge, because we often fool ourselves about our real motivations.” Second,

93

The phrase “Ignatian Vision” begs the question, is there one unified “Ignatian vision” that can be isolated
and studied? Even the question “Is there a unified Ignatian theology?” needs to be raised. For Rahner, the
idea that there exists one single theology promoted by the Society of Jesus may have been true during the
Baroque era, but that this cannot be the case today. He hopes, however, that the “spirit and spirituality” of
Ignatius can be found within his theology. Rahner’s hope points to the fact, then, that something of
Ignatius does endure and can be appropriated in one’s theology and worldview.
94

Throughout this dissertation I make a distinction between the terms “Ignatian” and “Jesuit.” The term
‘Ignatian’ refers to the ‘spirit’ of Ignatius as found in the Spiritual Exercises and other of his writings. The
term ‘Jesuit’ refers to those things particular to the Society of Jesus.
95

There already exist numerous works exploring the Ignatian influence on Rahner’s thought. Cf. Philip
Endean, Karl Rahner and Ignatian Spirituality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Declan Marmion,
A Spintuality of Everyday Faith, A Theological Investigation of the Notion of Spirituality in Karl Rahner
(Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1998). There has yet to be any systematic exploration into the Ignatian
influence on the theology of González Faus. Rahner has many works interpreting Ignatian spirituality.
Endean has an extensive list of his works on this topic in his work Karl Rahner and Ignatian Spirituality
(268-274). González Faus’ most direct reflections on Ignatian spirituality come from his work Adiestrar la
libertad: meditaciones de los Ejercicios de San Ignacio (Santander: Sal Terrae, 2007). Also see his works,
La experiencia espiritual de los Ejercicios de san Ignacio (Santander: Sal Terrae, 1990), and “Hagamos
redención del género humano” in Cristianisme i Justícia (Jan, 1997). A thorough comparison of the two
theologians’ works on Ignatian themes may offer some insight into the similarities and differences in their
interpretation of Ignatian spirituality.

79
Ignatius in the Exercises discloses “the mystical identification [of the excercitant] with
‘the poor and humble Christ.’” Finally, González Faus has learned from Ignatius how he
held “in tension” in his later life the two incongruent realities of “the radical nature of the
gospel and the patient strength to make that radicality a possibility in the structures of this
world.” 96
Isolating the “spirit” of Ignatius in the thought of these two theologians is a
daunting task. However, I believe that there are two clearly obvious Ignatian themes that
are essential to their theological anthropologies: the mystical immediacy of God in
Christ, and Christian discipleship as a call to transform one’s self and the world. Both of
these themes are fundamentally grounded in what both Rahner and González Faus see as
the goal of the Spiritual Exercises: freedom.
The first Ignatian theme that is essential to their theological anthropologies is the
idea of the possibility of a person’s mystical immediacy to God in Christ. This influence
most clearly comes from Note 15 of the Spiritual Exercises. In an interview, Rahner
points out that, in the words of Ignatius, the Spiritual Exercises are concerned with
“letting the Creator and the creature…deal directly with each other.”97 He goes on to say
that Ignatius “presupposes as both possible and actual” an experience of God and an
immediate encounter with Jesus. This Ignatian theme is stressed in his essay “Ignatius of
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Loyola Speaks to a Modern Jesuit.” 98 In this essay, Rahner takes on the persona of
Ignatius himself to speak to a contemporary Jesuit. The Ignatius portrayed by Rahner is
one who has experienced God directly and who names this experience as an experience
of grace and of God’s very self. 99 For Rahner, this non-mediated encounter with God in
Christ is the experience of grace. It is, in scholastic terms, an experience of uncreated
grace. It is in this experience of an immediacy of God in Christ that Rahner situates his
Christology and anthropology. 100
This notion that the human person can have an immediate experience of God in
Christ is also fundamental to the theological anthropology of González Faus. For him,
this experience of God in Christ is an experience of gratuidad (gift), and justice. In his
reflections on the Spiritual Exercises, González Faus sees misericordia (mercy,
compassion) at the heart of experiencing God’s self in Christ. This experience of God,
through an experience of misericordia, is an experience of divine love. This is the last
contemplation of the Fourth Week of the Exercises, known as “Contemplation to Attain
Love.” Out of this experience of love emerges the Christian praxis of accompaniment
with the poor and marginalized. 101
The second Ignatian theme that is essential to the theological anthropology of
Rahner and González Faus is that of discipleship. This theme emerges from the Second
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Week of the Exercises with a meditation on the Kingdom of God and the “Call of the
King,” and ends with an annotation on discernment called the “Election.”
In his essay on “Ethics” in Rahner’s thought, Brian Linnane makes the claim that
“the concept of choice is at the heart of both [Rahner’s] transcendental anthropology and
the Ignatian spiritual tradition.” 102 This idea of choice in Rahner’s theology is not “the
mere capacity to select among various objects,” but rather “‘the possibility of saying yes
or no to oneself, the possibility of deciding for or against oneself,’ which is also always a
decision for or against God.”103 It is this “definitive choice” and “fundamental option”
that leads to what Linnane sees as Rahner’s “ethics of discernment or discipleship.” 104
For Rahner, the person’s fundamental option is participation in the death of Jesus, which
“represents Jesus’ complete acceptance of the divine will and his unsurpassed love of
neighbor.” 105 Contrary to the critiques that Rahner’s anthropology lacks a concrete
dimension, Linnane argues that Rahner’s understanding of the concept of Christian
witness, which flows from the participation “necessarily involves a public, social, and
historical proclamation.” 106
For González Faus, the meditations on the Second Week are meant to lead the
exercitant towards a reflection on the human person’s mystical identification with the
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poor and humble Christ. To enter into this contemplation, he points out that the person
needs to have that First Week experience of sin and misericordia, which are “two focal
points of the ellipse that constitutes our reality.” 107 For González Faus, this experience of
misericordia is a mystical experience of the person of Jesus, who calls us to transform
our lives into “channels of misericordia.” 108 Our self knowledge of mystical union with
the Christ of misericordia then presents us with the possibility to choose Christ’s
personal project of transforming persons to become persons of misericordia or the
kingdom of God. 109
The transformative nature of an Ignatian vision is clearly notable in the thought of
both Rahner and González Faus. The anthropologies of both Jesuits are indebted greatly
to this worldview that proclaims the conversion of the person to the incarnate Christ, and
the transformation of the world into the kingdom of God. The following chapter will
begin an exploration into their theological anthropologies as two possible alternative
anthropologies for a globalizing world with an initial analysis of the human predicament.
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CHAPTER THREE
DESCRIPTION OF THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT
“The death of the Son of God was the most direct offense to God and the greatest
act of human injustice. That is the paradigm of all sin.” 1 This claim by González Faus
may appear to be a rather obvious and simple assertion. However, these words contain
much significance beyond their obvious meaning, and I contend that this “paradigm of all
sin” can offer Catholic theology the necessary framework to approach the contemporary
problem of global disparity and the current direction of globalization through a re-vision
and re-articulation of a Christian theological anthropology. 2
All anthropologies ask one fundamental question that consists of two aspects:
What constitutes human fulfillment, and what hinders or damages that fulfillment? The
second aspect of this question illustrates the fact that any exploration into human
existence must address a real predicament within that existence. This chapter will
attempt to address this predicament by way of Karl Rahner’s and González Faus’
understanding of this predicament. The goal of this chapter and Chapters Four and Five
is to examine the relative adequacy of these two differing anthropologies as possible
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Proyecto de hermano: Visión creyente del hermano (Santander: Sal Terrae, 1991), 405. Hereafter, this
text will be cited as Proyecto.

2

Throughout this chapter, “anthropology” subsequently means “theological anthropology” unless it refers
to the anthropology at the heart of the current state of globalization.

83

84
alternatives to a prevailing anthropology at the core of the current direction of a
globalizing world and as responses to the problem of global disparity. 3

Rahner: Human Existence as Transcendent Spirit and Created Being
Rahner never wrote one single exhaustive work on human existence that was
isolated from other theological questions and problems. Rather, he used anthropology as
an approach to address the pressing theological questions and problems of his time.
Therefore, one way to explore how Rahner understood human existence is from an
approach that methodically examines the development of his thought over a period of
time and that extracts the necessary anthropological elements to present a formal
exposition of human existence. However, what I attempt to do instead is use Rahner’s
work Foundations of Christian Faith to examine Rahner’s anthropology and then use his
earlier books and essays to offer any necessary clarifications. 4 I will do this primarily
because Foundations is most often acknowledged as Rahner’s most fundamental and
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systematic work and because it is one of the most commonly used of Rahner’s texts when
teaching or researching Rahner’s theology. 5
The following section will examine two formal dimensions of human existence as
found in Rahner’s anthropology. These two dimensions are the openness of human
existence, and the enduring structures within human existence, which Rahner calls
“existentials.” However, prior to an exploration into these dimensions, some preliminary
remarks need to be made on Rahner’s understanding of the relationship between matter
and spirit.

On Matter and Spirit
One on-going challenge within an exploration into human existence is the attempt
to avoid any dualism between “body/matter” and “spirit” and offer an integral
anthropology. From the early stages of his thought, Rahner was concerned about this
classical problem.
In Chapter Five of his work Hearer of the Word, Rahner argues that “To be
human is to be spirit [Der Mensch ist Geist], i.e., to live life while reaching ceaselessly
for the absolute, in openness toward God.” 6 However, as he later argues in Chapter Ten,
human existence, as constituting an openness towards God, is being spirit in a particular
way. He claims that “Human beings are spirits in such a way that, in order to become
spirit, we enter and we have ontically [seinshaft] always already entered into otherness,
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into matter, and so into the world.” In other words, “we are spirit in a peculiar way. Our
human spirit is receptive – anima tabula raza – and because of its receptivity this spirit
needs, as its own, indispensable means, produced by itself, a sense power through which
it may strive toward its own goal, the grasping of being as such. In this sense to be
human is to be sense-endowed spirituality [sinnliche Geistigkeit]. 7 Therefore, for
Rahner, there is a distinction between matter and spirit, but no real division between
matter and spirit within human existence. Though matter and spirit are conceptually
distinct, human existence in its entirety is a unity. In other words, there is unity in
distinction between matter and spirit. This notion of unity in distinction becomes an
important hermeneutical device throughout Rahner’s entire theological program.
Rahner’s concern to assert the unity of matter and spirit within Christian theology
in order to avoid any conception of human existence and reality in a one-sided manner is
again taken up in his essay “The Unity of Spirit and Matter in the Christian
Understanding of Faith.” 8 In this essay, the central problem of materialism (i.e., a
reduction of human existence and all reality to merely material existence) is an example
of a one-sided framework that absolutizes a particular region of human existence and
reality. As he claims “there is today a world-wide materialism which disputes the
foundation of the Christian faith.” 9
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In his response to this problem, Rahner asserts that “The Christian faith
recognizes a unity of spirit and matter by their very origin, in their history and in their
final end.” 10 This point appears to be not only an attempt to avoid any one-sidedness to
human existence but also to avoid any real separation between matter and spirit within
theological paradigms.
In his argument, Rahner again attempts to establish an anthropology that upholds
a unity in conceptual distinction. For Rahner, the relationship between matter and spirit,
then, is actualized in the principle of change and becoming. Human existence is in an act
of becoming and transformation. Human existence, in its act of becoming, is an “active
self-transcendence.” He argues:
We have seen that becoming is really self-transcendence, and this in
certain cases even towards a new nature even though this happens, of
course, by the power of the dynamism of the absolute being, all of which,
however, in its turn does not deny the fact that this is a question of a
genuine, active self-transcendence. We have seen furthermore, that matter
and spirit are not simply disparate things but that matter is, as it were,
‘frozen’ spirit whose only meaning is to render real spirit possible.
Finally, we have seen that the spirituality of the creature always remains
spirituality in materiality right up to its absolute perfection. 11
These preliminary remarks on Rahner’s understanding of the unity in the
relationship between matter and spirit show that Rahner was aware of the dangers of any
monism or dualism within a reflection on human existence. This attempt to avoid any
form of dualism or one-sidedness within the relationship between matter and spirit is an
effort to offer an integral understanding of human existence, and this integral
anthropology is clearly found within the first five chapters of Foundations.
10

Ibid., 154.

11

Ibid., 177.

88
The Openness of Human Existence
For Rahner, at the heart of human existence is the fundamental openness to all of
reality. This fundamental openness is what Rahner understands in the theological sense
as the ability to hear God’s message of salvation present within human existence. 12 The
ability to hear God’s message is the ability within human existence to encounter the
transcendent God immediately in every human experience, as well as the ability to freely
respond to this encounter. For Rahner, being a “hearer” constitutes personhood and
subjectivity. In other words, the hearer of God’s message is both person and subject. 13
In Foundations, Rahner describes personhood14 as an experience, and more
specifically as “the original experience,” which is “hidden and total” and “silent and
unobtrusive.” 15 This is not an isolated experience of an isolated being, but rather an
experience of being, and more specifically an experience of being-in-relationship (e.g.,
being in relationship with the self through self-reflection, or being in relationship with
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In FCF, Rahner begins with a particular framework of a philosophical anthropology of personhood and
subjectivity. Before doing this, though, he makes the case that a philosophical anthropology does not
exclude Christian faith, but is rather the presupposition of Christian faith. More specifically, he makes the
claim that Christian faith already presupposes that human existence has the ability to hear God’s message
(i.e., receive the message of Christian faith). He argues that “theology itself implies a philosophical
anthropology which enables this message of grace to be accepted in a really philosophical and reasonable
way, and which gives an account of it in a humanly responsible way” (FCF, 25).
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The notion of “person” has been a debatable concept within Western thought for millennia. One
particularly influential interpretation of personhood within Western thought understands the person in
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God, other persons and the material world). He argues “Being a person, then, means the
self-possession of a subject as such in a conscious and free relationship in the totality of
itself.” 16 On one hand, this description of personhood as an experience, and an
experience of relationality avoids reducing the person to a mere object outside of and
beyond the other realms of human experience (i.e., physical pain and pleasure).
On the other hand, an interpretation of personhood as an experience allows
Rahner to avoid reducing the person to a mere by-product of the individual’s history. For
Rahner, the individual’s particular history does not totally encapsulate nor define that
particular individual. Instead of being absolutely determined by one’s genes,
environment, and particular history, the individual, as a person, can put their very
existence into question, and therefore can transcend it. As Rahner puts it, “A finite
system cannot confront itself in its totality…It does not ask questions about itself.” 17
This “confrontation” of the person with his or her “totality” is a particular and personal
experience.
For Rahner, the particular and personal “experience” that the human being has is
an experience of subjectivity. What is meant by an “experience of subjectivity” is the
experience of self-reflection and self-questioning. The individual can reflect on his or her
life, and place the whole of this life into question. He states that “A person looks inside
himself, looks back at his past and looks at the world around him, and he discovers either
to his horror or to his relief that he can shift responsibility from himself for all the
individual data that make up his reality, and he can place the burden for what he is on
16
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what is not him. He discovers that he has come to be through what is other than
himself.” 18 In this questioning of the person’s decisions to authentically respond or not
respond, the individual becomes open “to the unlimited horizons of such questioning.” 19
This, for Rahner, signifies that the subjectivity of the human person points to the
individual’s infinite spiritual horizon. The individual person is only a subject insofar as
the person is in a process of “being subject.” 20 Therefore, subjectivity is always more
than an objective part of the human being. Instead, it is a way of being in responsible
relationship to oneself, other subjects, and the world.

Human Existentials
The personal experience of subjectivity does not exhaust human existence for
Rahner. Human existence constitutes both a subjective, “spiritual” dimension and a
dimension of relatedness to what is “other” than itself. This dimension of relatedness to
what is other is what Rahner calls the “existential” dimension of human existence. This
dimension is constituted by various “existentials,” and is the dimension that mediates
personal subjectivity. 21 These existentials are experiences or ways of being human that
constitute personhood and they are also always-already-present within human experience.
They are transcendence, freedom and responsibility, orientation towards the
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incomprehensible mystery, being in history and in the world, and personal relationality
(i.e., the human being’s social nature). 22
The first existential of personhood that Rahner explores is the experience of
transcendence. As Rahner explains, the human person is a finite being with limitations
and limitedness. Though the person is bound by finitude, the person is able to recognize
and acknowledge this limited nature. The person can raise particular questions about his
or her limitations, wonder about one’s particular death, or even ask the meaning of life.
These, and further questions, elicit possible answers, and these answers raise further
questions. He points out, “Every answer is always just the beginning of a new question.
Man experiences himself as infinite possibility because in practice and in theory he
necessarily places every sought-after result in question. He always situates it in a broader
horizon which looms before him in its vastness.” 23 Since the human person can
recognize this finitude and reflect on it, and can imagine numerous possibilities, the
person has already transcended his or her finitude. The person, however, can also ignore
the experience of transcendence in various concrete ways in the individual’s concrete
experiences. 24
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FCF, 26. Rahner does not limit himself to only these five experiences. In fact, any universal human
experience can be classified as an existential. For example, “toil, ignorance, sickness, pain and death” are
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At the same time that the person acknowledges his or her finitude, and places his
or herself in question, the person can imagine an endless number of possibilities for his or
herself. For Rahner, this openness to numerous possibilities is the openness to absolute
being. This openness of the human person is prior to any objective experience and is
open to being as such. As he puts it, the person is “grounded in a pre-apprehension
(Vorgriff) of being.” 25 The person “cannot understand himself as subject in the sense of
an absolute subject, but only in the sense of one who receives being, ultimately only in
the sense of grace.” 26
A second existential of personhood is the experience of responsibility and
freedom. 27 For Rahner, every individual person is able to discern whether one choice is
better than another, freely make that choice, and then acknowledge responsibility for that
choice taken. In his exploration into the experience of freedom, Rahner distinguishes
between two forms of freedom: transcendental (originating) freedom and categorical
(originated) freedom. These are not two types of freedom ontologically distinct from
each other, but rather “two moments which form the single unity of freedom.” 28 They
are two dimensions of a single reality.
As Rahner sees it, transcendental freedom, as a dimension of freedom, is “a
person’s ultimate responsibility for himself.” 29 It is an experience in which a “subject
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experiences himself as subject,” as well as “the power to decide about oneself and to
actualize oneself.” 30 This actualization of the person is made real in the concrete actions
within time and space, and thus mediated through the categorical experience of freedom.
Rahner also points out that, as with subjectivity, the “person can evade his responsibility
and freedom, and can interpret himself as the product of what is not himself.” 31
The third existential of personhood that Rahner describes is the experience of
dependency. The person experiences this dependency as a dependency on something
other than his or her self, whether that “other” is absolute mystery or the historical and
created forces that affect that person (e.g., the person’s genes or culture). As Rahner puts
it, “In spite of his free subjectivity, man experiences himself as being at the disposal of
other things, a disposal over which he has no control.” 32 Furthermore, the person’s
transcendentality cannot be understood as that of an absolute subject
which experiences and possesses what opens before it as something
subject to its own power…Man never establishes his own freedom in
some absolute sense, in the sense of a freedom which could make
complete use of the material which is given to him in his freedom, or
could cast it off in an absolute self-sufficiency…In an ultimate and
inescapable way, man even as doer and maker is still receiving and being
made. 33
A closer examination of Rahner’s description of human dependency points to its
twofold nature. The experience of human dependency, on one hand, highlights the
person’s creatureliness as an account of the person’s relationship to its creative ground
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(i.e., God). Rahner uses the term “creatureliness” to characterize the human person’s
relationship to the absolute and incomprehensible mystery of reality (viz., God). Human
persons experience their creatureliness immediately, and it is through the experience of
creatureliness that the person has an experience of transcendence.
For Rahner, creatureliness is not a datum alongside other data concerning human
existence. Rather, like the other human existentials, it is an experience, and it is in this
experience that the person encounters God. 34 The experience of creatureliness becomes
the mediating factor in which the person encounters and relates to the world and
encounters and relates to God.
The experience of dependency also reveals the person’s finite embodied presence
in history and in the world. 35 For Rahner, human existence is fundamentally situated in
history and in the world. Human existence, as with all of existence, is moving in one
direction to a goal and that that movement and finality is meaningful.
The fourth existential of personhood consists in the fact that the “existentiell”
human existence (i.e., the concrete experiences of human existence) is moving towards
an absolute goal and final consummation. In other words, personhood is constituted with
an orientation towards the incomprehensible and absolute mystery, which is the person’s
final actualization. Rahner makes the claim that, “If man really is a subject, that is, a
transcendent, responsible and free being who as subject is both entrusted into his own

34

35

Ibid., 81.

This is not a new idea within Christian thought, nor does this notion of the historicity of spirit diverge
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hands and always in the hands of what is beyond his control, then basically this has
already said that man is a being oriented towards God.”36
It can be noted from the quote that this orientation is twofold. First of all, there is
a movement on the part of the individual person. In other words, as subject, the person,
through self-reflection, continues to discover and uncover the mystery that is at the core
of the person’s existence. The experience of self-awareness, which cannot be ever
exhausted in this life, is a movement beyond the person’s own particular ego and outward
into the ineffable mystery.
This quest is not initiated only by the individual person. Rather, this orientation is
also already begun prior to the individual person’s freedom. This orientation is the
ground and the movement towards that which gives unity and totality to the person,
which, for Rahner, is the incomprehensible mystery and which is expressed as “God.” It
is also offered as a gift. Rahner claims that the person’s “orientation towards the absolute
mystery always continues to be offered to him by this mystery as the ground and content
of his being.” 37 This is “from a theological point of view” called “grace, and it is an
inescapable existential of man’s whole being.” 38
The fifth existential of human existence found in the anthropology of Rahner is
the relationality of human existence. This existential is the fundamental interpersonal
and social nature of human existence. As already noted, Rahner’s anthropology begins
with a personal experience of subjectivity that is fundamentally free and responsible for
36
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the actualization of the subjective person’s freedom. However, the person never
actualizes him or herself in absolute isolation. As Rahner states in Foundations,
“Freedom is always the freedom of a subject who exists in interpersonal communication
with other subjects.” 39 Therefore, the human subject never experiences its freedom
absolutely, but rather through an encounter with another subject.
Though Rahner makes the claim that relationality (i.e., interpersonal
relationships) is a human existential, some theologians (e.g., Metz, Brackley) argue that
Rahner places very little emphasis on this existential or that it remains too formal and
abstract. Metz’s critique that Rahner’s anthropology focuses less upon the interpersonal
subject and more upon the individual subject is a critique that many other theologians
have used to press further a Rahnerian anthropology. The anthropology of González
Faus can also be seen as a similar critique of Rahner’s anthropology. However, I argue
that González Faus not only employs a “Metzian-like” critique but that his anthropology
actually goes beyond this critique and presses it further.

González Faus: Human Existence as Creature and Divine Image of God
The most reliable pathway into the anthropology of González Faus is through his
work Proyecto de hermano: Visión creyente del hombre. He begins his inquiry into
human existence with a reflection on creation and the creatureliness of the human person,
and then moves to the unique gift within human existence (viz., the image of God).40
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As with Rahner, choosing a starting point to explore human existence does not mean to say that one
particular characteristic of human existence can be separated and dissected in an absolute manner without
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Typical of his methodology, he will do this by first establishing what the Christian
tradition says about a topic and then correlate it to his contemporary context and
language.

Creation
Prior to an exploration into González Faus’ understanding of human existence,
some preliminary remarks on how González Faus understands the notion of “creation”
need to be made. González Faus first of all claims that “the theological objective of the
theme of creation is not what is said about creation in itself (metaphysically speaking, or
as a concept of unknown causality and without analogy), nor what is said immediately
about the world (as scientific information, etc.), but what creation says about human
existence and about its anthropological purpose (i.e., in order for the human person to
live with a worldview grounded in faith).” 41 In other words, the theological objective of
the theme of creation is that “creation” is something “given,” that is, a gift, to human
existence.
González Faus argues that a Christian theory of creation must begin with an
eschatological and soteriological approach rather than an ontological one. He points out
that a faith perspective, which is what Christian theology claims, does not begin with
faith in a creator God (i.e., as in the Greco-Roman tradition), but rather faith in a saving,

theologians will continually attempt to argue that human existence constitutes a unity. As González Faus
points out, creatureliness is not an independent entity separated from other dimensions of human existence.
Rather, “Creatureliness and the image of God form, in human existence, and indissoluble unity, where it is
impossible to precisely isolate what pertains to each of these categories.” However, as he argues, “it is
pedagogically necessary to treat human creatureliness separately because it would be dangerous to confuse
it with the other dimensions of human existence ”(Proyecto, 19).
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or liberating, God (i.e., the Christian God).42 In the biblical tradition, as well as in the
Christian creedal statements, faith in the personal saving God, not an impersonal creator
God, is the context for interpreting the concept of creation. In other words, even though
the biblical canon and the official creeds of the Church begin with a creator God, this is
not the chronological evolution of the texts, nor is it the evolution of an individual’s or
community’s faith experience. 43 A truly Christian theory of creation, then, must
approach the problem from a vision of a God who liberates and saves, and speaks of the
origins of creation only secondarily after treating the goal and salvation of creation.
A soteriological and eschatological approach to creation, then, better positions
creation within a theory of history (viz., the history of salvation) rather than within a
theory of causation. For example, the schema “gift-rejection-death-promise” of Genesis
2-3 comes from the particular historical experience of Israel, which is then universalized
for all human existence. 44 This understanding of creation as the “creative” act of creating
history, and not as a scientific category for the origins of things, plays an important role
in González Faus’ anthropology on the whole.
For González Faus, this approach to creation is not new but rather reaffirms the
Roman Catholic claim that creation constitutes a “positive and good orientation,” and that
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the final end of all of creation, as proceeding from God, is to help human existence
achieve its own end and consequently empower human existence to help creation achieve
its end. 45 This final and definitive end of human existence is nothing less than the
fulfillment of the covenantal relationship of filiación and fraternidad. 46 This binomial
filiación-fraternidad, as the descriptor for the biblical covenantal relationship between
human existence and God, is the fundamental framework out of which González Faus
constructs his anthropology.

Human Creatureliness
For González Faus, language about creation and human creatureliness lies
between “two stumbling blocks.” 47 These stumbling blocks consist in various forms of
monism (e.g., pantheism) and dualism (e.g., Manichaeism). Both arise from “two real
human experiences, but incorrect in their partiality.” 48 On one hand, when language of
creation and creatureliness remains in this partiality, the possibility of extreme
interpretations of human existence emerges. On the other hand, when language of
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creation and creatureliness hold both in tension, the possibility for a more comprehensive
and true expression of human existence arises.
González Faus offers three examples of holding language about human existence
in tension in order to avoid any form of partiality. 49 First, human existence needs to be
viewed as “good,” but it is good to an extent. In other words, there is a “relative
goodness” about human existence. Having faith in creation affirms that God created all
things “good” and that there is goodness found within creation and within human
existence. However, this goodness is limited (i.e., it is good to the extent that God see it
as good). Second, a comprehensive vision of human existence should maintain the
tension between freedom and giftedness. For example, human existence can exercise its
freedom through self-actualization and independence. However, human freedom is not
autonomous and absolute, but is a freely given gift. Third, a holistic vision of human
existence must maintain a tensive vision of reality. In other words, God can be found in
all of reality, and reality does reveal a sense of finality. Thus, all of reality is open to
more possibilities than the human mind can fathom.
For González Faus, a holistic vision of human existence should assert the fact that
human creatureliness not only encompasses the createdness, or limitedness of human
existence, but it also asserts the truth that human existence consists in the human
creature’s ability to exceed its limited nature. At the same time that creatureliness
manifests the limitedness of human existence; the human creature has the potential to
exceed this limitedness. Of all created things, human existence is the only being that can
know itself and acknowledge itself as different from other created beings. As González
49
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Faus states, the human person is “the privileged creature, the end and lord of everything,
and first analogy of creation.” 50 This idea that human existence is a privileged existence
is not meant to justify the claim that humans can dominate all other created things.
Instead, this privileged existence is the gift of God’s emptying of self, and that this gift
bears an element of responsibility towards creation.
For González Faus, this responsibility is a two-fold responsibility to “humanize
the earth” and to be in “communion with creation.” 51 As the privileged existence in
creation, human existence was created as the “subject of the covenant,” and was thus
created to create. 52 Being the subject of the covenant entails a profound responsibility to
create a new earth and a new history. Also, human existence has a responsibility to be in
communion with creation. This means that there ought to be respect for creation by way
of moderation. 53 Creation is not at the absolute disposal of human existence. Rather,
creation is a gift for human existence that has intrinsic value. This understanding of
creation as a gift for humanity challenges the notion that an individual person or group of
individuals has a right to reap the benefits of the earth without any obligation to, or
concern for, others or the earth.
The possibility to exceed its limited nature by human existence also points to the
universality of all of human existence. As González Faus argues, “the preeminence of
50
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human existence in creation would not be as such if it did not apply to all human
persons.” 54 He continues that “the particular dignity of human existence is that which
grounds the unity of all human kind.” 55 This universal dignity establishes the
fundamental ethic for a universal anthropology and the basis for a global justice. 56
Creatureliness, seen from the framework of the covenantal relationship,
fundamentally constitutes “an integral and open possibility” to fraternidad. 57 However,
for González Faus, a faith-oriented vision of human existence sees human existence as
composed of more than merely a finite existence.

Divine Image of God
As seen with Rahner, González Faus will make the case that human experience is
not adequately interpreted when the person is solely defined by their historical or
biological determinacy. There is within human existence “’something’ more”; a “spark, a
seed, an aura of divinity.” 58 For him, this “something more” is something that has to do
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with the possibility of human transcendence, and which in the biblical tradition is called
“the image and likeness of God.” 59
Within the biblical tradition, human existence is a unique embodied mediation of
the transcendent God. As González Faus sees it, the Hebrew Scriptures make it clear that
only human existence can mediate God and that all other forms of mediation (i.e., as
found in the prohibition of Ex.20:4-5) are idolatrous. In the Christian Scriptures, this
mediation is made definitive in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. 60
Beyond the biblical tradition, the question of what constitutes the notion “image
of God” within human existence does not have a definitive answer, according to
González Faus. However, as with Rahner, he argues that the fact that the question of
human transcendence can be raised discloses the openness of human creatureliness. 61 In
other words, human questioning and reflection reveals the very possibility of human
transcendence.
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In order to approach the question of what constitutes this openness of human
existence (viz., the image of God) González Faus explores various particular and holistic
responses to this question that highlight the fact that human existence strives for totality
and wholeness.
First, he looks at the question of what constitutes the image of God from
responses that isolate particular features and determinations within human existence. As
González Faus points out, the Fathers described the image of God as a risen, rational
figure or embodied spirit of God. Some of the Fathers saw this risen existence as
consisting in both body and soul, while the more Hellenized Fathers interpreted the image
of God by way of a Logos philosophy. 62
Medieval thinkers, in turn, understood the image of God as a divine faculty “only
in the spiritual and immortal soul.” 63 From this perspective, the image and likeness of
God was not perceived as an anthropological fact but rather as something theological. In
other words, the image of God within human existence “does not explain anything about
human existence but rather it says something about God: namely, that God is Spirit.” 64
More contemporary thinkers, such as Wolfhart Pannenberg however, see the
image of God as presented in Genesis 1:26 and Sirach 17:1-3 as constituting the ability to
have dominion. In other words, God has created human persons to create. 65 He adds that
the image of God within human existence also points to the “desire for immortality.” 66
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Other contemporary anthropologies, such as that of Karl Barth, understand human
existence as consisting in a “communion of persons.” More specifically for Barth, this
communion of persons finds its expression within human sexuality. 67
Emil Brunner, in turn, offers a description of the image of God that is rooted in
the notion of freedom. For Brunner, the best definition of God and of human existence is
that of freedom. More concretely, the human person’s freedom is imaged after God when
the person confronts the reality of God and says “no.” There is something within this
“no” that is “absolute.” 68 However, the human person’s freedom is truly like that of God
when the person says “yes” to God. This becomes, for Brunner, a “liberated freedom.” 69
González Faus argues that all of these descriptions are valid, and that they all
point to a certain essential reality within human existence. What they fundamentally
point to, for him, is that the image of God is a “universal particularity.” 70 This idea of the
image of God as a universal particularity is not a definitive description for González
Faus. It is, in effect, an abstraction that allows for the possibility of holding together in
tension the uniqueness and the commonality of the human person. González Faus argues
that this description of human existence is the most adequate because it best discloses
“the hard contradiction, the repeated tragedy, and the undeniable greatness of human
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existence,” and “because to the extent that human existence strives for totality, it is
clearly striving for divinity.” 71
Second, González Faus approaches the question of human existence by exploring
other responses that use more formal language. For example, human existence
constitutes a real dignity of the person. This dignity of each person means that every
individual person is an “impenetrable mystery” that should not be manipulated and must
be respected. 72 This means that there is an obligation towards a practical response by
other persons.
Human existence also consists of a “’restless heart,’ whether restless for love,
knowledge, power, or wealth.” 73 Human existence is a movement towards possibility
and a hope for the final consummation of history. For González Faus, this restlessness
ultimately means that the desire for any human value (e.g., love, and knowledge) is a
desire for God.74
A final example of a formal response is the idea that the image of God “implies a
new way to approach God.” 75 Since human existence constitutes an inclination to an
absolute end, God is acknowledged as the goal of and the energy behind this inclination.
In exploring all of these responses, González Faus concludes that the image of
God within human existence is a limitless dynamic calling. It is a calling as a task and a
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project, and marks the person’s destiny. 76 For that reason, the person is not a thing at rest
but rather a reality that is on the way; and on the way upward to an ascent. This notion of
ascent is not to be understood in the sense of a heaven. Rather, it is an ascent towards
filiación-fraternidad. Finally, to avoid any form of dualism infecting his anthropology,
González Faus argues that the image of God is not something added on to the person’s
creatureliness from beyond, but rather a way of being a creature or a way of living our
creatureliness. 77
The question now arises, is the divine dimension found within human existence
an immanent dimension within human existence or is it a dimension that is extrinsic to
human reality and is “added on” in some abstract way to human existence? 78 As
González Faus states the problem, “Is the ‘divine’ human or not human?” If one affirms
that the divine is intrinsic to human reality, then we deny that it is a gift from God
logically beyond human reality. If one contends that the divine is objectively extrinsic to
human reality, then it must be a characteristic that needs to be purged because it alienates
the person from their true nature.79
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On Spirit and Matter
Drawing from transcendental Thomism, González Faus attempts to maintain an
integral understanding of the spirit-body binomial in human existence. 80 He argues that
the soul is not the “motor” of the body, but rather the “form” of the body. Therefore,
without the soul there is no body, and without the body there exists no soul. Any notion
of the spirit-body binomial other than this one has the danger to lead towards dualism or
monism. Rather, as he put it, “The body is animated material, and the soul is incarnate
spirit.” 81 This renewal of the tradition’s understanding of the body-spirit dilemma allows
González Faus to correlate it to the problem of the relationship between the individual
and the social. In other words, the apparent contradiction between the human person as
an individual being and the person as a social being can be addressed by way of the bodysoul dilemma. Another way that classical theology looked at the spirit-body relationship
was to argue that spirit is the universal openness and familiarity with everything, whereas
matter constitutes the principle of individuation. 82 This correlation and use of unity-indistinction paradigm becomes key to González Faus’ conceptual argument for addressing
the apparent contradiction.
After exploring the formal structures of human existence within the
anthropologies of Rahner and González Faus, much can be seen as similar. However, the
problem of the human predicament must now be directly addressed. More specifically,
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the question of sin must now be considered. This next exploration will point out the
fundamental differences between the anthropologies of these two Jesuit theologians.

Rahner: The Fragility and Vulnerability of Human Existence
As Stephen J. Duffy argues, Rahner’s anthropology “is anything but naively
optimistic. Beyond ‘essential,’ integral, human being Rahner sees the existential human
being, whose integrity is won only by moral struggle, threatened as it is by its own
fallibility within, and a history of sin and guilt without.” 83 In Rahner’s own words,
“Guilt and sin are without doubt a central topic for Christianity,” and “any introduction to
the idea of Christianity would be deficient if it did not discuss man’s guilt and
forlornness, the necessity of deliverance from radical evil, redemption and the need for
redemption.” 84 Central to his exploration into the question of sin are the notions of
concupiscence, guilt, and original sin. 85
In Foundations, Rahner argues that the contemporary person does not have a
“clear consciousness that they stand before God burdened by guilt and blame,” and that
“modern social sciences have a thousand ways and means to ‘unmask’ the experience of
man’s guilt before God and to demolish it as a false taboo.” 86 Furthermore, the
contemporary person may not see the human being as a moral agent and attempt to argue
that moral norms are merely social constructs. Regardless of how the individual
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understands guilt and morality, Rahner claims that no one can deny the fact that the
human person is a responsible and accountable being. 87
He points out that “at least in certain dimensions of his existence (the person) has
the experience of being able to come and of actually coming into conflict with himself
and his original self-understanding.” 88 Since we are beings whose nature constitutes
greater possibilities, and since we can be aware of our own personal lacking in fulfilling
these possibilities we experience our own fragility and ambiguity. Furthermore, these
possibilities within human existence can be freely actualized or not actualized, and yet
the individual person must accept his or her responsibility in making these free decisions.

Concupiscence
A logical place to begin with an exploration into Rahner’s understanding of sin is
with the idea of the possibility of sin. A renewed inquiry into the traditional concept of
concupiscence gives Rahner the conceptual framework to reformulate a theology of sin
by way of the conditions for the possibility of sin. 89 It is in his early essay, “The
Theological Concept of Concupiscentia,” which originally appeared in 1941, where
Rahner attempts to offer this “fresh formulation of this concept” while situating it within
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the tradition and “the customary teaching of the theologians.” 90 He therefore approaches
the question of concupiscence in its “narrowest” or theological sense. 91
Throughout the history of Catholic theology, the doctrine of concupiscence has
traditionally been understood within the context of the doctrine of original sin.
Concupiscence has been understood either as a power that weighs the human person
down and induces the person towards sin (i.e., Augustine’s notion that original sin
inclines the person to choose evil) or the desire of the lower appetites in the human being
(i.e., the Post-Tridentine notion of the disordered orientation towards some created
good). 92 Instead of approaching the question of concupiscence from within these two
paradigms, which may lead Rahner to gravitate towards one theory over the other, he
approaches the problem from a transcendental analysis of the problem situated within the
contours of human freedom.
Rahner argues that a personal free decision is a “spiritual act” that orients the
whole of human existence towards the whole of reality (i.e., God). 93 Though it is a
spiritual act, this spiritual act is not “purely” spiritual. Instead, the free decision found
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within human existence is intrinsically connected to the sensible sphere of human
existence. 94
Understanding the personal free decision within the contours of an overall
orientation towards God, and within the contours of the sensible sphere of human
existence, Rahner wonders “how far the freely operative subject when he makes his
decision succeeds in actually extending this tendency totally to dispose of himself
throughout the whole extent of his being.” 95 In other words, does the human person, in
all of his or her free decisions and in the context of his or her created nature, ever
surrender the totality of their being to absolute being itself? This does not seem to be a
possibility, for Rahner, within created human existence. As he claims: “the dualism of
person and nature…has its metaphysical root in the finitude of man; thus ultimately in the
distinction between essence and existence, in virtue of which the essence, in its complete
unfolding, always remains an ideal capable of being attained only asymptotically by the
concretely existent being, even as regards the freedom through which it makes itself what
it is.” 96
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Therefore, for Rahner, there is an enduring conflict between the human as a given
nature and the ultimate desire of human existence that is never overcome by the created
human person. Rahner argues that “There always remains in the nature of things a
tension between what man is as a kind of entity simply present before one (as ‘nature’)
and what he wants to make of himself by his free decision (as ‘person’): a tension
between what he is simply passively and what he actively posits himself as and wishes to
understand himself to be.” 97 This tension is what Rahner understands as concupiscence
in its narrowest (i.e., theological) sense.
The notion of concupiscence, then, is not strictly located within the traditional
paradigm of original sin and the personal experience of sin. Rather, for Rahner,
concupiscence in its theological sense is best understood within the duality of what the
individual human being is as a created finite being (i.e., a given nature), and what the
individual hopes to become (i.e., a potentially free person). Concupiscence is not a
product of original sin, but is the enduring tension found within human existence as free
persons strive to create themselves as persons. Therefore, concupiscence in its
theological sense, as a precondition prior to individual free decisions, cannot be
designated strictly as evil. Rather, as Rahner argues, “as far as concupiscence (in the
theological sense) precedes the free decision…it cannot be characterized as morally evil,
let alone as sin.” 98 Concupiscence in the narrowest sense is a bivalent, neutral term.
However, the argument in “The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia”
continues setting the groundwork for the real possibility for human sinfulness. Rahner
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argues that concupiscence, “can of course be called ‘evil’ in so far as it is only present in
man in its concrete existential form in virtue of the Fall of the first man…and in so far
as…it can on occasion also drive towards what is morally impermissible contrary to
man’s free decision and thus lead to sin.” 99
This possibility to sin is both already given within human existence prior to free
decision (i.e., as in the classical doctrine of original sin), and as what determines free
conscious acts.

Sin as a Free and Personal Decision against God
Rahner is clear about the fact that the exercise of freedom by the individual
person is “a freedom for something of final and definitive validity, and a freedom which
is actualized in a free and absolute ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to that term and source of transcendence
which we call ‘God.’” 100
For Rahner, the freedom that is actualized in the world is never a purely direct
“yes” or “no” to God as the unthematic transcendental horizon of the totality of the
individual, but rather is always one that is mediated in the concrete world of objects.
However, as he argues “Even in the act of such a thematic ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to God, this ‘yes’
is not affirmed immediately to the God of original and transcendental experience, but
only to the God of thematic, categorical reflection, to a God in concepts, maybe even
only to a God in false gods…” 101
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This possibility of saying “no” to the transcendent and absolute God by saying
“yes” to “a God in false gods” does not lead to hopelessness nor does it contradict or
negate the fact of human freedom. Rather, when the individual person acts authentically
within the realm of their freedom by striving for what is beyond their selves, the person is
deciding to respond affirmatively to God’s will. Thus, in every authentic act of freedom
that moves the person beyond themselves is an encounter with God “in all the things of
the world, and therefore and especially in our neighbor.”102
For Rahner, freedom’s possibility can also consist of a “no” to God through
various ways. The person can primarily ignore their experience of freedom and
transcendence. This is categorically done by preoccupying and busying oneself with the
material world and all of its attractions and diversions. The person can also feel that any
real meaningful questions about one’s existence and the meaning to this existence can be
postponed to a later date when the busyness stops or when one is financially stable. The
person can also ignore the experience by arguing that any questions of ultimate meaning
make no sense and are pointless. This sense of meaninglessness in life may emerge from
a latent feeling of despair.
This possibility of freedom to say “no” is something “abortive,” “selfdestructive,” and “self-contradictory.” 103 It is in statements like this that the significance
and seriousness of Rahner’s theology surfaces. For Rahner, there is a sense of radical
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decisiveness in the possibility of human freedom and the gravity of human decision.
Human existence can definitively choose against human life.
This experience of the lack of integration of human existence in its totality before
God arises from a situation and history of guilt existing prior to personal freedom, and
from choices and decisions made within that freedom.

Original Sin
After showing Rahner’s foundation for the possibility of human sinfulness, and
examining the exercise of freedom as a personal “yes” or “no” to God by the individual,
an exploration into his understanding of what traditional Catholic theology calls “original
sin” is in order.
For Rahner, in order to talk about the doctrine of “original sin,” it is imperative to
lay some groundwork. The premise that he begins with is the claim that an individual’s
act of subjective freedom becomes objectified in the world, and that this act of freedom
co-determines the situation of other individuals’ subjective freedom. An individual
person’s subjective freedom is not disengaged from history, time or society. Rather, the
individual “always and inevitably exercises his personal, inalienable and unique acts of
freedom in a situation which he finds prior to himself, which is imposed on him, and
which is ultimately the presupposition of his freedom.” 104 Therefore, the individual’s
free acts are affected by the free personal choices and acts of others. Furthermore, the
guilt of others becomes a factor in the free choices and acts of the individual.
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Having established the claim that an individual’s freedom is co-determined by the
freedom of other persons in the world, he challenges the notion that original sin is
something that arises from a single act of freedom, whether by Adam or the first humans,
and that is biologically inherited by subsequent generations. He argues that this
understanding of the concept is not a Christian one. He states that “Personal guilt from
an original act of freedom cannot be transmitted, for it is the existentiell ‘no’ of personal
transcendence towards God or against him. And by its very nature this cannot be
transmitted, just as the formal freedom of a subject cannot be transmitted.” 105 The
personal free decision of an individual is unique to the individual and that consists of
responsible acknowledgement of the consequences attached to the decision.
Original sin, then, is the “original” guilt that is “already imbedded in the origin of
this history.” 106 Rahner claims that the meaning of original sin is based on two factors.
He argues that “it is based on the universality of the determination by guilt of every
person’s situation, and this factor includes the original nature of this determination by
guilt in the history of the human race” and “it is based on the reflexive insight, deepening
with the history of revelation and salvation, into the nature of the relationship between
God and man.” 107
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González Faus: The Project of Enmity
(Rupture of the Filial; Corruption of the Fraterno)
González Faus claims that language about sin has recently had “bad press” and is,
in a way, no longer understood.108 He sees that this bad press has arisen from a notion of
sin that is no longer adequate for our contemporary context. Though he does not attempt
to elaborate the reasons for this bad press nor does he specifically blame any particular
harmatology, it becomes clear throughout his exploration into a new language for sin that
he locates the problem in a harmatology that views sin as only a deliberate, conscious,
and private transgression against God and God’s eternal law. His task, as he sees it, is to
find a new language to describe the reality of sin. He argues that the language of sin for
today must be one in which sin is understood as a reality that is hidden and masked,
structured in institutions, and as an offense against God, which ultimately damages
human existence. An adequate language of sin for today must also address both the
personal as well as the impersonal dimensions of sin.

Human Instability
In Proyecto de hermano, González Faus begins his exploration into the notion of
sin by pointing out the instability found in human existence. In other words, humans are
not just limited and finite creatures that are prone to death, but human existence also
constitutes, in its innermost dimension, a form of instability. Drawing from the thought
of Paul Ricoeur, human being is a labile being. This unstable nature of human existence
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does not cause sin but is the condition for sin’s possibility. 109 It is an experience that is
unique to human existence and is not analogous to the limitedness of being found in other
living creatures. In other words, this lability within human existence is the human
possibility to hate another person, to be cruel towards and inflict injury on another
person, and the potential to systematically eliminate another person.
After establishing the condition of the possibility of sin in human lability,
González Faus attempts to discover a more adequate language about sin that is
fundamentally rooted in human experience. 110 He argues that an exploration into the
reality of sin must take into consideration the experiential dimension and the fundamental
power of sin. As he sees it, within the depths of human experience is a personal
experience of alienation. This experience is what González Faus understands to be the
most inauthentic experience of human existence and which is at the heart of the teachings
of Catholic theology about the human person. 111
Employing the scriptures, he points out that the first experience of sin for the
Israelites was not Adam and Eve (i.e., a metaphysical description of the “essence” of sin
in human existence) or even Cain (i.e., an individual offence against another individual),
but rather the Israelites’ experience of alienation in Egypt and of social oppression by the
Egyptians. As in the interpretation of creation, it is the Exodus story that reveals the first
experience of sin for the authors of the Torah. More concretely, it is not through reason
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that the person recognizes sin, but in the concrete experience of sin, inflicted by others,
that the human person comes to realize the reality and nature of sin. 112 The victims of
society, not the victors, are those who most acknowledge the reality and existence of sin.

The Masking of Sin
To find an adequate language about sin, González Faus attempts to situate what
constitutes the ultimate power of sin. He postulates that this power is constituted by
“masking, lying, blindness,” and “unconsciousness” (inconsciencia).113 What is
essentially masked is the true nature of human existence, which is the covenantal
relationship between the human person and God as Father (viz., the vocation of divine
filiación) and the covenantal relationship between the human person and others (viz.,
fraternidad). The idea that at the heart of sin is its ability to mask and hide itself, whether
in the form of concrete lies or an unconscious unawareness, and that the true nature of sin
must be revealed through an unmasking or disclosure is evident for him in Paul’s letter to
the Romans.
In this letter, Paul uses two biblical categories as a rhetorical device to describe
the nature of sin, namely the “Gentile” (el pagano) and the “Jew.” 114 As González Faus
argues, as types, they do not represent any specific religious or cultural group, whether
past or present. Rather, they are “two ways of living as a human being that is present
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within each one of us.” 115 Both types of sin illustrate an anti-fraternal posture of human
being.
The first form of sin that Paul in his letter describes is that of the “Gentile” or
“Pagan.” This form of sin consists in the divinization (i.e., the absolutization) of the “I”
or the self. The philosophical starting point for this type of sin is the logic of the
statement “I desire, therefore I am.” It has its roots in the practical egolatry (i.e., the
divinization of the “I” through the absolutization of desire). 116 Any sort of moral
compass arises from the self and the self’s desires. When this type of sin becomes
embodied within the individual, it takes the form of personal lies. When this type of sin
becomes embodied in the group, it takes the form of ideological, institutional and
structural lies.
The consequences of this self-absolutizing and the absolutizing of the ego’s
desires is that the truth about human existence and about God is replaced with the lie, i.e.,
the absolutization of one’s own self and one’s own desires. Also, this form of sin leads to
the disregard for others; it is the person’s lack of consideration for all of reality, not just
one’s own reality. Fundamentally, the sin of this type is the falsification and perversion
of the truth of the most definitive dimensions of human existence (i.e., filiación and
fraternidad). Instead of human existence being an image and reflection of God, human
existence becomes its own God. In addition, instead of human existence being defined as
inherently social, human existence becomes defined as inherently atomistic or
individualistic.
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González Faus argues that the contemporary form of this sin is made manifest in
the anthropology of the Western world, which is marked by egocentrism and modern
“enlightened” individualism. It is also made manifest in the economic system of
capitalism. The nature of capitalism as a system is to maximize profits and bring others
to maximize consumption. The system is legitimized by the necessity of some profit as
the fruit of economic activity without considering everything else and everyone else. 117 It
also becomes legitimized by the maximizing of consumption by individuals. If
individuals do not maximize consumption, then the system becomes paralyzed and it
eventually collapses.
The second type of sin that Paul’s letter to the Romans describes is the sin of the
“Jew.” 118 This second type of sin constitutes the sins of accusation and hypocrisy. The
hypocrite sanctions his or her own actions while condemning the other person who acts in
the same manner. This person has no patience or sense of forgiveness for the sins or
moral transgressions of others, and condemns the actions that they commit. This form of
sin has the potential to lead to the absolute condemnation, and, subsequently, oppression
of other individuals and communities.
Moving away from first-century Pauline rhetoric, which can be misunderstood
and ultimately harmful, González Faus uses the example of the terrorist to describe this
form of sin. The terrorist believes that the life of others is expendable in order for, what
is in their reasoning, often considered “higher ideals” or justice. The terrorist also

117

118

Ibid., 209.

Again, as noted earlier, the term “Jew” does not refer to any cultural or religious group for Paul but is a
literary type for rhetorical purposes.

123
believes that they have been given authority (e.g., by God or through human reason) to
make the appropriate changes within a society and that the authority given to them is
absolute. The absolute authority subsequently permits any action to eliminate the
problem. In addition, for González Faus, the category of “terrorist” in this context is not
limited to individuals or small groups of people. Rather, it can also be applied to nations
that attempt to “terrorize” others by their economic and military power.

Restoring the Language of Sin: Sin as an Offense against God
González Faus now examines four possible descriptions of sin. He points out that
“The reality of sin can be suggested by the language of blemish, described by the
language of transgression and can best be defined in the notion of straying from the right
path. However, language about sin needs to be religiously transformed through the
experience of offense against God.” 119
First, González Faus looks at the language of blemish or stain. He argues that the
language of blemish can suggest the reality of sin but that this type of language is
ambiguous. With this language of sin, there are no real criteria of what contaminates the
person or the origins of this contamination. However, there is an experience of disgust or
dirtiness and suggests the existence of sin in the human person.
Secondly, he explores the language of transgression. This language can describe
sin, as in the case with the language of stain, but this language still does not define sin.
Transgression is connected to the ethical language of moral obligations and duty. This
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language objectifies sin, but also abstracts it and externalizes it outside of human
existence.
Third, he examines the question of sin as digression or straying from the right
path. This form of language about sin characterizes sin better than the previous terms and
can be helpful to define sin. However, this language remains in the privatized realm of
human existence. The language of digression or straying suggests a personal failure on
the part of the individual and does not necessarily incorporate the interpersonal and social
consequences of sin. This language needs to be “religiously transformed” in order to
express the ultimate dimension of human being and therefore the ultimate dimension of
sin. 120
Finally, he approaches the question of sin in terms of offense against God or the
breaking of the covenantal relationship. This language about sin expresses the
interpersonal and social realms of human existence. Language of offense does not
necessarily mean a legal offense against a lawgiving God. The use of covenantal
language allows for an understanding of offense not as an offense against a master (el
Amo) or legislator. Rather, covenantal language transforms the language of offense into a
trespass against a beloved or loved one (El Amor). Understanding offense against the
covenantal relationship with God is understood by González Faus as an offense against
the gift of and call to be the image and likeness of God.
For González Faus, these last two descriptions of sin are more adequate to the
reality of sin because they illustrate the real nature and power of sin (viz., the masking of
sin). Whereas the first two descriptions of sin view sin as something that can be
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objectified, located, and measured, the last two descriptions do not.121 Talk about sin
must be in terms of broken or corrupted covenantal relationships and not as a thing that
can be measured or located outside of human relationality. Therefore, for González Faus,
sin is the corruption and damage of the covenants of filiación and fraternidad.

Structural Sin
The use of the categories “structural” and “social” by Catholic theologians to
describe a certain dimension of sin arises out of the changes within Catholic theology
after Vatican II. The direct use of these categories appeared in Catholic theology after
the Latin American Bishops Conferences (CELAM) in Medellin in 1968 and in Puebla in
1979. González Faus argues, as would many other theologians who employ these
categories, the use of “structural” and “social” to describe a certain dimension of sin does
not negate the significance or the seriousness of personal sin. Rather, structural sin can
help better make sense of personal sin. 122
For González Faus, the use of the categories “social” and “structural” help the
theologian offer a language to describe the power of sin to mask itself and the context
that this power creates within the social dimension of human existence. He argues that
“All of us are anonymously situated in, invaded by and infected with anti-fraternidad. 123
In other words, human existence exists within and shaped by a context of conflict and
enmity. This infection and invasion is the product of a “foreign evil force” in the world
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that transforms human activity into an instrument of sin. 124 This force consists of the
externalization of sin (pecado estructurante) whereby individual egoisms become a part
of institutions and systems within a society, the objectification of sin (pecado
estructurado) whereby sin infects and shapes the social institutions and systems, and the
creation of unjust situations and contexts by these institutions and systems whereby all
individuals within society become victims of this foreign force.
Taking his lead from the theology of sin of the Dutch Jesuit Piet Schoonenberg,
González Faus argues that the early church was familiar with the masking and impersonal
feature of sin with the Johannine notion of “the sin of the world.” 125 He points out that,
according to the Gospel of John, Christ took away the sin of the world and not particular
sins.
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“The world,” in John, i.e., the cosmological-human system, is the world that is

created and loved by God. When sin is inserted in this system, then the world becomes a
place of self-divinization and enmity. 127 The “world,” for González Faus, is the
relational dimension of human existence inasmuch as it is structured in a way that is
contrary to the God and to the human person. 128 The “sin of the world” is the sin of
human existence that constitutes nothing less than that which is diametrically opposed to
the person of Jesus and the Kingdom of God. From this “sin,” individual human persons
become sons and daughters (i.e., victims) of this world.
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Externalization of Sin in Society (el pecado estructurante)
González Faus argues that a characteristic of sin is its externalization. Appealing
to social analysis, he argues that “evil is never merely personal.” 129 Since human persons
are inserted into social institutions that precede the individual person’s existence, and
human activity is always simultaneously active and passive, every activity has an effect
on the society or social institution to which the person belongs. 130 In other words, human
persons create society but are also marked and conditioned by society. Therefore, when
the human person thinks only about him or herself or acts only for him or herself, fissures
begin to form within the bonds of relationships. Ultimately, these fissures form into
perceivable cracks within the social system.
Though sin appears within social structures, it is not born from these structures. 131
Rather, sin is found within social structures because of the lability within human
existence that establishes the conditions for the possibility of sin. This reveals the fact
that sin comes from the human person’s lack of fraternidad. Sin comes from the person’s
tendency to absolutize their self-interests. 132 The person approaches society with the
thought that his own particular good is that of the community’s. 133
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Objectification of Sin in Society (el pecado estructurado)
As persons create institutions within society, they taint these institutions with their
sinfulness. These social institutions in turn become objectified entities that shape and
form human persons within society. González Faus offers three examples of social
structures that become bearers of sin. They are ideologies and values; influences and
examples; needs and customs. 134
The first example of structured sin in society is the notion of externalized social
values (“ideologies”) that become corrupted. As González Faus argues, every society has
a system of values and interests. These values, whether just or unjust, are often upheld
and assumed natural by systems that are found within a particular society. The strong
anti-communist sentiments within the West during the last century and into this century
are an example of structural values within a society. When certain values compromise
human freedom and dignity, those values become destructive to human relationships.
The second example of structured sin in society is the notion of social influences
and examples that become corrupt (the “scandal”). González argues that human persons
are situated beings and are formed by that situation. He also argues that human persons
attain self-awareness through an experience of the other. He gives the example of
education. He argues that education is essential to the human being because of the
contradictory nature of the human condition (viz., the contradiction between individual
and social, spiritual and material, natural and supernatural, etc.).135 As situated beings,
human persons simultaneously learn from others and influence and affect others. When
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an individual person strives to fulfill his or her own desires, others become formed by
those egocentric actions and attitudes. Scandals “do not just arise contingently as the
fruit of a perverted expressed will…rather the whole person in a way shapes the goodness
and evil of others and is formed in his goodness and evil by the life of others.” 136
The last example of structured sin in society that González Faus proposes is the
situation in which certain needs become falsified or corrupted. Certain perceived “needs”
become a part of the necessities of a particular society. These perceived needs then
become imbedded within the culture as necessary for the proper functioning of the
society, and even perceived to be natural needs or needs that have been sanctioned by
God. There are many examples in which social “necessities” or “needs” have in fact
been social injustices (e.g., slavery, human sacrifices, the Inquisition…). For González
Faus, this form of sin is clearly noticeable when an economic system such as capitalism,
and its “law of the market” claim, becomes seen as something natural and something
necessary. The law of competition is viewed as something natural and necessary, and
therefore is, and should be, the law that governs the world and human existence.
When these needs of society become seen as natural and necessary, and become
absolutized, all other forms of possibilities become heretical or too idealistic. Anything
else is viewed as a natural impossibility (imposibilidad implantada). In other words,
there is no alternative to the status quo established by the powerful within society. This
form of sin fundamentally threatens human faith and even the possibility of faith or any
form of human possibilities. Hope, then, is placed in this world rather than in God.
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Historicity of Sin
The historicity of sin is also an essential aspect of González Faus’ harmatology.
An adequate language of sin must take into consideration the historicity of sin, according
to González Faus. Both an understanding of the reality of sin and the categories to
describe sin must have a historical dimension.
For González Faus, human evil and sin are not abstractions separated from human
history or a onetime event within history. As illustrated in the biblical story of David and
Bathsheba, human evil is both progressive and cumulative. In other words, human
inequity takes on a spiral effect. Just as it is possible, for González Faus, to analyze the
cumulative sins of an individual within their personal histories, so too can the structural
nature of sin be analyzed on the level of global history. 137
González Faus also argues that any exploration into the nature of sin must realize
that the categories that are being employed to describe sin are bound by history. He
argues that the use of historical categories does not mean merely asking about the
temporal origins of sin but also the attempt to understand the language of sin as a
language in flux. 138 Ultimately, the process of sin is the frustration of the human promise
of filiación-fraternidad.
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Original Sin: The Structured Condition within Human Existence
For González Faus, sin does not only affect the structures of society, but it also
affects the structures within the individual person. 139 This interior structuration of human
existence is what Christian theology calls “original sin.” 140
As González Faus argues, adequate language about original sin must include the
idea of the condition of the possibility of egoism (egoísmo potenciado) or the notion of a
particular egoism (amor sui). This is necessary because egoism is the ultimate source of
the masking of sin. 141 As González Faus argues, the notion that human existence from
the beginning (i.e., the “origin”) is broken and damaged does not mean that there is a
simple lack of harmony among particular elements within human existence (e.g., the
lower material vs. the higher spiritual aspects of human existence) or a lack of harmony
among particular desires. Rather, original damage within human existence is the
governing of human instincts and desires by a principle of the absolutization of the ego
and a contempt for others.142
With the advancements in biological anthropology, González Faus argues that
what theology called “peccatum originale originans” (Adam’s concrete act of
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disobedience) can be understood as something “global” and “evolutionary.” 143 This
dimension of original sin is the sin of all of humanity and of all of history. In other
words, the notion that all human persons have original sin “means that this humanity
(humankind) is that which is deteriorated, separated from God, and self-deceiving.” 144
In correlating the structuration of sin to the doctrine of original sin, he proposes
four conclusions about what constitutes original sin. First, he concludes that human
existence is damaged interiorly. 145 This interior damage is a condition of “weakness and
inferiority.” 146 González Faus argues that “classical theology” called this interior damage
“pecado original originado.” 147
Second, he concludes that “this damage is caused by the human person: the
structuration of sin on all levels of human life,” and that “this damage already begins at
the origin of human history.” González Faus argues that these next two descriptions of
human damage are equivalent to what classical theology called “pecado original
originante.”148
Lastly, he concludes that “this damage contradicts the will of God about human
existence.” He argues that this last description of human damage “attempts to understand
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why classical theology dared to call sin “original” of what was said in the first
proposition.” 149
With these conclusions, González Faus offers his reinterpretation of the doctrine
of original sin as constituting the following historical process: first, human existence’s
act of willful separation (viz., separation from one another and from the ground and goal
of human existence); second, God’s condemnation of this separation; and lastly, the
subsequent damaged relationship between humanity and God.150 This reinterpretation of
the doctrine of original sin affirms four points: first, that human history as it has occurred
is not what God has willed; second, the globalized and globalizing world as it appears is
not what God wants for the human community; third, the individual person has not
become what God had intended the individual to become; and fourth, all of these realities
continue to grow and reoccur as a fatal dynamic movement away from God. 151
The Theologal Dimension of Sin 152
Drawing upon Irenaeus of Lyons, González Faus claims that offense against God
is the person’s self-destruction by one’s self, and this self-destruction is the alienation of
one’s self from God.153 This self-destruction is the ultimate dimension of sin.
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As González Faus points out, there exists an awareness of guilt and blame within
human existence. 154 This consists in the rejection of the truth that human persons ought
to live by the “absolutely transformative event that God exists.” 155 When the individual
person rejects any ultimate meaning to his or her existence, or any significance of an
ultimate meaning for his or her life, then the individual rejects the very meaning of
human existence.
For González Faus, the content of guilt and blame is the perversion of the human
person’s relationship with God that takes place not only in religious activities but also in
worldly activities. 156 He states that “[s]inning against God is not doing harm to God’s
divinity, but rather doing harm to the Son’s ‘body’ and the ‘temple’ of the Spirit (i.e., the
human being).” 157 Thus, any offense against God is the person’s self-destruction by
one’s self.
This self-destruction is the damage that is done to the ultimate ground and
structure of human existence. This ultimate ground and structure is the theologal
dimension of human existence, which is human existence’s “‘supernatural’ destiny” as
the divine image and likeness. 158 It is “the form of love and freedom that have been
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revealed as profoundly human – by being truly divine – in Jesus of Nazareth.” 159 Thus,
the theologal dimension of sin is the ultimate damage of the relationship between human
existence and God and the damage of the relationship among persons. It is the
disharmony with what ultimately constitutes human and what leads to the deterioration of
the covenants of filiación and fraternidad.
To conclude, González Faus’ claim that the paradigm of all sin is the death of the
Son of God points to this theologal dimension of sin. It fundamentally points to the
radical nature of sin as the enmity and non-communion of persons in a recurrent process
of culpable egoism that ruptures the person’s relationship with God, corrodes solidarity,
and inhibits the person’s movement towards the person’s definitive goal of filiaciónfraternidad.

Concluding Remarks
At this point it is imperative to return to the central problem of this dissertation:
the need for a re-examination and re-articulation of the current theory of human existence
within Catholic theology in order to offer a viable approach to the crisis of extreme
poverty and the social ills that come with extreme poverty by way of an alternative
anthropology. More specifically to this chapter, a re-examination and re-articulation of a
theory of human existence within Catholic theology must present an account of the
human predicament and human sin that can best shed light on the problem of global
disparity which I claim emerges from the prevailing anthropology at the heart of the
current direction of globalization. It is clear that Rahner’s theological anthropology still
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offers a very sound foundation to approach the problem with his transcendental
anthropology that presents the free and responsible subjective experience. However, it is
my contention that the anthropology of González Faus provides contemporary Catholic
theology the necessary shift in understanding human existence that does not do away
with Rahner’s anthropology but rather builds on his foundation and yet presses it in a
new direction and with a new methodology.
More concretely, this chapter uncovered three important points of distinction
between Rahner and González Faus in their exploration into the human predicament and
sin. The first point deals with the human subject. This distinction consists of two parts.
First, Rahner’s understanding of the human subject is based on a Marechalian Thomism
that sees the subject as a dynamic reality that strives for the absolute mystery in love,
knowledge and truth. For González Faus, influenced by the thought of Ricoeur and Latin
American liberation theologians, the human subject is marked by instability and
fallibility. Second, González Faus does affirm the transcendental idea that the subject
strives for the absolute mystery in love, knowledge and truth. However, the reality of this
absolute mystery is its communal nature (i.e., Trinitarian). Therefore, reality is
Trinitarian and it is made manifest within social and relations and community. 160
The next point of distinction is found in the use of language to describe human
existence and the human predicament. Rahner’s use of the transcendental method and
Heideggerian categories to describe human existence offers a viable global approach to
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argue for the dignity of all human persons, and therefore the need for global justice. 161
Also, a Rahnerian description of the human predicament which depicts the human subject
as being radically conditioned by guilt and therefore marked by a potential to reject God
and reject other persons offers a reasonable explanation of sin in the world. However, it
is my contention that the biblical language of covenant (viz., filiación and fraternidad) to
describe human existence, and the damaging of covenant by sin, especially through the
categories of masking and the lie, to describe the human predicament is a more adequate
language to employ within the contemporary globalizing context that has enshrined a
radically individualistic and egocentric anthropology.
The third distinction is González Faus’ use of the critical-social theory which
brings into view the effects of society upon the individual person. His use of the literary
and social analysis of the Frankfurt School, especially the literary method of social
critique of Walter Benjamin, has given him the necessary methodology to view the nature
of sin as constituting an historical process and as affecting the interior and the exterior
structures of human existence.
The critique that Rahner’s exploration into sin lacks any social categories holds
little ground in light of recent reflection on the evolution of his theology, especially in
part to Metz’ challenge. It is clear that the trajectory of Rahner’s anthropology was
moving in the direction of greater concern for addressing social sin. Unfortunately, he
never did present a complete systematic articulation of social sin. Looking to Rahner for
a formal articulation of sin is necessary. However, to remain with that understanding of
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sin limits the possibilities for addressing the human predicament that I contend is at the
root of global disparity.
The following chapter, then, will explore the themes of grace and redemption
within the anthropologies of Rahner and González Faus in order to assess which
anthropology offers the most adequate response to the misdirection of globalization, its
prevailing anthropology, and the reality of global disparity.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE SAVING ACTIVITY OF GOD
In his book Divine Revolution, Dean Brackley asks the question, “What is the
relationship of God’s saving action (grace), not simply to subjects (even to social
subjects), but to the social relations and institutions, especially to oppressive social
relations and death-dealing institutions?” 1 In that same work, Jon Sobrino is quoted as
contending that “The essential relationship between faith and salvation is not at issue, and
in official tradition, we are in possession of a (reductive) understanding of salvation in
the line of redemption from sin and of transcendent salvation. The controverted element,
then, is historical and social salvation.” 2 Both of these quotes clearly point out that the
problem in soteriology (i.e., the relationship of God’s saving activity to human existence)
is not that of the relationship of God to human persons, which is the common
understanding of the Christian notion of salvation, but instead the relationship of God to
human communities and to human structures.
The previous chapter of this dissertation made the claim that there is a tension and
a predicament found in the structure of human existence. The chapter also made the
argument that sin is a reality in the depths of human persons that affect’s human relations
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and also human structures, and that it is the radical nature of sin that is at the root of
global disparity. Finally, the chapter concluded that the most compelling theory of sin
that best connects the notion of sin to the problem of the current global order and the
reality of global disparity is one that sees sin as the enmity and non-communion of
persons in a recurrent process of culpable egoism that ruptures the person’s relationship
with God, corrodes solidarity, and inhibits the person’s movement towards the person’s
definitive goal of filiación-fraternidad. These conclusions ultimately point to the fact
that human existence is radically damaged and in profound need of redemption. This
redemption must include all of human existence, which means that since human existence
consists of historical and social dimensions this redemption must be a redemption not
only of the transcendental and historical dimensions of human persons, but also the
redemption of human communities and human structures.3 The goal of this chapter, then,
is to explore the theories of grace and redemption in the anthropologies of Rahner and
González Faus in order to address what Brackley and Sobrino see as the main problem in
soteriology, and to begin assessing which anthropology will offer a more effective
response to the present course of globalization and the inherent anthropology in this
current course of globalization. 4
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Rahner: Grace as the Gift of Divine Self-Presence
Rahner’s entire theological program can be considered a theology of grace.
Central to his theological anthropology is the notion that all of creation, and particularly
human existence, is saturated with grace. For Rahner, grace is not something that is
other-worldly and that is added to the world or to human existence. Rather, grace is the
gift of God’s self in the depths of all existence. It is the free gift of God’s indwelling
presence in human existence and experienced through human history. It is the formal
object that informs human consciousness in history and in the final vision of God. It is
also the radical fulfillment of human existence as made manifest in the incarnation of
Christ.

God’s Self-Communication
The notion of grace for Rahner can be summed up in his statement that grace is
“God’s self-communication in love.” 5 This self-communication is fundamentally what
God wills for creation (i.e., the world and human existence), and what God wills is God’s
self. As Rahner understands it, the goal of God’s plan for human existence is ultimate
communion with God’s self. He states that “God wishes to communicate himself, to pour
forth the love which he himself is. That is the first and the last of his real plans and hence
of his real world too. Everything else exists so that this one thing might be: the eternal
miracle of infinite Love.” 6 In other words, God has graciously and freely chosen to draw
near to human persons in order to be in a communion of everlasting kenotic love with all
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of human existence and thus redeem human existence. For Rahner, this gracious plan of
God’s salvation takes place in the individual person’s concrete history and situation and
is offered to all human persons.

The Gift as God’s Indwelling Self-Presence
This self-communication of God is not a collection of facts about some distant
deity. As Rahner claims, “‘Self-communication’ is meant here in a strictly ontological
sense corresponding to man’s essential being, man whose being is being-present-tohimself, and being personally responsible for himself in self-consciousness and
freedom.” 7 God is in fact making God’s self “the innermost constitutive element” of
human existence. 8
In an attempt to address the prevalent theories of grace that were found in the
manual theologies of the time, Rahner’s Theological Investigations often employed
categories of personal encounter to envision grace. 9 Therefore, within Rahner’s theology
of grace, God’s self-communication is seen as a freely given loving and personal
presence and embrace within human existence, and it is this presence and loving embrace
that ultimately transforms and fulfills human existence. As Rahner argues, this gift of
God’s self is in fact an interpersonal encounter. He states that
Grace is God himself, the communication in which he gives himself to
man as the divinizing favour which he is himself. Here his work is really
7
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himself since it is he who is imparted. Such grace, from the very start,
cannot be thought of independently of the personal love of God and its
answer in man. This grace is not thought of as a ‘thing’. It is something
that is only ‘put at man’s disposal’ in that act of ‘letting oneself be
disposed of’ which is the proper gift of the freest grace, the miracle of
love.” 10
Since Rahner was concerned about the interpersonal nature of grace, one of his
tasks was to address the classical debate over the relationship between “created” and
“uncreated” grace. This meant that Rahner had to address the manual theologies of his
day that were rooted in nineteenth century Scholasticism. As Rahner saw it, neoScholastic theology was not incorrect regarding its teachings on the relationship between
created and uncreated grace, but rather that a return to the patristic theology of grace
could draw out what was latent in Scholastic theology. 11 Rahner argued that, on the one
hand, in Scripture and in the Fathers, “the created gifts of grace [are] a consequence of
God’s substantial communication to justified men.” 12 On the other hand, in Scholastic
theology the presence of uncreated grace (i.e., the “indwelling of the Spirit”) in the
justified person “is seen merely as a consequence of the bestowal of created grace.” 13 In
other words, created grace is an “absolute entitative modification and determination of
man.” 14 It is a precondition of uncreated grace.
In order to offer an adequate solution to harmonize the two theological traditions
without favoring one tradition over the other, Rahner employs the notion of formal
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causality. As Rahner argues, using Thomistic terminology, the relationship between God
and the created person can be constructed by way of cause and effect. However, God’s
relationship to human existence is not as that of efficient causality, but rather in the
category of formal causality. 15 As Rahner points out, “in efficient causality the effect is
always different than the cause.” In formal causality, “a principle of being is a
constitutive element in another subject by the fact that it communicates itself to this
subject.”16
Rahner modifies this category with the prefix “quasi” (i.e., “as if”). What this
“quasi” means for Rahner is that the “form” (i.e., the ground of the knowledge of God in
the beatific vision) “abides in its absolute transcendence (inviolateness, ‘freedom’).” 17
He argues that this use of quasi “provides an emphatic reminder of the analogical nature
of our concepts in the matter of a relationship to the world known only through
Revelation.” 18 Therefore, the difficulty in harmonizing the two traditions is resolved
through the categories of formal causality and formal ontology, and with the analogical
modification “quasi.” 19
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Rahner then raises the question whether or not this proposed solution to the
problem endangers “the significance of created grace for justification, adoption, etc., as
Trent sees them?” 20 In order to address this question and remain within the tradition,
Rahner argues that “there does not exist even the beginning of a possibility of thinking of
created grace apart from uncreated grace, and so of thinking of uncreated grace as a fresh
gift arising out of a new and independent demonstration of God’s grace.” 21 Rather,
created grace is the disposition for the uncreated gift of God’s presence. He argues that
“[i]n order that it can be a dispositio for uncreated grace at all, it does indeed have first of
all the character of a formal entitative, supernatural determination of the human
spirit…” 22
So that uncreated grace does not become a mere consequence of created grace,
Rahner recalls that “created grace alone (as a finite determination of the subject) can be
called forma in the strict (categorical) sense of the word (as opposed to the divine Being
itself, which remains transcendent with respect to the creature in spite of its formal
causality).” 23 Created grace, then, “constitutes man as a subject fit to receive the
substantial gift of the divine essence for a future visio” and “it assimilates man to God’s
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nature.” 24 Furthermore, he contends that “[i]t is through created grace alone that man
becomes a subject who is capable of knowing and loving God supernaturally, who has
the capacity for it. But in order that such a supernatural ‘life’ should become actual there
is need further of the self-communication of the object of this supernatural life…” 25

The Experience of Grace
The questions then arise, how does the human person actually and concretely
experience the indwelling presence of God and how does the indwelling presence of God
affect how the person lives in the world? In his article “Reflections on the Experience of
Grace” Rahner asks the question unambiguously and precisely: “Have we ever actually
experienced grace? We do not mean by this some pious feeling, a sort of festive religious
uplift, or any soft comfort, but precisely the experiencing of grace, i.e. of that visitation
by the Holy Spirit of the triune God which has become a reality in Christ through his
becoming man and through his sacrifice on the Cross.” 26
Referring back to our most basic and fundamental transcendental structure of
human existence, Rahner argues that the movements of grace cannot be unambiguously
distinguished from the cor inquietum of the human person. Rather, grace is experienced
within the concrete experiences of human existence. 27 The experience of grace, then, is a
modality of transcendental experience. 28
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Though grace can be experienced, it can never be “grasped” directly and
objectified by the human consciousness as in the case of an individual a posteriori object
or thing. Furthermore, grace may not necessarily be recognized as explicitly
supernatural. Rahner states:
The experience which we are appealing to here is not primarily and
ultimately the experience which a person has when he decides explicitly
and in a deliberate and responsible way upon some religious activity…It is
rather the experience which is given to every person prior to such reflexive
religious activity and decisions, and indeed perhaps in a form and in a
conceptuality which seemingly are not religious at all. 29
Therefore, this experience of grace is an a priori experience that permeates every realm of
human existence, and is the unthematic horizon of human consciousness. 30
Grace can, however, become thematic and recognizable through the history of
revelation and through self-reflection. He states:
a person who opens himself to his transcendental experience of the holy
mystery at all has the experience that this mystery is not only an infinitely
distant horizon…He experiences rather that this holy mystery is also a
hidden closeness, a forgiving intimacy, his real home, that it is a love
which shares itself, something familiar which he can approach and turn to
from the estrangement of his own perilous and empty life. It is the person
who in the forlornness of his guilt still turns in trust to the mystery of his
existence which is quietly present, and surrenders himself as one who even
in his guilt no longer wants to understand himself in a self-centered and
self-sufficient way, it is this person who experience himself as one who
does not forgive himself, but who is forgiven, and he experiences this
forgiveness which he receives as the hidden, forgiving and liberating love
of God himself… 31

28

FCF, 129.

29

Ibid., 132.

30

TI, 4, 178.

31

FCF, 131.

148
The possibility for a thematic experience of grace, will be further addressed
below. First, it is important to offer a brief contextualization of the perennial problem of
the relationship between nature and grace and how Rahner addressed that problem since
the manner in which Rahner addresses the problem becomes the key to understanding
how human persons can actually experience grace.
The Nature and Grace Debate 32
Though Rahner argues that the indwelling presence of God in human existence
can be known reflexively and indirectly through the structure of human transcendence,
the question of how this relationship between human persons and grace actually works so
that the human person can freely and concretely affirm and accept, or deny and reject, the
offer of God’s self must be addressed. 33
Central to the question of the relationship between nature and grace is the concept
of “pure nature.” This concept arose out of an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’
theology of nature and grace during Baroque Scholasticism and, according to Stephen
Duffy, the Baroque Scholastics had misinterpreted Aquinas’ theology of nature and
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grace, and more particularly his “theorem of the supernatural.” 34 This theorem of the
supernatural was meant to address the problem of the gratuitousness of grace, both prior
to and after the Fall of Adam. 35 As Duffy contends, Aquinas offered an insight into the
“created sharing of the divine nature” with human existence. 36 This “created
communication of the divine nature, enabling one to love God as God is in Godself,
transcends all the resources not only of human nature but of any created nature
conceivable. It is absolutely supernatural.” 37 In other words, “God in giving us
participation in the divine inner life gives us to ourselves and releases within us the
authentic powers that make us who we are as humans. One is finally free to become
one’s genuine self.” 38
Instead of interpreting Aquinas’ notion of human “nature” as a “middle term”
between nature as sinful and nature as redeemed, Duffy contends that the Baroque
scholastics interpreted “nature” as juxtaposed with grace. This, he argues, created a need
for the idea of a “pure nature” prior to the Fall. 39 In other words, Baroque scholasticism
misinterpreted Aquinas’ hypothetical “pure nature” and subsequently reified it. “Pure
nature” became an in-closed nature that was oriented towards its own end and that did not
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include grace. Grace, rather, was something extrinsic to pure human nature and was
something superimposed on human nature. This ultimately led to theories of grace that
understood grace as a super-natural existent outside of human existence.
From that point on, Baroque Scholasticism became the guiding interpretation of
Aquinas’ notion of nature until the early 20th century. It was in 1946 that this
interpretation of Aquinas was challenged by the Jesuit Henri de Lubac in his work Le
Súrnaturel. De Lubac, influenced by the thought of Maréchal, Rousselot and Blondel,
was concerned that an abstract notion of pure nature, as a closed system, can lead to a
theology of grace that separates grace from life. As a response to this theory of pure
nature, de Lubac, and other theologians of the theological movement often called the
nouvelle théologie, returned to a retrieval of Aquinas’ thought on the relationship
between human existence and grace.
Retrieving Augustine’s cor inquietum, de Lubac argued that the natural is
fundamentally made for the supernatural. There is no real separation between nature and
grace; there is only a theoretical distinction through abstraction. 40 Due to the uniqueness
of de Lubac’s thought, theologians of the time placed de Lubac’s assertions under
scrutiny and critique. Karl Rahner was one of those theologians.
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The Supernatural Existential
Rahner entered the contentious debate over the relationship between nature and
grace in a seminal essay in 1950, which later was expanded upon in “Concerning the
Relationship between Nature and Grace.” 41 This essay was an attempt to approach the
debate in a new way; though as is typical with Rahner, within the contours of the
tradition.
The essay begins with a brief critique of “the average textbook-conception” of the
relationship. Rahner argues that in this view of the relationship grace appears “as a mere
superstructure…which is imposed upon nature by God’s free decree, and in such a way
that the relationship between the two is no more intense than that of a freedom from
contradiction.” 42 In other words, this textbook conception, which Rahner labels as
“extrinsecism,” contains serious problems (viz., a two-fold order of the natural and the
supernatural, an anthropology that potentially only understands a pure natural end of the
human existent, and a theory of the potentia obedientialis that has a mere non-repugnance
for grace and the beatific vision).
After this initial critique of extrinsicism, Rahner then turns his attention towards
the “current” approaches to the debate (viz., that of the nouvelle théologie). 43 Rahner
fundamentally supported the attempts by the nouvelle théologie to avoid extrinsicism
when speaking of the relationship between nature and grace. However, Rahner believed
41
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that their attempts were inadequate in offering a more integral theory of that relationship
and a subsequent integral theology of grace.
Within these new approaches to the relationship between nature and grace,
Rahner saw the potential loss of the gratuity of grace through their theory of human
nature. He raises the question: “But is this inner reference of man to grace a constituent
of his ‘nature’ in such a way that the latter cannot be conceived without it…?” 44 This
view of human nature, for Rahner, would consist of the other end of the spectrum
opposite of extrinsicism. In other words, the nouvelle théologie exemplified an
intrinsicism whereby the gratuity of grace could potentially be lost. This was a concern
for Rahner since he argued, in line with Humani Generis, that grace must be considered
“unexacted.” 45
Rahner did acknowledge the fact that the nouvelle théologie did view the
unexactedness of grace as an axiom and as a point of departure for their theological
reflection. However, as Rahner points out “the only question then is whether this axiom
is objectively consistent with the theorem of an unconditional reference to grace in virtue
of nature as such.” 46 In other words, Rahner saw an inconsistency in the theory of
human nature of the nouvelle théologie (viz., that of the undisclosed theologian “D.”) and
their belief in the gratuity of grace. According to Rahner, they conceived of a nature that
consisted of a natural desiderium for the supernatural, and that this intense desire is one
which “’demands’ grace” and therefore logically eliminates any notion of the gratuity of
44
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grace. However, Rahner believed, according to Duffy, that the “nouvelle théologie
“jeopardized the gratuity of grace by reducing it to the gratuity of creation” and that
Rahner defended an “intrinsicalness of grace…but not at the expense of its special
gratuity.” 47
Therefore, in order to avoid any pitfalls while addressing the problem of the
relationship between nature and grace (viz., extrinsicism and intrinsicism without the
gratuity of grace), Rahner attempts to construct an argument employing both Scholastic
and non-Scholastic terms (viz., obediential potency and supernatural existential).
Rahner contends that God created human existence in such a way that the human
being “can” receive the infinite and real love of God’s very self, and that the human
being “can and must at the same time accept it for what it is: the ever astounding wonder,
the unexpected, unexacted gift.” 48 God’s first and last wish and plan for human existence
is God’s very self, and this plan is freely given by God. Rahner argues that in order for
this love to be “unexacted,” or freely given, the human being “must” be created “just ‘so’
that he can receive this self-communication only as grace; thus he must not only give him
an essence but also constitute him as a ‘nature’ (as opposed to an unexacted
supernatural).” 49 Human existence, then, is constituted in such a way as to be able to
receive this self-communication of God. In other words, the human being has “a real
‘potency’ for it” and this potency “is what is inmost and most authentic in him, the centre
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and root of what he is absolutely. He must have it always…” 50 Furthermore, since God
addresses individual persons as a “real partner,” as one who can reject or accept the love
given, then this innermost reality within human existence must be experienced as “an
event and wonder not owed” to the person. 51 Ultimately, this is what Rahner calls the
supernatural existential. 52
As Rahner understood it, within human existence there exists a “central, abiding
existential.” 53 This existential is a dimension of human existence, and therefore “present
in every person at least in the mode of an offer.” 54 It is also “present prior to their
freedom, their self-understanding and their experience.” 55 Moreover, “everyone, really
and radically every person must be understood as the event of a supernatural selfcommunication of God, although not in the sense that every person necessarily accepts in
freedom God’s self-communication to man.” 56 Therefore, this existential is not a faculty
of human nature but it is the real constitution of the human person. It is the initial
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ordination of human existence towards God, and it is present as an offer prior to human
response.
This abiding existential is, furthermore, “supernatural.” 57 For Rahner, it is
important to understand this existential as supernatural in order to maintain the
unexacted, unmerited, and freely given nature of this existential. As he argues, the
human person “is already redeemed and absolutely obliged to tend to his supernatural
end. This ‘situation’ is not merely an external one; it is an objective, ontological
modification of man, added indeed to his nature by God’s grace and therefore
supernatural, but in fact never lacking in the real order.”58 In other words, this freely
given existential consists of an ontological restructuring of human existence for the real
acceptance of the divine life.
For Rahner, this supernatural existential is not human nature as such. In order to
avoid confusing the supernatural existential with human nature, and to avoid any
reification of human nature, Rahner offers a distinction between the two “natures” of
human existence. The two natures are the concrete contingent “nature” (i.e., in a
biological sense) and human “nature” (i.e., in the theological sense). Human “nature” in
the theological sense is an existential. Rahner calls this human dimension of the
“substance of his concrete quiddity” human “nature” and refers to it as a “remainder
concept.”59 This nature, Rahner argues, will have to be such that it has an openness for
57
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God’s love and presence. Since this openness is an orientation towards God it (the
openness) “is not to be thought of merely as a non-repugnance, but as an inner ordination,
provided only that it is not unconditional.” 60 However, this nature is still distinct from
the supernatural existential. He states that
Even the man who has not been justified and inwardly sanctified by God’s
grace is not, in the present order, in such a way identical with a man in the
‘status naturae purae’…The ordination which obliges him to a
supernatural end consists…not just in a purely juridical obligation…It is
far preferable to think of the ordination to a supernatural end, which is
binding on all men in the present order of reality and salvation, as a real
ontological existential of man…” 61
Though human existence has been created with the offer and call of God’s
presence within the event of human existence through the supernatural existential, it is
important to explore the relationship between human freedom and grace. In other words,
since the supernatural existential is an abiding existential in human existence and thus
orienting the human subject towards God, what do we make of human freedom? In other
words, does human freedom play a role in the saving activity of God?

Accepting God’s Self in Freedom and in History
The classical doctrine of justification is often employed to address the problem of
the effects of grace on the human person. As the event of a free, unmerited and
forgiving, and absolute self-communication of God, the human person is already
“justified” in God. This absolute self-communication of God as the act of redemption
already became realized in the absolute historical event of the incarnation of the divine
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Logos in Jesus of Nazareth. For Rahner, this is not merely a juridical statement but rather
an ontologically real event. He contends that “[p]rior to any subjective attitude, man is
really different (from what he would be as mere creature and mere sinner), because
redemption has taken place in Christ.”62 Therefore, since human existence has been
transformed by the redeeming act of Christ, where does human freedom fit?
Rahner argues that authentic Christian teaching understands the relationship
between the human person’s justification and sanctification, and their fulfillment in the
“closest possible unity.” In other words, grace and the final vision of God are “two
phases of one and the same event which are conditioned by man’s free historicity and
temporality.” 63 They are two modalities (i.e., modifications) of human transcendence.
The first is the offer and call to human freedom. The second is the response to this offer
as permanent existential of human existence (i.e., acceptance or rejection). Therefore, “in
grace…[man] participates in God’s being…he is already God’s son here and now, and
…must only become manifest.” 64
Since the full realization of human existence is God’s ultimate intention for
human existence, it is only in the communication of God’s self that human existence
attains this full realization. As stated earlier, Rahner argues that this redeeming act of
God’s self-communication begins as an offer which can be accepted. It is an offer that
takes place in history and meets human existence within its own freedom.
62
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For Rahner, this offer must be understood as a gift so that the integrity of the
freedom within human existence is not compromised. Therefore, as an offer, this
communication of God’s self is not imposed upon human existence. Rather, the
individual person must freely accept this free offer which is nothing less than the
beginning of the person’s salvation.
For Rahner, God’s offer of God’s self is a possibility for human existence that can
only be actualized through the concrete event of human freedom. As noted in Chapter
Three of this dissertation, Rahner distinguishes between two forms of freedom:
transcendental (originating) freedom and categorical (originated) freedom. As an
authentic human existential, transcendental freedom “is not the power to do this or that,
but the power to decide about oneself and to actualize oneself. 65 The person, in fact,
actualizes him or herself through concrete, historical acts of freedom. Thus
transcendental freedom becomes mediated through the person’s concrete choices and
actions. These two forms of freedom are therefore not separate freedoms but rather a
unified moment of human realization.
This freedom to accept God’s offer of self is, as Rahner contends, “freedom in
and through history and in time and space.” 66 The human person, therefore, can and must
respond within his or her particular historical context and situation. As Rahner argues,
“man is essentially the historical being for whom divine revelation and salvation are
encountered through his specific history. At the same time he is the being who is always

65

Ibid., 38.

66

Ibid., 95.

159
already endowed by what we call the Holy Spirit of grace with the saving reality of God
himself, as offer made to his liberty, which can be realised in all history.” 67
The freedom to accept or reject God’s communion with human existence cannot
be isolated to one event or another. Rather, as Rahner argues, the present and future
actions and choices of an individual person are “co-determined” by a previous choice or
action. 68 In other words, human realization, or even human destruction, is a process that
takes place in concrete history and over time and the individual person is responsible for
his or her salvation or destruction in every temporal decision. He states:
The divinized transcendentality of man, who actualizes his essence in
history and only in this way can accept it in freedom, has itself a history in
man, an individual and collective history. This transcendentality, as
borne, empowered and fulfilled by the divinizing self-communication of
God, this transcendentality takes place; it does not simply exist. 69
From this quote we can discern that the redemption of human existence not only takes
place in history through God’s self communication, but that redemption is a collective
existence.
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The Definitive Culmination of Redemption 70
For Rahner, the incarnation of the Word of God is central to grace. It is the
ultimate disclosure of God’s self-communication in freedom and in history. It is
fundamentally the saving event and act of God’s love in human history and human
existence. Furthermore, this event of God’s saving action took place in the world.
This last point is very important for Rahner since he is concerned about all forms
of Christian gnosticism that rejects the material world. He asserts that authentic Christian
teaching is much more materialistic than presented in any gnosticism and that an
authentic Christianity teaches that “God lays hold of matter when the Logos becomes
flesh, and does so precisely at that point of unity at which matter become conscious of
itself and spirit possesses its own essential being in the objectifications of matter.”71
As Rahner argues, this saving event of God’s historical self-communication took
place in the concrete life and particular choices of Jesus of Nazareth. 72 In other words,
Jesus made the Absolute Mystery fully incarnate in his life and was fully open to this
Mystery. Jesus Christ, the God-Man, then, is precisely the goal of human existence, and
therefore the salvation and redemption of human existence.
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The Social Quality of Grace
Up to this point, Rahner’s theology of grace appears to appeal to the individual
and his or her relationship to or experience of grace and seems to say very little with
regard to the social quality of grace. Brackley contends that Rahner’s theology of grace
does incorporate, to an extent, the social nature of grace. He finds passages in Rahner’s
theology that call attention to the social quality of salvation that includes social structures
and systems. However, he does make the claim that Rahner “fails to elaborate on this
point or draw out its implications.” In other words, “How does salvation take place in
social, cultural, economic and political life?” 73 He points out two reasons why Rahner’s
theology of grace and salvation falls short. He contends that “Rahner’s entire enterprise
springs from the tradition of reflection on nature and grace. This tradition rarely asks
how grace…is related to our social relations.” In addition, he points out that “Rahner’s
Catholic tradition is more analogical than dialectic” and that “[o]ne temptation of this
tradition is to neglect the struggle (dialectic) of grace against sin.” 74 As I see it, this is a
fair assessment of Rahner’s theology of grace by Brackley and I contend that the
soteriology of González Faus can address Brackley’s concern.

González Faus: The Radical Gifts of Filiación and Fraternidad
In Proyecto de hermano, González Faus contends that the restoration and
redemption of the damaged human existence consists in two tasks. The first task is the
re-creation or restructuring (reconstrucción) of human existence. The second task is the
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empowering (potenciación) of human existence. Both of these tasks are fundamentally
the work of God (i.e., grace) in human existence and human history, and constitute one
process of human salvation.
For González Faus, this work of God in human existence and history is analogous
to a personal narrative that is threatened to be terminated and never concluded. 75
However, it is a narrative that constitutes three recognizable phases. First, grace is
present in human existence and history through God’s presence and initiative of forgiving
and justifying love. Second, grace is present in the struggle for liberation of the self from
itself. Lastly, grace is present in the goal of the binomial filiación-fraternidad.
In the following section I will explore what González Faus sees as the first phase
of the presence of God’s action in human existence and history (i.e., the initiative of God
acting within human existence as forgiving and justifying grace). I will do this first by
examining the formal notion of grace in his theology and then by exploring how his
theology addresses the problem of the relationship between grace and human nature.
However, the pressing question that guides this chapter and this dissertation is, does
González Faus see human structures, systems, and social relations as open to receiving
the gift of God’s self as God’s saving activity?

Grace as God’s Familial Presence in Human Existence
For González Faus, the initiative of God consists of four defining features. The
first feature of God’s initiative in human existence is the gift of God’s self. Like Rahner,
González Faus’ formal notion of grace places an emphasis upon the indwelling presence
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of God within human existence. This gift of God’s self initiates a restructuring as well
as an empowering of human existence. In other words, God’s presence initiates the
process of divinization of human existence. God’s acts of restructuring and empowering
create a new form of existence within the human; that which biblical language calls the
new person of Jesus Christ, or the Second Adam. González Faus points out that Paul
understood this newness as a “change of image” from that of Adam to that of Christ. 76
Like Rahner, González Faus wants to restore the centrality of uncreated grace
(i.e., the indwelling presence of God) in order to uphold God’s gratuitous initiative
working in human existence and to clarify what its relationship is to created grace. He
also wants to avoid the reification of grace and the mechanization of the restructuring of
human existence. Furthermore, he wants to challenge the individualistic conceptions of
grace and move towards interpersonal and social conceptions of grace.
For González Faus, the real problem arises in the Scholasticism after Aquinas,
which reified the metaphysical language of grace utilized by Peter Lombard and Thomas
Aquinas. He points out that in Aquinas’ interpretation of Peter Lombard ideal love is not
something created in the human person. This ideal love is nothing other than the holy
Spirit present in the human person. 77 What is created is the subsequent “act of love” by
the person.78 This act of love is initiated by the will, and according to Aquinas “there
cannot be such a perfect operation of the will that is united with the Spirit if there is not a
76
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prior quality (i.e., habitus, forma) that perfects the will. 79 Therefore, the initiative of
God (as forgiveness and as grace) is efficacious (i.e., it has the power to produce the
desired effect of changing the person) and therefore the uncreated gift (the Spirit)
provokes a “created gift” or a restructuring in the person. 80 González Faus has no
problem with this Thomistic scheme. What seems to trouble González Faus is what
Baroque Scholasticism did with its interpretation of Aquinas.
As González Faus contends, the later Scholastics took Aquinas’ abstract formula
and attempted to discover “how” this new love is produced in the egoistical person. 81 He
argues that the later Scholastics emphasized efficient grace, which created a vision of
God as something wholly transcendent that “produces” rather than creates or fosters.
Furthermore, the emphasis upon efficient grace is likely to conceptualize the relationship
between God’s saving activity and human existence in purely individualistic terms.
González Faus sees this manner of viewing God and grace as leading up to Baroque
Scholasticism after the Council of Trent wherein there emerged a forgetfulness of
uncreated grace and an increase in the “market” of created grace. 82 This ultimately led to
a vision of the relationship between God and human existence as one centered on
productivity, and the vision of grace as likened to that of a commodity that is acquired by
the individual.
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The second defining feature of God’s initiative is that grace seeks out that which
is most authentically human in human existence. For González Faus, God’s action in
human existence is a restructuring of human existence through the process and gift of
humanization. In other words, grace not only creates a qualitative change within human
existence, but is that gratuitous qualitative change. As he states, “the term ‘grace’ refers
to the quality of human existence.” 83 This grace of humanization is essentially the
transformation of the person from an egocentric individual to a social and relational self.
This transformation is fundamentally the process of filiación.
This humanization, and therefore filiación of, human existence analogically
corresponds to the filiación of Jesus Christ. In other words, this qualitatively restructured
human existence through the process of filiación takes shape, and is absolutely confirmed
in Jesus Christ the incarnate Word and the fullness of God’s presence in history. This
unique restructured human existence found in Jesus Christ was the absolute confirmation
of the indwelling presence and work of God. This act of grace was nothing less than a
total humanization of Jesus Christ in history.
González Faus argues that the act of humanization is the first act of grace and it is
fundamentally the emptying out, or divesting 84, of human existence. This divesting of
self was found in the life of Christ. Christ’s life, which was a life for others, shows that
this divesting is a liberation from egoistical self-interest. Therefore, the work of grace in
human existence, as found in Christ, is fundamentally a divesting of egoism for the
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saving action of the project of fraternidad through which the gift of filiación is
disclosed. 85
As González Faus points out, Christ’s life as Son of God confirms the possibility
of opening oneself up to kenotic love, which is the nature of God’s self. 86 Furthermore,
being open to self-emptying love implies “believing in love, hoping in love, and loving
love” and this is precisely the meaning of “putting on the new person.” 87 This form of
love that was manifested in Jesus Christ is the kenotic love of others as a brother and a
sister (Mt 12:50). Jesus completes what, for González Faus, is the reality of human
existence; namely, “loving one another as a brother or sister.” 88 As the first born,
Christ’s filiación opens up the possibility for our filiación. This historical process of
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becoming a son or daughter of God is made possible, though only partially, because of
God’s own participation in human existence. 89
The third defining feature of God’s initiative in human existence is that this
initiative is born in history and takes the form of history. 90 For González Faus, a danger
inherent in understanding the work of grace in human existence as a divinizing power is
the tendency to spiritualize or intellectualize this power so that it becomes divorced from
concrete history. 91 This ultimately led to various forms of dualisms in western Christian
thought and culture, which tended towards individualistic soteriologies and theories of
grace. It becomes essential then for any theology of grace to understand grace as
embedded in the world, in history, and in social relations.
As González Faus argues, the work and task of grace does not take over history
nor abandons history. Rather, grace empowers and transforms history. 92 The life of
Jesus discloses that grace is a process in history that struggles to realize filial and
fraternal relations in the world. God graciously enters human history as a process and
struggle towards the project of filiación-fraternidad. 93 In addition, the process and
struggle of God’s saving activity takes place in history on a personal level, social level,
and global level. As a history, González Faus sees this process and struggle as analogous
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to an enduring and long-suffering relationship between two lovers. In other words, there
is a tension between a person being selfish with his or her time and resources and sharing
his or her time and resources.
The last defining feature of God’s initiative in human existence is the universality
of grace. In other words, God offers God’s self “permanently and to all persons,
including those that are outside of the church.” 94 In making his point, González Faus
looks to the book of Jonah. He points out that when God forgave the Ninevites, Jonah
became frustrated with God because within Jonah’s own self-centered worldview, there is
no place for a forgiving God beyond the limits of Jonah’s own making. 95 However,
González Faus claims that the writer of the book wants to show the universal nature of
God’s love and forgiveness. Consequently, if a theory of grace does not maintain the
universality of grace, then there is no possibility for the gift and project of fraternidad nor
the gift of God who becomes a brother to all human persons. 96 As González Faus argues,
the danger inherent in an exclusivist soteriology can be seen in the extremist positions of
Calvinist predestination, with its emphasis on the individual believer, and the sectarian
views of Catholic Jansenism. Both of these deviations from the early Patristic and
classical teachings of the church on salvation have evolved into the contemporary
“arrogance of Calvinism-capitalism and the arrogance of Jansenism-sectarianism.” 97
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As a result of these four phases of God’s initiative in human existence, González
Faus draws out four conclusions. First, he argues that the concept of grace means the
presence of the Spirit of God in human existence. Grace, in this view, is not seen as a
thing or an object that manipulates or forces the person’s intellect or will one way or the
other. Rather, grace is the personal presence of God within the individual, which is not
capable of “forcing the person’s will but of transforming it.” 98
Second, this presence entails “a restructuring of the depth of the human person:
namely, our spirit, in which the decision to believe and the openness to hope gives us the
ability to love as God loves.” 99 This restructuring of the person is a restructuring of the
egocentric will to a will that is united to God’s will through fraternal relationship with
others.
Third, González Faus argues that “the gift of the Spirit has to be understood in
terms of personal presence and not substantial presence.” 100 He points out that Rahner’s
notion of “quasi-formal” causality is helpful but insufficient. As González Faus sees it,
Rahner relies too heavily upon Scholasticism and its Aristotelian categories of
substance. 101 Therefore, he claims that the Aristotelian classification of causal relations
“does not seem to be the most suitable form of relations in order to explain this type of
presence.” 102 For González Faus, then, the most adequate category to use to describe the
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indwelling presence of the Spirit is the category of interpersonal relations, and to extend
this argument even further, God’s indwelling presence in human existence is Trinitarian
by nature and therefore social. The category of social relations then becomes the
paradigm for relationships between persons.
Fourth, González Faus argues that the most adequate categories to describe the
“action of the love of God” in human existence are not found in the categories of physical
causation. Rather, the most adequate way to express the action of love within human
existence is through the categories of dialogical relations. González Faus describes this
form of relationship as a dynamic and continual loving call. 103

Justification by Fraternización
Grace envisioned in terms of personal presence and relationships of fraternidad
opens up the possibility for mutual relationships of self-surrender and fraternidad. Thus,
grace is fundamentally “the re-creation of human existence destroyed by the human
person.” 104 Furthermore, grace begins the transformation of human existence by
‘justifying’ human existence through kenotic love. 105 For González Faus, the importance
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of the justification of human existence by grace fundamentally is “how one responds to
God in a dialogical existence.” 106
In his presentation of the history of the term “justification” and the debate over
the notion “justification by faith,” González Faus draws out two anthropological
consequences. The first, he claims, is that “if love is what justifies us, love is the ultimate
truth of the human person, which is the final judge of humanity and inhumanity.” 107
Therefore, for González Faus, the truth and the judge of the human person is not human
reason, as often argued. In fact, human reason does not justify human existence. If
reason becomes judge, and is considered the ultimate truth of human existence, then it
will fall into the service of its own interest and its own egoism. 108 Rather, it is love that
is the truth and judge of human existence and love suggests a relationship between free
persons and not between a person and an object.
The second anthropological consequence is that “grace does not have to be
understood as a miraculous mechanism and an instantaneous act.” 109 Rather than being
understood as an instantaneous and mechanical act, grace can be seen as a “long history
and a slow dialogue.” 110 Furthermore, understanding grace as a long and slow process
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illustrates the point that even in times of apparent alienation from God divine love is
always present.
Besides transforming human existence, the justification of human existence elicits
a response from a person in freedom. In other words, justification is the freedom of the
person to accept this re-creation of human existence which was begun by God. This
acceptance is not a passive act of faith but rather the free gift of fraternidad, which
emerges from an active faith.
Avoiding any blind fideism, González Faus argues that faith is a “type of attitude
that encompasses the person’s whole being and comes at the risk of the person’s whole
being.” 111 Extending this notion of faith within interpersonal categories, González Faus
understands this attitude as a real openness by a person to being loved by another person,
and to loving another person. In other words, “faith is structured as love, because the
reception of the gift of filiación begins the work of the construction of fraternidad.” 112
This openness by the person takes the form of a “handing over of,” “surrendering” and
“emptying” (entrega) one’s own life to the “other” with the hope that the “other” will
enrich and deepen one’s own life. 113 It is in this way that the person is justified by
faith. 114
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González Faus argues that there are real social implications in understanding the
doctrine of “justification by faith” in this way. 115 As González Faus contends, the error
that Luther made when he challenged the Church was to “reduce God’s love to God’s
love for me and, at the same time, its effects in me and for me.” 116 For González Faus,
this reduction of faith to an individualistic faith, which is so prevalent in societies
affected by the Enlightenment, may have contributed to the deification of the autonomous
self. As he sees it, this individualistic form of faith has “a profound social
implication.” 117 In place of this reductive notion of faith and relationship to God,
González Faus argues that the prayer traditionally attributed to Mary called the
“Magnificat” better expresses authentic Christian faith and identity. In other words,
God’s love for the person in his or her human poverty (i.e., weakness and need) illustrates
God’s love and mercy for the poor and broken-hearted.
Justification by faith, then, according to González Faus, is an active turn to those
in most need. In other words, justification by faith is disclosed in the concrete option for
the poor and weak that is proclaimed by theologies of liberation. For González Faus, the
person who is justified in God’s eyes chooses to love those who seem to be incapable of
being loved (e.g., the destitute), not because the person has merited this love but because
of the gratuity of God’s love that extends to all. The person who realizes that God’s love
for human persons is purely free and gratuitous accepts that this same love “justifies” and

115

Ibid., 520.

116

Ibid., 520.

117

Ibid., 520.

174
grants the gift of divine love to all who are not valued by this world. 118 Accepting this is
one of the decisive proofs that the person has been justified by faith. Thus, the doctrine
of justification becomes an active return to works of justice in the option for the poor and
destitute.

God’s Saving Action and the Human Desire for Fraternidad
Since grace is God’s initiative of love and personal presence in human existence
as well as an act of justification by faith, the question arises, what is the relationship
between God’s action and the actions of human persons working towards fraternidad? In
answering this question, it is important to understand how González Faus understands the
relationship between nature and grace. González Faus makes the claim that historically,
philosophers and theologians have engaged the problem of the relationship between the
action of God and human action by using analogies that are based on the notion of
efficient causation or chronological distinctions. 119 He argues that this epistemological
starting point (i.e., a theory of knowledge framed within efficient causal relations) may
lead to two extremes, namely monism and dualism.
Instead of a never-ending struggle between two extremes, González Faus turns
away from chronological distinctions to ontological distinctions between the activity of
God and the activity of human persons. In order to move in this direction, González Faus
draws heavily on the theory of the analogy of being and of symbol as understood by
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Rahner. This framework helps González Faus establish a theoretical middle-ground in
his attempt to avoid any form of dualism or monism. 120
For González Faus, this third approach to reality and human existence is not
meant to eliminate or annihilate these partial approaches. Rather, a more adequate and
practical attitude and approach to reality maintains an analogical vision of unity-indistinction, which allows for these two partial approaches to remain present in dialogical
tension. 121 What is essential to this third approach, however, is the awareness that these
other approaches arise from profound human experiences and that they do play a real role
in how we understand the world and human existence. It also creates an awareness of the
practical consequences of pursuing these approaches to their extreme ends.
After establishing an epistemological starting point, González Faus addresses the
problem of the nature and grace debate. He does this by contending that this apparent
disparity found between the divine and the human is not only found in “religious realms”
(i.e., in realms where we talk about or experience God), but also found within the realms
of concrete human experience. 122 He offers the examples of love, knowledge, human
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action and human willing, freedom, and the meaning of death as examples of how this
apparent disparity is found within the realms of concrete human experience.
Every concrete human experience, whether it consists of love or the pursuit to
answer a particular question, is conditioned by the possibility to love, to will or to know.
Following in the transcendental theology of Rahner, González Faus makes the case for
the condition of the possibility of experiencing these particular human experiences as the
openness to human transcendence. For example, he states in Transcendental-Thomistic
fashion, that “the natural desire for absolute knowledge is the condition of the possibility
to know anything.” 123
This discussion helps González Faus arrive at three conclusions. The first
conclusion reveals that these examples point to the reality that “the human person is a
limited being with an unlimited dynamism.” 124 Even when the individual person judges
these experiences (viz., love, freedom, will and action, etc.) as absolutely constituted
solely by the self, and uses this conclusion to justify any form of egoism (i.e., an
absolutization of the self), the person ought to reflect on how these same experiences
have come to define and determine the person. The recognition that these experiences
transcend, and therefore have the potential to determine the person, ought to remind the
person that human existence is nothing more than an “epiphenomenon” and not the center
of realty. 125
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The second conclusion shows that each one of these experiences have a certain
“global characteristic.” 126 This conclusion becomes a justification for the use of the
theology of Irenaeus. The notion that these experiences can be found within all human
persons, regardless of culture or religious beliefs, everywhere and for all times, is a
hallmark of the anthropology of Irenaeus. 127 For example, the condition of the possibility
for love, knowledge, action, freedom, and the meaning of death are translated into
Irenaeus’ language of “communion with God, vision of God, divine filiación, possession
of the spirit, and immortality.” 128
Finally, these examples from the concrete realm of human existence support the
conclusion that “the image and likeness of God is not some foreign additive to human
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creatureliness, but rather a way of being-from-creation or a way of living out one’s
creatureliness.” 129
González Faus presses the tradition further when re-envisioning Augustine’s cor
inquietum, Aquinas’ natural desire to know God, and Rahner’s supernatural existential.
When speaking of the divine orientation towards God, as in Thomas’ understanding of
human reason as the desire for the vision of God and Rahner’s supernatural existential,
González Faus clarifies his point with an attempt at balancing a Scholastic emphasis upon
the orientation of intelligence and knowledge with a humanistic position for the innate
desire for the construction of a perfect society. He states, “the dynamism that is found in
the created person, as the image of God or divine calling, is not only that of human
reason and knowledge…nor is it only in the construction of human society…” 130 Instead,
this divine orientation towards God, for González Faus, is the “dynamism of the person,”
who is the subject of both individual reason and society. 131 It is the person in his or her
totality as a rational being and as a communal being. Thus, González Faus make the
argument that the natural inclination of reason and of interpersonal and social relations in
human existence is an inclination towards the kingdom of God.
For González Faus, the classical idea of the potentia obedientialis within human
existence also needs revision. In revisioning this Thomistic idea, he employs the work of
the Spanish theologian Juan Alfaro. González Faus argues that just as there is a positive
129
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disposition or connaturality in human reason with respect to the beatific vision, there is a
type of positive disposition within human liberation with respect to the “trinitarian
community” found in God. 132 Just as the theological tradition claims that there is an
innate appetite within human reason for God, so there exists, he argues, an innate desire
for community. 133 His attempt to move from the notion that the human person is a
“rational animal” to the notion that the human person is a “social animal” reinforces his
argument. The following quote paraphrases Alfaro’s Thomistic revision of the
obediential potency. González Faus writes that
Since communion is one of the supreme goods of human existence, we
have to affirm that it (i.e., human existence) possesses a certain innate
inclination and desire (apetito) for communion. It is an inclination and
desire that pertains to the same dynamic potential within human existence
to construct society (el mundo). This desire finds total rest and peace
within the infinite communion. This is the greatness of the immanence of
the kingdom of God in the person as a social being: that “the human
community, in virtue of its relational nature (comunitariedad), can only
realize its perfection in the Trinitarian communion. Furthermore, it is in
the Trinity that the human community is necessarily perfected. This fact
reveals that human existence has, in the most intimate dimension of its
social nature, a unique ontological likeness to the kingdom of God. In
other words, human existence has an innate and exclusive connnaturality
with respect to the Kingdom that he does not have with respect to any
other object.” 134
A desire for human community found within human existence is therefore more
than a mere non-repugnance of community life; it is rather a real innate desire. 135 This
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desire is fundamentally a desire for the kingdom of God, which is the absolute and final
manifestation of fraternidad.

Grace as the Project of Fraternización
As pointed out earlier, González Faus makes the claim that the person who
realizes that God’s love for human existence is purely free and gratuitous accepts that this
same love “justifies” those who are rejected or forgotten by the world. The justification
of the person is in fact an active return to works of justice in the option for the poor and
destitute of the world. This implies an active faith that works for justice. Furthermore,
this active faith arises out of the restructured person, which implies a liberation of the self
from itself and is nothing less than the gift and process of filiación.
This liberation is something dynamic and always changing and it is always lived
and experienced as both freedom and a struggle. 136 The person’s choice to be liberated
from the enslavement of egoism begins the project of fraternización and therefore of
redemption. Though the person must freely choose this struggle for liberation, the person
must wade through the waters of ambiguity that is both personal responsibility and God’s
initiative. As González Faus contends,
Redemption, for the person, is not mechanistic as though it was given to
the person from someone else and in which the person experiences as a
lottery. Even though redemption and forgiveness are grace and initiative
of God, there is no other redemption that is beyond the person’s own
responsibility. Grace does not take away the person’s freedom, but rather
it gives the person freedom; and it frees precisely by humanizing the
person and offering the person responsibility. 137
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This justification by an “act of” (i.e., active) faith, which is ultimately liberation
from one’s self, requires a situational change. As González Faus states, this situational
change is the real insertion into the death and resurrection of Christ.138 It is an objective
situational change that requires a subjective transformation. In other words, it is the
restructuring and regeneration of the human person by God’s spirit from an enslaved and
alienated egoism to a liberated existence in community. It is a transformation of the self
existing purely for itself towards a self-in-relation-to-others.139
González Faus argues that “faith is structured as love because the reception of the
gift of filiación opens the way to the construction of fraternidad.” 140 He states that “if
grace is the love of God that dwells in the human person, and that helps the person love
and be loved, the person is certainly a new creation.” 141 In other words, the indwelling
love of God in human existence interiorly restructures the person for the task of
fraternidad. In turn, the active engagement in the project of fraternización leads to an
unfurling of the gift of filiación.
This restructuring of human existence is no less than the restructuring of the
theologal142 dimension of human existence, which becomes manifest in faith, hope and
love. González Faus argues, using Aquinas’ understanding of the effects of grace on the
human person, that the restructuring of the human person is not a restructuring of human
138
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faculties, but rather of the essence of the human person. As González Faus understands
it, this change is a restructuring that transforms the human powers of memory,
understanding, and will. As a result, human understanding is raised up to a faith that
acknowledges Jesus Christ as the absolute paradigm of human existence over and above
the ego-centered self. Also, human memory is lifted up towards the hope that remembers
the resurrection of the crucified one. Finally, human will is transformed from absolute
love of self to the decision to surrender the egocentric self to the absolute kenotic love of
God so that the will may be able to love others with the infused power of God. 143
Faith, hope and love, then, are not merely effects of one’s moral ability but rather
they are the divine strength that renews (i.e., re-creates and empowers) the person’s
broken will. 144 They are theologal virtues; that is, they are three possibilities of the new
person: the newness of love, the gratuity of faith, and the ‘receptivity’ of hope in that this
hope comes from an Other and not from oneself. 145

The Redeeming Act of Fraternización
González Faus argues that the final project and goal of human existence, which is
nothing less than the binomial filiación-fraternidad, is historically and fully disclosed
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(desplegado) in the person of Jesus Christ. In other words, Jesus’ salvific action, which
is made manifest in his life and made manifest on the cross, becomes the paradigm of the
restructured human person. Because of Jesus’ salvific action, the ultimate and absolute
expression of filiación-fraternidad in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ
becomes a gift to the human person.
The gift of filiación-fraternidad, which is fully disclosed in the life of Jesus
Christ, becomes historically realized for the individual person through the person’s freely
chosen insertion into the life, death and resurrection of Christ. This insertion into
Christ’s life affirms the covenantal relationships of God as Father and the “other” as
brother and sister. Thus, human existence participates in this salvific gift when the
individual person freely accepts the vertical covenantal relationship of God as Father, and
when the person actively works towards horizontal covenantal relationships grounded in
love of one another as brother and sister.
In concrete terms, these covenantal relationships founded on grace, love and
justice begin with the surrender of the egoistical self and a vesting of the social self. The
surrendering of the egoistical self is made a reality through the liberation of self-interest
by the works of the Spirit, and is ultimately the gift of redemption. This liberation of
self-interest is not a death of interest as in Stoic apathy or Buddhist nirvana, but rather “a
transformation of interest.” 146 This transformation of interest, as understood by González
Faus, is instead a movement away from egoism towards love of others in covenantal
relationships. It is “experienced as new life and as the freely given source of self-
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realization and meaning that is a byproduct of working towards the kingdom of God.”147
As González Faus argues this is, for Christians, the only possible way of understanding
the salvation of human existence. This transformation of interest thus informs and
changes social relationships, human structures and human systems.
The question arises, then, is this transformation really possible? As González
Faus contends, the transformation of the person’s self-interest into the interest of
fraternidad and subsequently of transformed institutions and systems is only possible by
loving real, concrete human persons, not abstract human existence. In addition, the
transformation of self-interest, which ultimately leads to the liberation of the self, is
experienced and lived out as an ongoing struggle. It is the struggle between agapic,
kenotic love and egoism. 148 Therefore, as González Faus argues “the person that receives
‘the gift of God that is God’s self’ is the person that dies to egoism in order to open the
self to love.” 149 Furthermore, it is essential to acknowledge the fact that this love is very
difficult and practically impossible and that it is really God’s grace that is at work. What,
then, becomes of human freedom?
As González Faus sees it, grace and redemption constitute the process and project
of the liberation of freedom for love. 150 This liberation of freedom is experienced and
lived out as authentic freedom. As González Faus argues, the actions of the Spirit (i.e.,
the reign of the Spirit) in human existence consist in the insertion of the person into
147
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divine filiación in order to become a brother or a sister (hermano) to one another. From
this insertion arises attentiveness to the other which goes beyond the moral law. Then,
the insertion of the person in divine filiación establishes the conditions for a freedomfrom-self in order to become free from self-interest (para que pueda ser
desinteresado). 151 This creates an equation among freedom and indifference
(desinteresado), and among filiación and fraternidad. 152 In other words, for González
Faus, when freedom equates to indifference, then filiación (i.e., divine relation with God
as Father) means fraternidad. 153 Therefore, “fraternidad is a beginning (inchoation) of
filiación.”154 On the other hand, where freedom equates to egoism, then personal dignity
means enmity towards others, which ultimately creates death and destruction.
This new way of being human entails a series of experiences of ‘dying,’ and the
experiences of passing from death to life is an experience of ‘resurrection.’ Furthermore,
this restructured existence becomes verified by real concrete experiences of life and death
in the struggle for justice.
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This restructuring of human existence as grace fundamentally re-creates the
person for coexistence and gives the person the strength and potential for communion
with others. Grace also re-creates the person for the liberating acceptance of his or her
limits and of his or her blame in order to accept the free offer of the love of God. This
empowerment by God is given to human existence in order for the person to be able to go
beyond his or her own limits, not by the absolutization of the “I”, but rather in the
trusting openness to the gift of filiación and in the response towards fraternidad.
Finally, in order to believe in fraternidad, in order to look for it and to love it,
what is necessary is a redemption of the image of the person. As González Faus points
out,
The road to fraternidad supposes a 180 degree turn in the human
trajectory. It supposes an abandoning of the described course in Gen 3:5
in order to give way to the course described in Phil 2:6. Abandoning the
movement to want to be-like-gods and instead to enter into another much
slower movement of self-emptying of this divine condition. 155

Concluding Remarks
After exploring the concepts of grace and redemption within the theologies of
Rahner and González Faus, the guiding question of this chapter must be revisited: How
does God’s saving activity transform the current course of globalization, which I contend
is a boon for some and a hardship for others? I argue that a Catholic theological
anthropology can offer a viable response to the current global disparity if it adequately
addresses that question.
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I believe that Rahner’s theology of grace and redemption offers a foundational
framework in approaching this question. Specifically, Rahner’s theory of the
supernatural existential offers a viable and reasonable way to address the question of the
relationship between God’s action in the world and the human person’s action in the
world. The theory argues that “antecedently to justification by grace, received
sacramentally or extra-sacramentally, man is already subject to the universal salvific will
of God, he is already redeemed and absolutely obliged to tend to his supernatural end.
This ‘situation’ is not merely an external one; it is an objective, ontological modification
of man, added to his nature by God’s grace and therefore supernatural, but in fact never
lacking in the real order.”156 This theory offers a reasonable claim for the conditions of
the possibility for redemption and for the conditions for the possibility of the dignity of
human existence. Furthermore, the theory of the supernatural existential avoids the
danger of extrincisism, whereby the freedom of human response is compromised.
Therefore, it balances the tension between the absolute gratuitousness of God’s presence
and activity in human existence and the responsibility of human activity within the world.
Thus, it offers theological anthropology a foundational theory for the possibility of
addressing the anthropology that is at the center of the current trajectory of globalization
and thus changing the direction of globalization in order to humanize it. However, I
argue that a global issue such as global disparity and the anthropology that has
engendered the global situation can be best approached via social categories and therefore
the theory of the supernatural existential needs to be re-worked utilizing social categories.
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González Faus’ theory of grace and redemption adequately addresses this need through
his use of social theory and social categories.
As González Faus argues, the Christian Trinitarian God is intrinsically social
(comunitario), and God’s gift to human existence, which is fundamentally
communication of God’s self, is the communio sanctorum. 157 He claims that this
traditional ecclesial idea of the communio sanctorum can best be interpreted as the
“communion of holiness (or of the holy things).” 158 This expression, then, reveals “the
intrinsically ‘social’ or communitarian characteristic of grace.” 159 Therefore, the grace of
faith, or at least the openness to the gift of transcendence within human existence,
transforms the process and project (construcción) of the creation of a just society into the
inchoation and anticipation of the kingdom of God. 160
As González Faus argues, if holiness is social (comunitariedad) and the person is
made holy and justified by faith, which is structured as love, then the theological virtues
of faith, hope and love are intrinsically social (colectivas). 161 Furthermore, the
Thomistic idea of the relationship between rational creature, faith, and the beatific vision,
which is a grace and redemption, can be reformulated in terms of the relationship
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between social creature, social justice (caridad), and the Kingdom of God. 162 This latter
formula expresses the divine gift of filiación-fraternidad that is given to human
existence.
Like the theory of the supernatural existential, the theory of divine filiaciónfraternidad retains the tension between the gratuitousness of God’s presence within
human existence and the natural orientation of human existence towards God. In other
words, the first act of grace (i.e., God’s gratuitous and saving activity in the world) is the
removal of (desposeer) egoism within the human person. This removal of egoism within
human existence is not intended to destroy the person, but rather to empower the person
for fraternidad, which ultimately is the indicator of divine filiación. 163 Grace structured
as filiación-fraternidad is the restructuring of the individual person from an ever present
and ever threatening egoism and autonomous self to the final grace, which is fraternidad.
Fraternidad, in turn, is the grace needed to restructure the social egoisms found within
death dealing institutions and systems.
As a final assessment of the anthropologies of Rahner and González Faus, the
following chapter will explore the ecclesial implications of, and possible working
metaphors of church that arise from, both Rahner’s approach to grace and redemption and
González Faus’ approach to grace and redemption.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ECCLESIAL IMPLICATIONS
In commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Bishop Hélder Câmara
of Pernambuco, Brazil, Jon Sobrino wrote that:
Envisioning the Church as "poor and powerless" has never prospered
much among us. Not even Vatican II, as important and decisive as it was
in other matters, made it a central concern. The Latin American bishops'
conference at Medellín (1968) did indeed make it a key issue, and the
Puebla conference (1979) also stressed it, even in the face of serious
opposition. For the last three decades, however, the abandonment of the
vision has been only too apparent. As Fr. José Comblin says: "After
Puebla there began the Church of silence. The Church began to have
nothing to say." Although the Aparecida conference (2007) slowed down
the decline a bit, the Church has still not experienced that "turning around
of history" that Fr. Ignacio Ellacuría said was needed in order to heal a
society that is gravely ill. The conclusion is that we need to return to
being a Church of the poor and to work hard for that. In El Salvador,
since the death of Archbishop Romero, the erosion has been clear, as has
been the need for ecclesiastical regeneration. 1
These words are a striking reminder that what was proclaimed by Pope John XXIII
almost forty years ago, namely, that the church should be “the Church of the Poor,” has
yet to materialize and is still a relevant and urgent need. Unfortunately, as pointed out by
Sobrino, this vision and need has been abandoned and forgotten by many from within the
church.
Up to this point I have presented a dialogue between the theological
anthropologies of Karl Rahner and José Ignacio González Faus with the hope of re1
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envisioning Catholic theological anthropology in order to offer a more relatively
adequate response to the contemporary crisis of the misdirection of globalization and the
reality of global disparity due to the prevailing anthropology found in the current
direction of globalization. I have found that Rahner’s transcendental anthropology offers
a foundation for constructing a more historical, contextual and socio-communal
anthropology but that it needs to be pressed further in order to best respond to the current
anthropology that values the autonomous and absolute individual self whose only
responsibility is to serve and benefit its own self, and which underpins the economic and
political structures and systems that are at the heart of the current trajectory of
globalization. I believe that González Faus’ socio-communal anthropology offers a
vision of human existence that takes into consideration the social dimensions of human
existence and its project and goal of solidarity and community. In other words, I argue
that González Faus’ theological anthropology is not a drastic break from Rahner’s
theological anthropology, but rather González Faus draws from certain fundamental
aspects of Rahner’s theological anthropology. 2
In this last chapter, I will examine the radical (i.e., radix, root) images or
metaphors of church that would arise from the anthropologies of these two Jesuit
theologians. Ultimately, my aim is to argue that a re-examined and re-envisioned
Catholic theological anthropology as found in the thought of González Faus necessarily
has implications for the nature and mission of the church and that subsequently can offer
a relatively adequate response to the problem at hand. The ecclesial implications arising
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from González Faus’ theological anthropology will also address the pressing need, as
pointed out by Sobrino, for both a vision of the church of the poor and also a provisional
approach to bringing this vision to fruition.

Dulles’ Ecclesial Models
In order to offer an exploration into, and assessment of, the ecclesiologies of
Rahner and González Faus, it is helpful to see their notions of church set within a larger
framework of other ecclesiologies. The American Jesuit Avery Dulles offers one way of
presenting this framework in his classic work Models of the Church by outlining six
metaphors of church. 3 In mapping out their ecclesiologies within this larger framework, I
will first present the ecclesial models of church as institution, church as mystical
communion, church as herald, and church as a community of disciples. I will then turn
my attention to exploring the ecclesiologies of Rahner and González Faus within the
models of church as sacrament and church as servant. It is important to note that even
though Rahner’s ecclesiology can be situated within the sacrament model and González
Faus’ ecclesiology can be situated within the servant model, these placements do not
limit the extensiveness of their reflections on the nature and mission of the church. The
focal concern of this dissertation, which is to offer an adequate approach to addressing
global disparity, will guide my outline and assessment of Dulles’ models and ultimately
the ecclesiologies of Rahner and González Faus.
3

Models of the Church, (New York: Image Books, 2002). The original edition of Dulles’ work was
published in 1974 and did not include Chapter XIII “The Church: Community of Disciples.” That chapter,
which Dulles stated “[brought] the book into alignment with [his] current thinking,” was added to a later
edition published in 1986, (6). The final Expanded Edition was later published in 2000 and included an
article in the appendix entitled “The Ecclesiology of John Paul II,” which had previously appeared in The
Gift of the Church: A Textbook on Ecclesiology in Honor of Patrick Granfield, O.S.B., ed. Peter C. Phan
(Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2000), 93-110. Hereafter Models of the Church will be cited as MC.

193
Importance of Re-envisioning Religious Imagery
Dulles begins his exploration into, and examination of, various ecclesiologies by
offering a word on religious imagery. In his attempt to establish the importance of
images in theology as well as the criteria for the adequacy of certain images, Dulles
argues that “[r]eligious imagery is both functional and cognitive. In order to win
acceptance, the images must resonate with the experience of the faithful.” 4 He continues,
“In times of rapid cultural change, such as our own, a crisis of images is to be expected.
Many traditional images lose their former hold on people, while the new images have not
yet had time to gain their full power. The contemporary crisis of faith is, I believe, in
very large part a crisis of images.” 5 Dulles’ assessment of the crisis of faith as a crisis of
imagery still applies today with the phenomenon of globalization and the challenge of
global disparity.
The purpose of utilizing images and models in theology is to attempt to gain
better insight into the mysteries of faith. As Dulles argues, theologians use images and
models to both explain what is believed and what is known as well as explore new
theological insights and possibilities. 6 Therefore, since models and images are employed
to describe a mystery, they must be open to critique. In addition, the models employed
should clearly relate to the historical context and the problems that are at hand.
Furthermore, no single model or image “should be canonized as the measure of all the
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rest.”7 However, as important as it is to try to relativize the various accepted models in
order not to absolutize one over others, opt for one model over others may be necessary
depending on the historical context and the problems and questions that the individuals of
that particular context face. I argue here that the ecclesial model that best suits today’s
contemporary situation will need to take seriously the following statement by Johan
Verstraeten:
Christian communities can function as an inspiring and healing force in
the concrete history of women and men. This depends on the extent to
which the communities are fully connected with the world and on the way
that they make a difference by interrupting time-bound hermeneutic
schemes (particularly by way of proclaiming new life). 8

Possible Models of the Church
In order to organize his outline of the possible models of church, Dulles offers
three features of the church that run through all of the models. Those features are the
bonds that unify the members of the church, the beneficiaries of the church, and the
nature of the benefits of the church. To remain faithful to Dulles’ logic, I will use these
three features to present Dulles’ models.

Church as Institution
The first model of the church sees the church as institution. This model of the
church dominated theories of church within Catholicism from the time of the Council of
Trent to Vatican II and is best represented by Robert Bellarmine. For Dulles, the church
as institution does not mean the same thing as institutionalism. Rather, the church as
7
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institution means that “[t]he Church of Christ does not exist in this world without an
organization or structure that analogously resembles the organization of other human
societies.” 9 This is an important point for Dulles because, as he states, the church “could
not perform its mission without some stable organizational features.” 10
As Dulles explains, the bonds that unify the church according to this model come
from Bellarmine’s definition of the church. For Bellarmine, membership within the
church is clearly demarcated. As Dulles makes clear, members of the church are “those
who profess the approved doctrines, communicate in the legitimate sacraments, and who
subject themselves to the duly appointed pastors.”11 In other words, the criteria for
membership must “be visible, that is to say, juridically applicable.” 12
As an institution, the church is to benefit its own members, and what the church
offers to its members is ultimately eternal life. Any concern for the world is a concern
for the eternal salvation of individuals’ souls. This is done through evangelization and
ultimately by bringing individuals into the church as full visible members of the church’s
institutional structure.
Dulles finds many problems with this model, three of which I will explore. First,
as already pointed out, the primary concern of the church in this model is for the
salvation of souls through bringing individuals into church membership. Any social or
global concerns, outside of the church, are taken as secondary. In other words, the
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salvation of the individual person’s soul takes precedence over the individual’s socioeconomic problems. As an example of this, Dulles writes that “Catholics in the Counter
Reformation period became overly concerned with fulfilling ecclesiastical obligations
and insufficiently attentive, at times, to fulfilling the law of charity.” 13 Thus, in terms of
theological anthropology, this model has the potential to overemphasize the person’s
individual salvation. Furthermore, the notion of salvation has the potential to be
relegated to an ontological and otherworldly salvation. Even if this model does
emphasize the communal feature of the church as a perfect society, it has the potential to
isolate itself from the world, alienate individuals from one another, and ultimately
overlook the universal nature of salvation.
A second problem that Dulles points out is that this model tends towards
clericalism. As Dulles argues, overemphasizing the role of the clergy can lead to the
passivity of the laity. 14 Passivity of the laity is clearly antithetical to a globalizing world
where the individual person experiences greater interconnectedness with the wider world.
In other words, in order to address any issue in a globalizing world of growing interaction
and interconnectedness, there needs to be a deeper awareness of the growing changes in
the world, and a more conscious engagement and responsible participation in the world
by all individuals.
A third problem with this model, according to Dulles, is that “[e]cumenically, this
ecclesiology is sterile.” In other words, this model “fails to account for the spiritual
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vitality of non-Roman Catholic churches.” 15 This is an important critique of the
institutional model since global problems, such as global disparity and radical egoism,
need to be addressed by Christianity as a whole. 16 It will be a battle waged in vain if the
Catholic Church does not, in authentic humility, recognize its own limitations and
sinfulness and thus actively work towards collaborating with other Christian churches as
it attempts to address the current global crisis.

Church as Mystical Communion
The second model that Dulles outlines is the church as mystical communion.
Two of the best representatives of this model are Yves Congar and Jérôme Hamer. 17
According to Dulles, Congar sees the church as a “fellowship of persons” (community of
salvation) and “the totality of the means by which this fellowship is produced and
maintained” (institution of salvation). 18 Both of these aspects, for Congar, are essential
and inseparable.
Hamer, fundamentally in agreement with Congar, attempted to combine these two
aspects under the one idea of communion. In his ecclesiology, Hamer distinguishes
between the horizontal dimension and the vertical dimension in which the horizontal
represents the “outward and visible bonds of a brotherly society” and the vertical
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represents “the divine life disclosed in the incarnate Christ and communicated to men
through his Spirit.” 19 In both Congar’s and Hamer’s ecclesiologies there is an emphasis
upon the immediate relationship of all believers to the Spirit.
In this model, the bonds of union are the “interior graces and gifts of the Holy
Spirit.” 20 It is a spiritual and mystical union that unifies the members of the church,
rather than a juridical union as found in the institutional model. Essentially, the church in
this model is a communion of the faithful united through the Spirit of God.
The beneficiaries of this model, as Dulles sees it, are not just those individuals
who have a visible and juridical connection to the church, but rather the beneficiaries are
those persons who are united in the Spirit of God. What the members of the church gain
in this model are the initial phases of union with God in this life, which will ultimately
become complete in the next life. In other words, as Dulles writes, “[w]herever the
Church is present, men are already united with God.” 21
As with the first model, Dulles offers the weaknesses that he finds in this second
model. Additionally, in light of the issue of globalization and the concern for global
justice, I see a couple of problems. I agree with Dulles that this model “tends to exalt and
divinize the Church beyond its due.” 22 This is problematic since it provides little room
for self-critique by those inside or outside of the church.
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Another critique that Dulles offers, and that I agree with, deals with this model’s
ambiguity surrounding the mission and identity of the church. Though Dulles is forceful
in stating that this model “fails to give Christians a very clear sense of their identity and
mission,” I would qualify that statement with the idea that it may, but not necessarily, fail
to clarify the identity and mission if that mission and identity is not christocentric.

Church as Herald
Another model of the church that Dulles outlines is the church as herald. This
model is best represented by Karl Barth, Rudolph Bultmann and Hans Küng. Unlike the
model of church as communion, this model emphasizes the word of God as well as
personal faith and the proclamation of the word of God over interpersonal relations and
mystical communion. 23 Though there is much variance and divergence between the
theologians of this model, at the core of this model is the word of God, which is an event
that takes place as often as God addresses the community and this address is believed. In
the words of Richard McBrien, the “Church is essentially a kerygmatic community which
holds aloft, through the preached Word, the wonderful deeds of God in past history,
particularly his mighty act in Jesus Christ. The community itself happens wherever the
Spirit breathes, wherever the Word is proclaimed and accepted in faith. The Church is
event, a point of encounter with God.”24
The church therefore is shaped by the word being proclaimed and by the word
being faithfully heard. The church is not, in this model, confined to any particular visible
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institution. As Dulles points out the “form of Church order in this ecclesiology is
characteristically congregational...the Church is not dependent for its existence on any
worldwide structure.”25 The bond that unites the Christian community, then, is faith in
the word of God in the event of Jesus Christ. This faith is essentially the individual
person’s response to the word, and the proclamation of this faith to the world. In other
words, faith is fundamentally that which unites and binds the community together.
In this model, the individual person’s response to the word of God constitutes
faith and becomes the condition for salvation. The goal of the church, therefore, is to
faithfully proclaim this message of salvation to the world. In Dulles’ words, the
“preaching of the gospel is related to salvation, because it summons men to put their faith
in Jesus as Savior. It announces the day of salvation that is at hand for believers. More
than this, the preaching is itself an eschatological event. The word of God, on the lips of
the authorized herald, is impregnated with the power of God himself, whose word it
becomes. The word saves those who believe in it. Conversely, it condemns those who
refuse to believe.” 26 Ultimately, it is those who hear the word of God and respond
faithfully to the message who benefit from the church.
The question now arises, how does this model stand up to the current issue of
global disparity? Since the real strength of this model is its prophetic nature, the church
can be envisioned as having the potential to unmask the idolatries found in society,
proclaim the good news to the poor, and herald the coming of the kingdom of God. As
much of a value that proclaiming and heralding the good news of Christ may have,
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proclamation without real concrete action to change social structures and systems may
have no real effect in the world. As Dulles argues, a real disadvantage with this model is
its exclusive focus on witness to the neglect of action. He claims that it “is too
pessimistic or quietistic with regard to the possibilities of human effort to establish a
better human society in this life, and the duty of Christians to take part in this common
effort.”27 This critique is important since a rapidly changing world may not remain idle
to reflect on and contemplate its own internal injustices or moral and ethical
inconsistencies.

Church as Community of Disciples
The next model, which Dulles prefers, is the model of church as community of
disciples. As Dulles points out, part of the inspiration behind this model was a remark
made by John Paul II in his encyclical Redemptor Hominis. In essence, as Dulles claims,
this model is a “variant of the communion model.” 28 For him, this model has the
potential to harmonize the differences of the other models and is therefore a sort of
bridge-builder model with the other five models. He argues that the “notion of
‘community of disciples’ is thus a broadly inclusive one. Without being adequate to the
full reality of the Church, it has…potentialities as a basis for a comprehensive
ecclesiology.” 29
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As Dulles admits, this ecclesial model very rarely appears within recent
theological literature. 30 However, unlike some of the other models, this model is rooted
in Jesus’ ministry and clearly noticeable in the New Testament. In addition to being
discernible in the New Testament, Dulles argues that this model of church appears often
throughout the history of the development of the church. For example, in the early
centuries of the church, martyrdom embodied this type of ecclesiology. Later on, the
religious life, and more particularly the monastic way of life, became a way for the
Christian to concretely distance his or herself from the values of the world in order to
uphold Jesus’ call to discipleship within an alternative society.
Dulles describes the model of church as community of disciples not only as an
alternative or distinct society from those societies emerging out of the values of the
world, but also as a unique way of life for the individual Christian. He points out that the
norm that constitutes Christian discipleship is “self-abnegation, humble service,
generosity toward the needy, and patience in adversity.” 31 This norm is further defined
through a personal, inward transformation and an active participation in the sacramental
life of the institutional church.
Though the model may appear to lack the real social mission of the church, Dulles
does claim that over the past century “the social dimensions of discipleship have come
increasingly to the fore.” 32 He sees Latin American liberation theologians as
exemplifying this move towards greater concern for the social dimension of discipleship.
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He points out that “[t]he Catholic Church in our time officially recognizes a close link
between evangelization and the struggle for justice, development, peace, and liberation in
the world.” 33 He adds that the church’s “commitment to Christ and its eschatological
hope have a proper and necessary impact upon political and economic life and
consequently on the transformation of human society.” 34
Dulles’ attempt to include the social dimension in his model is noteworthy.
However, it seems to me that underneath his receptivity to the use of more sociopolitical
categories in speaking of the church lies a vision of reality that consists of a real
separation and distinction between the religious and secular spheres, rather than an
analogical or conceptual distinction. This is noticeable when he states that “the Catholic
Church in our time officially recognizes a close link between evangelization and the
struggle for justice.” 35 I am concerned that he may be assuming an epistemology that
only sees a “link” between proclaiming the word of God and working for justice, and an
epistemology that has a real distinction between working for the kingdom of God and
working for humanity.
In addition, he seems to be more readily willing to point out the extremes of the
social dimension of discipleship (e.g., when he states that “the Church cannot be reduced
to the level of a political coalition”) rather than pursuing the benefits of the social
dimension. 36 I agree with Dulles that the church needs to avoid ecclesiological
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reductionism. However, I am concerned that his argument may be setting up an unfair
criticism of valuable aspects (viz., the communal and social dimension of human
existence, the imperative found in Matthew 25 of service, and the relationship Jesus had
with the sociopolitical structures of his day) of theologies of liberation. 37

Root Metaphors and Implications of Rahner’s Ecclesiology
Of Dulles’ six models, the model that best represents Rahner’s ecclesiology is
church as sacrament. In fact, Dulles argues that this model was influenced by the thought
of Rahner. 38 In the following section I will first outline Rahner’s notion of church as
sacrament. I will then offer an assessment of this metaphor as it stands up against the
problem of global disparity. Finally, I will examine Rahner’s text The Shape of the
Church to Come and argue that this text is the groundwork of Rahner’s evolving thought
on ecclesiology and that it illustrates the need for a more radical vision of the church.

Church as Sacrament of Salvation
As Dulles points out, the notion of church as sacrament greatly influenced the
documents on church outlined at Vatican II, namely, in the document “Constitution on
the Church.” It states that “the Church is a kind of sacrament of intimate union with God
and of the unity of all mankind; that is, she is a sign and instrument of such union and
unity.” 39
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As Dulles argues, the sacramental model offers an attempt at reconciling the
tension between the external characteristic of the institutional model and the internal
characteristic of the communal model. The church in this model is both a visible sign
and a sacrament of salvation, and, because it is a visible sign and sacrament, it consists of
external and internal dimensions. As a sign, the external dimension of the church is its
institutional structure. The external dimension is essential in order to make visible, and
historically concrete, the redeeming grace of Christ. Furthermore, this dimension
signifies the continuity of the gospel message of salvation from apostolic times to
contemporary times.
Since the church is also sacrament, it goes beyond the external, institutional
dimension and consists of an internal, grace-filled, and transformative dimension. As
Dulles explains, a sacrament “is a sign of grace realizing itself. Sacrament has an event
character; it is dynamic. The Church becomes Church insofar as the grace of Christ,
operative within it, achieves historical tangibility through the actions of the Church as
such.” 40 As Dulles continues, this dynamic event quality of the church as sacrament
takes place most fully at the Eucharist.41
The notion that the church is sign and sacrament has its theoretical foundation in
Rahner’s theory of symbol. In volume four of his Theological Investigations Rahner
40
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unpacks this theory through exploring an ontology of symbolic reality. In his exploration
of an ontology, the first two principles of this ontology captures the essence of his
understanding of symbol. First, he states, “all beings are by their nature symbolic,
because they necessarily ‘express’ themselves in order to attain their own nature.”42
Second, which is an inversion of the first principle, he writes that “The symbol strictly
speaking (symbolic reality) is the self-realization of a being in the other, which is
constitutive of its essence.” 43
After establishing the philosophical foundation of his theory of symbol, Rahner
applies the notion of symbol to the church. He argues that the church “is the persisting
presence of the incarnate Word in space and time” and hence the church “continues the
symbolic function of the Logos in the world.” 44 For Rahner, the church as symbol of
Christ’s grace is simultaneously a social and juridical entity and the expression of the
grace of salvation. 45 In other words, envisioning the church as symbol of God’s grace of
salvation means that the church contains what it signifies, viz., God’s grace of salvation.
It is, then, the sacrament of God’s salvation, and it is the sacrament of God’s salvation in
history.
Since the church signifies and mediates God’s salvation in Christ and in history, it
must necessarily be engaged in a real conversation with the social systems and structures
of the world. More specifically, as Rahner claimed in a lecture given in 1968, “the task
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of the Church or of the Churches as providing a critique of society is a theme that is
actual and relevant today.” 46 However, the church will not be reduced to purely an
institution of social critique. For Rahner, any ecclesiological reductionism neglects the
church’s transcendental dimension. As he clarifies, the nature of the function of the
church as critic of society “consists in opening up ever anew a perspective which
transcends the concrete reality such that within this perspective the social reality
concerned appears in its relative value and so as capable of alteration.” 47
The church as sacrament suggests an intimate link between the church and the
Spirit of God. For Rahner, the Spirit is essential to the nature of the church and the Spirit
is the one who “established the Church as the sacrament of God’s revelation in Jesus.” 48
In addition, the Spirit is made manifest in the church through the gospel message and
through the sacraments.
The role of the Spirit in the church does not mean that “spirituality” is a private
matter. Though Rahner affirmed the Spirit’s presence in the individual person, the
manifestation of the Spirit is most fully realized in the ecclesial community, which moves
the individual outside of self-love to a concrete historical love of neighbor. As Rahner
argues in The Shape of the Church to Come, “‘spirituality’ not only includes a love for
our close or distant neighbor, but a love which today is obviously more than a private
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affair and takes the form of a real struggle for more justice and freedom in society.” 49
Therefore, as Dulles explains, the bonds of union of this model are found in “all the
social, visible signs of the grace of Christ operative in believing Christians.” 50 In other
words, all activities that witness to the faith, hope and love that are foundational to the
Christian faith are expressions “of a heartfelt conviction inspired by the grace of the Holy
Spirit.” 51
As Dulles rightly points out, according to this model, the beneficiaries of this
form of church are “those who are better able to articulate and live their faith thanks to
their contact with the believing and loving Church.” 52 As Dulles sees it, those who
actively participate in witnessing and living out faith, hope and love through the visible
social activities of the church are the recipients of the grace of Christ, but are not
necessarily the sole recipients of the grace of Christ. As he claims, this model does not
confine God’s gifts “to people who employ biblical or Christian symbolism.” 53
However, those who do actively participate in the life of the church “become living
symbols of divine love and beacons of hope in the world.” 54
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Church as Sacrament of Salvation in Light of Global Disparity
The question that now arises is how does this model stand up to the current issue
of global disparity? Dulles’ assessment of this model can help answer this question. One
advantage of this model according to Dulles is that it allows for the movements of grace
outside of the institutional church. This is an important characteristic for a twenty-first
century ecclesiology. If an ecclesiology claims to offer a response to a particular global
issue, that ecclesiology may benefit from other approaches to that particular global
problem (e.g., the social and critically-oriented sciences).
A second advantage of this model in light of global disparity is “the ability of this
model to integrate ecclesiology with other traditional theological themes. The doctrine of
symbolic, or sacramental, causality brings Christology, ecclesiology, and sacramentology
into a single, overarching unity.” 55 This advantage is relevant to this dissertation since an
understanding of the church will necessarily be contingent on Christology and therefore
on anthropology.
The third advantage of this model that Dulles sees, and that can be beneficial in
light of the problem of global disparity, is that “this ecclesiology does not encourage any
deification of the actual form of the Church’s life, for it acknowledges that the symbolic
expressions of grace are never adequate to the life of grace itself. The Church is
continually called to become a better sign of Christ than it has been.” 56 More
specifically, this model opens up the possibility for necessary self-critique in order to
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avoid any possibility of contributing to, even if only indirectly and unconsciously, the
intensification of global disparity.
The only real critique that Dulles gives this model is the possibility of an
excessive sacramentalism. In his words, “sacramentalism, carried to excess, can induce
an attitude of narcissistic aestheticism that is not easily reconcilable with a full Christian
commitment to social and ethical values.” 57 In addition, Dulles makes the claim that the
notion of sacramentality that this model presupposes “is technical and sophisticated, and
defies easy popularization. This is not an objection against the theory itself, but it calls
attention to a real limitation in the utility of the theory.” 58 In a rapidly changing world,
where the majority of Catholics are found in the developing nations and where global
disparity is most strikingly present, an ecclesiology that is limited in its practicality may
be problematic. Furthermore, “an attitude of narcissistic aestheticism” is also a real
problem where egoism is the current underpinning attitude of the first world. However,
as important as these critiques are, it is unfounded to argue that Rahner’s ecclesiology
lacked a vision for, and the foundations of, a more practical and socio-communally
concerned ecclesiology. As Richard Lennan so effectively shows:
Although Rahner’s ecclesiology was not overtly political, its emphasis on
the sacramental identity of the Church, which included the Church’s
mission to be a symbol of humanity’s reconciliation to God in Jesus
Christ, was not innocent of political implications. Rahner stressed that the
Church could not live quietly with injustice, either in the wider world or
within the Church itself, as such injustice was alien to the Spirit. If the
Church was to be a symbol of hope for the world, it needed to be more
than a pious association of believers: it needed to be a community that
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relied on the Spirit, focused on Jesus Christ, prized unity, and worked to
incarnate justice in the world. 59
To this point by Lennan I would add that Rahner’s text The Shape of the Church to Come
offers a vision of and foundational ideas for a church of the future that is more socially
and globally oriented and committed.

Church as Local Ecclesial Community
Though Rahner’s work The Shape of the Church to Come was written in response
to the German bishops’ synod of 1971, most of what is said in the text can be useful
beyond the problems of the Catholic Church in Germany. After introducing the text by
outlining various problems facing the Catholic Church in Germany, offering an analysis
of the situation in Part One, and presenting some correctives to the current ecclesial
situation in Part Two, Rahner offers five possible metaphors or images for the church of
the future. These metaphors are open church, ecumenical church, church from the roots,
democratized church, and socio-critical church. Ultimately, I believe that each one of
these metaphors offer a possible vision of and foundation for a radical image of the
church of the future, namely, church as basic ecclesial community.
It is clear that there is a progression in Part Three of the text. Though Rahner is
very careful not to claim that he knows what exactly the church will look like in the
future, his reflections do tend to emphasize the importance of smaller, basic church
communities. This progression in thought takes concrete form with the first sentence of
the third image, namely church from the roots. He states that “[t]he Church of the future
will be one built from below by basic communities as a result of a free initiative and
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association.” 60 The following section will trace this progression beginning with the
metaphor of open church.
Rahner hopes that the church can move away from a ghetto mentality that turns
the church inward upon itself. As he argued earlier in this text, and reiterating what was
said at Vatican II, the church ought to be a church concerned with every person in the
world and not with itself. 61 In other words, the task of the church is to exist for every
person and not for itself. 62 As he argues, “[t]he Church has to stand up for justice and
freedom, for man’s dignity, even when it is to her own detriment, even when an alliance
– perhaps tacit – with the ruling powers would at first sight seem beneficial to her.” 63 In
addition, Rahner argues that those within the church ought to “be surprised how seldom –
apart from direct and express attacks on the Church – the Church comes into conflict with
those who hold power.” 64 Even in evangelization the purpose of the church is not merely
“saving those who would otherwise be lost, but acquiring witnesses as signs making clear
for all the grace of God effective throughout the world.” 65
As Rahner sees it, the open church is also receptive to new ideas and new ways of
answering pressing contemporary questions. Being open to new ideas and new ways of
answering questions by the church is not an attempt to relativize the teachings and
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dogmatic proclamations of the church nor does it disregard the church’s role in repelling
heresy. As he emphatically states “[i]t is obvious that there can be no further talk of the
orthodoxy which is essential to the Church, where there is no acknowledgement of the
living God of eternal life and of Jesus as mediator of salvation or where these things are
shut out by pure humanism or ‘horizontalism’. Anyone who does not acknowledge the
living God and Jesus as Lord is outside the Church.” 66 For example, “[i]f a theologian
attempts to interpret positively the official teaching of the Church without rejecting this
flatly or from top to bottom; if he does not merely express his critical reservation, but
stand up positively and seeks lovingly to win people for faith in God and Jesus Christ; if
he is not merely a critic, but a herald of the faith; if, without fuss, he shares and helps to
sustain the life of the Church: then the orthodoxy of his opinions may be presumed until
the contrary is conclusively proved.” 67 With regard to more specific questions of church
teachings, Rahner argues that there ought to be some form of “discernment of spirits” on
these questions.
With regard to the orthodoxy of a specific belief, Rahner argues that the issue at
hand “must be a question of real dogmas.” 68 However, the problem of orthodoxy today
is difficult “because a quite considerable theological pluralism simply cannot be avoided
and even has a positive function in the Church, since otherwise it would be impossible
properly to relate the one gospel to the diversity of horizons of understanding, productive
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ideas, mentalities, and so on in the world.” 69 The use of various scientific methodologies
in theology may in fact fall under this notion of the “diversity of horizons of
understanding.” For example, the denunciation by the Vatican of liberation theology on
the grounds that liberation theology employs Marxist analysis may not fall under the
category of heretical teachings since the use of Marxist analysis by most liberation
theologies within the Catholic tradition is used as a method of analysis rather than as a
critique of religion or Christian dogma.
The second metaphor is the ecumenical church. This metaphor is closely related
to the open church. Rahner’s reflection on this metaphor of church is clearly meant to
address the Catholic Church’s relationship to other Christian churches, both theologically
and institutionally. What is important to note for my argument here is that Rahner
acknowledges the pluralistic character of the church of the future. As he claims, “the
future Church will in any case be much more pluralistic than our Church has palpably
been juridically and in terms of sociology of religion since the Reformation period.” 70
This plurality points to the fact that the phenomenon of globalization has an impact on
religious traditions, and more specifically on the Catholic tradition and Church.
This notion of plurality, for Rahner, is not something to fear or reject, but is a
reality that needs to be embraced and dealt with. Rahner seems to be drawing from the
Scholastic theory of analogia entis here in that he can envision the unity of Christianity
in a plurality. As he sees it, the unity of the global church in the plurality of churches
will not come about by a unification of theological teachings. Rather, for Rahner, the
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“full unity of faith and theology as a consequence of institutional unification, particularly
since the latter need not mean institutional uniformity based on dogma as hitherto
envisaged by the Code of Canon law.” 71
The third metaphor is the church from the roots. It is here that Rahner makes the
case for the necessary existence of basic ecclesial communities within the church of the
future. He argues that “[t]he church of the future will be one built from below by basic
communities as a result of free initiative and association.” 72 In addition, “[t]he Church
will exist only by being constantly renewed by a free decision of faith and the formation
of congregations on the part of individuals in the midst of a secular society bearing no
imprint of Christianity.” 73 If this free association of believers “can really sustain the
essential, basic functions of the Church (organized proclamation of the gospel,
administration of the sacraments, Christian charity and so on),” then it has the right to be
recognized as church. 74 In addition, these communities should be understood as
maintaining the “reality of the great Churches” and not seen as mere “organs of the great
Church.” 75
The notion of church from the roots is not meant to be understood as a further
fragmentation of Christianity. As Rahner argues, the ecclesial base community does not
replace or usurp the proper role of the local parish or institutional form of church. In fact,
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base communities must still be legally recognized by what Rahner terms the “evangelical
great Church.” What is meant here is that there will be a plurality in the way in which
these ecclesial communities emerge, are structured, and relate to the greater church.
Hence, there will be a dialogical relationship between the “evangelical great Church,” as
coined by Rahner, and these local communities.
In summary, Rahner makes the claim that “concrete and living Christianity today
and particularly tomorrow can no longer be passed on simply by the power of a
homogenous Christian society…but must be carried into the future through the life and
witness of a genuine Christian community living out what Christianity really means.” 76
If these communities are “both very intensively active and at the same time outwardlooking, they will be able to be the bearers of the real missionary power of the Church for
the future.” 77 As I will point out later, González Faus will also argue for the necessary
existence of ecclesial base communities within the church as a response to the growing
global disparity.
The fourth metaphor, which builds on the previous metaphor, is the democratized
church. As Rahner argues, a democratized church flows directly out of the living and
stable basic ecclesial communities that are formed through a free association of believers.
The use of the term “democratized” may lead to misunderstandings of what Rahner is
attempting to argue. As with the metaphor of church from the roots, a democratized
church is not an unstructured free-for-all by its members nor does a democratized church
necessarily disregard any forms or structures of leadership. Instead, what the term
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democracy denotes is the idea of collaboration and collegiality among all church
members. As Rahner argues, “today and in the future, particularly in a Church built up
more than formerly from below, there must be a greater collaboration – even though in
varying degrees...” 78 One example that Rahner provides is in decision-making. He states
that “[a] more obvious participation of the laity is required, not only in the appointment
of office-holders, but also in other decision-making processes in the life of the Church.” 79
The final metaphor of church that Rahner presents is the socio-critical church.
Rahner begins his exploration into this image by pointing out that “there has been so
much talk about [the socio-critical commitment of the Church in all her members and
particular groups] since Vatican II” and that the critics of this trajectory within the church
“have the impression that, behind all the talk and the appeals about the worldresponsibility of Christians and the Church, there lies a tendency towards ‘horizontalism’,
an attempt to make the Church function as a purely humanitarian institution, perhaps
even as a merely secular society of the future.”80 However, as Rahner argues, this
commitment by the church is an essential task of the church, since loving God and loving
one’s neighbor “are radically dependent on each other.” 81
The gospel mandate “love of neighbor” is fundamental to the socio-critical church
for Rahner and is at the heart of the socio-critical feature of Rahner’s thought. 82 As
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Rahner argues, love of neighbor cannot be reduced or restricted to private, personal
relationships. In a world that is rapidly changing and becoming much more
interconnected the command to love one’s neighbor takes on a socio-political character. 83
In light of this reality (i.e., a changing, globalizing world and the socio-political character
of love), he sees a real problem with the privatization of this command to love one’s
neighbor, and thus subsequently the privatization of Christianity. He argues that “the
danger of debasing Christianity by confining the struggle with sin to the wholly private
sphere is imminent and menacing...” 84 In addition, he wonders if a “retreat to a private,
inner world, where alone the drama is to be played between the redeeming God of
freedom, love and justice, and sinful man, does not corrupt Christianity and the unity of
the living and historical person…” 85 Instead of a vision of the human drama that is
myopic, Rahner invites the Christian to see the world as interconnected and socially
structured.
As Rahner further argues, a Christian who acknowledges the “sin of the world”
cannot assume that these global changes are necessarily contributing to the betterment of
all people. Rahner sees a real disparity between “the modern industrial nations and the
underdeveloped peoples” that is amounting to “a global revolutionary situation.” 86 He
again reiterates this point by making the claim that “[t]oday…we should be able to see
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that we are in a global revolutionary situation (which is not the same as revolution). For
the social situation of this one world as a whole is characterized by such massive injustice
and material peril for the greater part of mankind that it would be impossible to find any
institutions capable of removing these things in an ‘evolutionary’ way and in accordance
with principles recognized on all sides in society.” 87 With this being said, for Rahner,
loving one’s neighbor in a globalizing world, then, takes the form of “criticizing and
changing society.” 88 Offering a particular example, Rahner argues that “[a] part of the
sociopolitical commitment of Christians, their groups, and the Church, which also
involves their institutions, is the duty of helping the Third World…But it is obvious that
our Christians and Christian congregations are not at all clearly aware of the fundamental
importance of this theme for the Christian conscience.” 89
It is now clear that, for Rahner, the metaphor of socio-critical church is founded
upon the conscience and responsibility of the individual Christian, and it places an
emphasis upon the active commitment of the individual members of the church. The
metaphor of church as institution can definitely offer a way of addressing structural and
global problems. However, as was pointed out earlier, the institutional model may tend
to paralyze the individual person from making decisions and taking action. Rahner is
therefore attempting to preserve the freedom and responsibility of the individual
Christian. This responsibility, though, goes beyond personal charity and moves towards
changing social structures as he makes the claim that Christians should “enter into a
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mental and material solidarity with those Christians and non-Christian groups which are
working for radical changes in the social and economic structures in their own
underdeveloped countries.” 90 At this point the argument of this chapter can now explore
González Faus’ understanding of the nature and mission of the church, and examine how
he employs elements of Rahner’s ecclesiology and yet moves beyond Rahner’s
ecclesiology.

Root Metaphors and Implications of González Faus’ Ecclesiology
Among Dulles’ six models, one that best represents González Faus’ ecclesiology
is the model of church as servant. However, because of his faithfulness to Vatican II and
due to the influence that Rahner’s theology has had on his theology, the model of church
as sacrament of salvation is also significant in characterizing his ecclesiology. 91 Though
González Faus’ ecclesiology fits best within the servant model and is marked by the
sacrament model, I argue that González Faus’ notion of the church goes beyond these
models of church, and that these models do not entirely describe his ecclesiology. I
contend that a more adequate model, or better, metaphor, to illustrate his ecclesiology is
the binomial filiación-fraternidad.
In order to remain consistent with this chapter’s framework, and in order to show
the uniqueness of the model of church as filiación-fraternidad, the following section will
be divided into three parts. I will first outline the servant model as presented by Dulles
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since that model is the appropriate starting point to describe the ecclesiology of González
Faus. Second, I will examine how liberation ecclesiology becomes the condition for a
necessary ecclesial reform for González Faus. Finally, I will present the root metaphor of
church as filiación-fraternidad and make the claim that this metaphor is the most
adequate ecclesial metaphor in light of the misdirection of the present course of
globalization and in light of the current problem of global disparity.

Church as Servant
As Dulles argues, the model of church as servant is found in the Vatican II
document “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.” There are a
number of characteristics of this model of church found in this document. For example,
the document presents a positive relationship between the church and the world and
acknowledges the autonomy of the world from the church. 92 It challenges the church to
continually renew itself in light of an ever changing world. It also invites the church to
acknowledge the valid accomplishments of the world and to learn from the world.
Lastly, the document invites the church to see itself as a “part of the total human family,
sharing the concerns of the rest of men.” 93 As a result, just as Christ was servant to all so
must the church seek “to serve the world by fostering the brotherhood of all men.” 94
As Dulles points out, the pastoral method that is found within this ecclesiology
may be called “secular-dialogic.” As he states, it is “secular, because the Church takes
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the world as a properly theological locus, and seeks to discern the signs of the times;
dialogic, because it seeks to operate on the frontier between the contemporary world and
the Christian tradition (including the Bible), rather than simply apply the latter as a
measure of the former.” 95 Dulles sees Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
Cardinal Richard Cushing, and Richard McBrien as representative of this pastoral method
and ecclesiology. 96
What unites the church in this model according to Dulles is “the sense of mutual
brotherhood that springs up among those who join in Christian service toward the
world.” 97 The mission of the church in this model is service to all those in need, and
therefore, the beneficiaries of this model are “all those brothers and sisters the world
over, who hear from the Church a word of comfort or encouragement, or who obtain
from the Church a respectful hearing, or who receive from it some material help in their
hour of need.” 98
In light of this dissertation’s guiding concern of global disparity and the
contemporary trajectory of globalization, one important advantage of this model is, as
Dulles claims, that “the modern world very much needs something the Church alone can
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give: faith in Christ, hope in the ultimate coming of God’s kingdom, and commitment to
the values of peace, justice, and human brotherhood.” 99 In addition,
The servant ecclesiology reflects a consciousness of these needs of both
the Church and the world. It seeks to give the Church a new relevance, a
new vitality, a new modernity, and a new sense of mission. The effort on
the Church’s part to overcome its pride, its corporate egoism, and its
callousness toward human misery promises to bring about a great spiritual
renewal within the Church itself. Not only individual persons in the
Church, but the Church itself, can be transformed into altruistic service
toward the poor and oppressed. This service can include prophetic
criticism of social institutions, and thus help to transform human society
into the image of the promised Kingdom. 100
Dulles offers a real challenge here for the church, namely, to be “transformed into
altruistic service toward the poor and oppressed” through “prophetic criticism of social
institutions” and the transformation of “human society into the image of the promised
Kingdom.” As I will show in the following section, the ecclesiology of González Faus
offers one way to address this challenge and therefore to ultimately address the challenge
of the misdirection of globalization and the reality of global disparity.
Just like the other models, Dulles finds something problematic with the servant
model and the point of contention that he makes is important. His main critique of this
model is its lack of biblical foundation. He does acknowledge that a notion of this model
can be indirectly drawn from the scriptures. 101 However, an indirect connection is not
sufficient enough for Dulles. The lack of direct biblical foundation could lead to, as
Dulles claims, “uncritical acceptance of secular values, thus muting its distinctive witness
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to Christ and to its own heritage.” 102 In light of González Faus’ book Hombres de la
comunidad: Repensando el ministerio eclesial, this concern is answered. 103 The basic
argument of his book is that the mission that Christ left to his apostles, and which made
up the early church, is a mission of service to others, especially those in most need. The
main point of this argument rests upon the fact that the “priesthood of Jesus Christ,”
which is entregarse (i.e., giving up of one’s self for another), redefines the priesthood and
is the consummation of every form of priesthood. This definitive characteristic
subsequently describes the mission of the whole church.

A Reforming Church: Liberation Ecclesiology as the Condition for Reform
As stated earlier, the servant model that Dulles outlines does offer a way to
introduce González Faus’ vision of the church. However, as I will show in the following
sections, González Faus’ vision of the church and the binomial root metaphor filiaciónfraternidad go beyond the servant model. Part of going beyond the servant model
consists of the church’s task of self-critique and self-reform. In other words, the
outward-looking feature of the metaphor of church as servant must be complemented
with an inward-directed criticism.
Much of González Faus’ reflections on ecclesiology are devoted to the need for
reform within the Church. As he states in Where the Spirit Breaths, “Not a few of the
faithful of our days are convinced that God continues to call the church to a serious
reform, and that the highest authorities in the church would be doing the church a
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disservice were they to insist on the unsuitability of such a reform on the grounds that,
since the church is holy, it is therefore beyond all reproach.” 104 This “serious reform,” as
he argues in his work El factor cristiano, can be initiated by the theologies of
liberation. 105
For González Faus, liberation ecclesiology holds in radical tension two seemingly
incompatible theological themes that are essential to re-envisioning and reforming the
church. He argues that the themes of mediation-incarnation within Roman Catholic
theology and protest-purity within Protestant theology are oftentimes seen as two
competing themes in the Christian theological tradition. As competing theological
themes and traditions, the ecclesiologies that arise from these traditions will vary and
therefore the full potential by which the gospel values and message can engage the values
and messages of the world may be weakened. Liberation theology, then, can help create
the needed bridge between these two traditions and therefore utilize the beneficial
features of both traditions.
Following the thought of Paul Tillich and Jean Guitton, González Faus argues that
Catholic ecclesiology, in general, emphasizes the notions of mediation-incarnation and
fullness. These notions of mediation-incarnation and fullness are found in the principles
of inculturation, sacramentality, and community. As he argues, “inculturation is a
consequence of the principle of incarnation. The universality of God (as the universality
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of the Word) became ‘particularized’ in order to be with us.” 106 Therefore, since
inculturation, sacramentality, and community have always been essential ecclesiological
principles within Catholic theology, the church has always attempted to find the Word
present in the particularities of history (e.g., Paul’s concern over Gentile converts, the
early Church’s incorporation of neo-Platonism and Aristotelianism; Mateo Ricci in
China; the Malabar Rites; the Paraguay Reductions).
As González Faus argues, liberation theology affirms the Catholic notion of
mediation-incarnation. Ecclesiologies of liberation see the Word of God and the active
grace of Christ present in the particularities of history. In other words, for ecclesiologies
of liberation particular historical cultures, communities and movements become the
context for the church’s task of filiación-fraternidad. For example, many ecclesiologies
of liberation argue that this particularization of the universal Word of God is found in the
sacramental nature of popular religiosity. 107 Therefore, these historical and concrete
cultures, communities and movements become the places of grace out of which the Spirit
of God gives persons in community the empowerment (potenciación) to restructure
(reconstruir) human systems and structures.
In addition to seeing concrete cultures, communities and movements as the loci of
God’s Word and grace, ecclesiologies of liberation see suffering and death as further
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places of God’s Word and grace. It is in the suffering of a particular people that the
church encounters the liberating God and experiences the transformative power of God.
As González Faus argues, liberation ecclesiology does not limit God’s liberating
and saving work to the categories of mediation-incarnation. Rather, for liberation
ecclesiology the themes of protest and purity found in Protestant ecclesiologies are
necessary for an authentic ecclesiology. These themes of protest and purity highlight the
principles of the cross, the absolute transcendence of God, the authority of the Word, and
the existential freedom of the individual Christian.
As González Faus points out, the cross of Christ has become an essential and
dominant symbol within many Protestant ecclesiologies. These ecclesiologies oftentimes
minimize the incarnation in order to emphasize the cross. This emphasis upon the cross
is reasonable especially when Christian communities find themselves in situations of
oppression and marginalization. For this reason, liberation theology has a long history of
employing the cross of Christ as a primary symbol and seeing the church as a crucified
people.
Another principle that arises from the themes of protest and purity is the principle
of the absolute transcendence of God. Within many Protestant ecclesiologies, God is
understood as the Absolute Other beyond all of creation. In other words, God cannot be
identified with anything in creation and therefore is beyond the possibility of being
manipulated by any particular ecclesial community, tradition or ecclesial authority. The
Word of God, as the absolute Word, is therefore not a word that can be grasped fully and
controlled but rather is the Word that challenges all forms of idolatry and must be the
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only word that is listened to and obeyed. Thus, the notion that God is Wholly Other
challenges any attempt by a particular community or individual to claim possession of
God’s word or God’s will. Hence, as González Faus argues, understanding God as Other
is also an important notion within liberation theology with its emphasis upon social and
religious critique.
To sum up, González Faus argues that liberation ecclesiology can reconcile the
competing images of church found within the Catholic and Protestant traditions of the
West. This reconciliation can then offer a holistic vision of a liberating church that is at
the service of the kingdom of God through the project and task of filiación-fraternidad.

Church as Project and Embodiment of Filiación-Fraternidad
To envision the church as project and embodiment of filiación-fraternidad means,
in essence, to see the church as the seed of the kingdom of God in history and in the
world. As the seed of the kingdom in history and in the world, the grace of the church
consists in its covenantal relationship of filiación to God the Father and its task and
project of the transformation of history and of the structures and systems of the world
through fraternización. However, it is important to remember that the church in its
created dimension also is in need of reform, restoration and redemption. The church’s
own reform, restoration and redemption are first of all found in its own restructuring from
an institution that is self-serving to a communal body that is devoted to the kingdom of
God. Second of all, the church’s restoration and redemption is found in its own
empowering by the grace of the Spirit to transform history and to transform the world.
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Though I have already pointed out that González Faus sees liberation theology as
an important factor in beginning the process of reforming and restructuring the church,
the following section will examine, more specifically, five features of this metaphor of
church and how these features contribute to the restructuring and empowering of the
church’s own body and how these features contribute to restructuring and empowering
history and the world. These five features of church as filiación-fraternidad are the
unmasking of idolatry and the experiencing of the true God, the denouncing of injustice,
the taking of sides, the changing of the situation, and the building of local communities.

Unmasking Idolatry and Experiencing the True God
The first feature of the metaphor filiación-fraternidad is that of critique of religion
and the authentic liberating experience of God.108 For González Faus, genuine critique of
religion arises from the unmasking and denunciation of idolatry. 109 Idolatry, in this
sense, is any fixation or absolutization by a person or society of something other than the
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liberating God of truth and justice. As González Faus argues, the Latin American
bishops of the 16th and 17th centuries recognized the human tendency to absolutize and
worship an economic system and money long before Karl Marx wrote about the fetishism
of commodities and money. 110
As pointed out in Chapter Three of this dissertation, González Faus argues that
the human act of idolatry becomes visible in acts of hypocrisy. Thus, at the root of
hypocrisy is the idolatric tendency within human existence. 111 A clear example of
hypocrisy, and therefore ultimately idolatry, is found, for González Faus, in the Spanish
conquest of Latin America. As he shows, the hypocrisy of the Spanish can be seen in
their justification of the conquest of the Americas for the sake of the evangelization of the
indigenous people. Instead of worshipping and spreading the good news of the liberating
God of Jesus Christ, the Spanish conquistadores worshipped the gods of gold and silver.
The real evil of idolatry, for González Faus, is found in human sacrifice. In other
words, the active displacing of the saving and liberating God of Jesus Christ with the
gods that feed off of human egoism and greed not only need human greed and egoism to
exist, they also need human sacrifices to exist and flourish. More concretely, these gods
can be found in the structures and systems of society that divinize the individual self or
particular groups or material goods at the expense of the dignity and life of those who are
made to serve these structures and systems. One clear example that González Faus offers
110
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is the silver mining at Potosí, Bolivia during the 16th century. The cruel conditions of the
work in the mines killed thousands of indigenous people. Being appalled at the
conditions of the mines and the death of the miners, the Latin American bishops
explicitly unmasked the injustice of this economic structure and condemned the
promotion of it by the Spanish colonists. One particular bishop, Bishop Domingo de
Santo Tomás of La Plata, wrote that the greed of the Spanish materialized in the human
sacrifice of the silver mines in Potosí. 112 In the same spirit another bishop, in a letter to
the King of Spain, wrote that the indigenous people are unable to hear the words of Christ
because of the words of the gods of the Spanish, namely, “give me gold, give me
gold.” 113
In addition, these demonic gods mask themselves as good and just structures and
systems and hide from the grace of fraternización. For González Faus, then, “the
denunciation of idolatries is one of the first tasks (misiones) of the church” since the
greatest sin against God is idolatry, which ultimately leads to the destruction of human
dignity and human life. 114
This unmasking of idolatry is simultaneously a real experience of God. As
González Faus argues, “this critique of religion, which is, definitely, a denunciation of
idolatry and its personal and social significance, alludes to an experience of the true God
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which takes place in the cry of the oppressed.” 115 It is in the cry of the oppressed that the
God of truth and salvation is heard and in an Exodus experience that the God of truth and
salvation is found. As with all experiences of grace, the individual person is free to
accept or reject the invitation to work towards unmasking idolatry and accompany the
poor and marginalized in their Exodus moment. This invitation forms the foundation for
the other features of filiación-fraternidad.

Denouncing Injustice
The second feature of the metaphor filiación-fraternidad is the “prophetic
denunciation of injustice,” and it is the logical consequence of the unmasking of society’s
idolatrous behavior. 116 Prophetic denunciation does not consist simply in being the voice
of the oppressed, but rather “it consists in clearly and courageously denouncing dubious,
and even perhaps lawfully enforced, practices.” 117
As pointed out in Chapter Three, the idolatries found in society oftentimes
develop into beliefs and practices that eventually become normative and institutionalized.
Some of these norms and institutions go directly against the teachings of the church (e.g.,
laws that prohibit the free practice of the faith). However, there are times when some of
these idolatrous social norms and institutions do not directly affect the church. Yet, the
church must always denounce such social normative practices, not just when these
practices directly affect the church but because they damage the human project of

115

Ibid., 144.

116

Ibid., 155.

117

Ibid., 157.

233
filiación-fraternidad. 118 One example of this denunciation of social practices that
González Faus describes is the forced migration of indigenous workers from their homes
during the Spanish conquest of Latin America. The denunciation of this atrocity, both
during the Spanish conquest of the Americas and during contemporary times, as
González Faus shows, did not come from European bishops, but rather from Latin
American bishops, even though they themselves were not forced to migrate. 119
A second example of this prophetic denunciation that he recounts is the
condemnation by some Latin American bishops of colonists selling vast amounts of
alcohol to the indigenous peoples in order to create a market of need. 120 In other words,
the bishops condemned the activity of selling large quantities of alcohol to the indigenous
people in order to get them to fall into a cycle of addiction and need, which ultimately
brought in revenue for the colonists.
Because of the bishops’ denunciations of abuses, the powerful class in Spanish
America felt threatened and subsequently attempted to use their power and authority to
defame the church and weaken the power of the bishops. This defamation by the
powerful took the form of making false claims to the king of Spain and to the local
authorities. Defaming the bishops eventually turned into systematic lying by the
powerful. As González Faus details, this systematic lying became a powerful resource
against the bishops. For example, he details an account of a document sent to the King
that blamed the Franciscans at the seminary of Santa Cruz de Tlatelolco (a seminary
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created for the education of indigenous seminarians) of teaching social rebellion. 121
Ultimately, this systematic lying led to direct threats to the bishops’ lives. 122 These two
hazards, namely, the defamation of names and the direct threat on persons’ lives, are
oftentimes the outcome of a church that prophetically denounces the injustices of the
powerful of society.

Taking Sides
The third feature of the metaphor filiación-fraternidad is the option for the poor
or, as González Faus puts it, the “class” option. 123 This preference for the poor does not
mean “exclusivity,” and therefore it does not negate the universality of the gospel
message. 124 Rather, the invitation to salvation for all persons is found in fraternización
with the poor and oppressed, not the exclusion of others. In other words, the grace to opt
for the poor and marginalized of society is given to all. As González Faus puts it, “the
possibility to have a preferential option for the poor and the possibility to encounter the
good news in this ‘foolish’ option is offered to all.” 125 This is the universal message of
salvation that the Jesus of the gospels has proclaimed.
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As González Faus sees it, the option for the poor draws its meaning from Jesus’
proclamation of good news for the poor. Jesus’ own option for the poor therefore
transforms the incarnation of the Word from an acceptance of the social order into a
protest and challenge of the social order. 126 In other words, the cross, which is the
paradigmatic symbol for the preferential option, prevents the theological notion of
incarnation (i.e., enculturation) from being co-opted into a justification of the cultural
status quo. 127 Hence, as González Faus claims, “only through the primacy of the poor is
Christianity truly Christian.” 128
For González Faus, then, without the poor and marginalized the theological theme
of “fullness,” as found in Catholic theology according to Tillich and Guitton, is
meaningless because the exclusion of certain groups of people (in this case the poor and
marginalized) destroys the “and” of Catholic universality. In addition, without the poor
and marginalized the theological theme of “purity,” as present in Protestant theology
according to Tillich and Guitton, is also empty of meaning and therefore the church is
threatened by the temptation to absolutize itself and to use the power given to it for its
own sake.
González Faus sees an authentic option for the poor and marginalized in the 16th
and 17th century Latin American bishops’ attitude and actions towards the indigenous.
He finds three underlying themes that confirm this preferential option in various letters of
bishops to the King of Spain, as well in an early bishops’ council in Lima, that confirm
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this preferential option by the bishops. The first theme that he discerns in these letters,
and in the bishops’ council document, is that the bishops treated the indigenous peoples
with dignity because the bishops saw them as human beings who deserve to be treated
with dignity.
The second underlying theme that he finds is that the bishops freely chose to
accompany these marginalized and oppressed people. González Faus points out that
while some Latin American bishops lived like kings, others chose to freely live like the
indigenous people and mandated that their priests and missionaries learn the language
and customs of the indigenous. For González Faus, not only is living like the people
important, but to live with the people is essential to being on their side. He argues that
the ministers of the church (especially the hierarchy) need to “understand the spirit of the
common people” and ought to live near the people. 129 Living with the poor and
oppressed will ultimately facilitate in the unmasking and the denouncing of injustice and
may lead to certain grave consequences. One example of this that González Faus
recounts is when the local government officials prohibited the missionaries from having
personal contact with the indigenous, as well as threatening the indigenous with hangings
if they were caught developing friendship with the missionaries. 130 This attempt at
inculturation by these bishops may appear almost natural today, but in the 16th century
the idea of inculturation was not the norm and was especially frowned upon in the
Spanish culture that promoted Spanish superiority.
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A third theme that he finds for this option for the indigenous is that the bishops
believed that they had a profound obligation to love the indigenous and to care for them
as a parent loves a child and to “warn those in power” that there is a divine obligation to
treat the indigenous with the dignity that they deserve. 131 In all three examples, what is
important to note is that the indigenous people did nothing to really merit this preferential
option by the bishops. It was freely chosen by these bishops to take the side of the poor
and oppressed peoples of this colonized land.
González Faus argues that these three underlying themes found in the Latin
American bishops of the 16th and 17th centuries can be applied today. He states that there
can be disagreement about whether or not a particular situation of a group of people can
be considered unjust. But, if there is a situation where people are being oppressed, the
church “demands of us a class option.” 132 González Faus continues by arguing that this
option is nonnegotiable and that it does not have to entail an armed conflict. Instead, “it’s
more about the problem of a conflict of interests, and there are some interests that cannot
be realized without ‘tearing apart and wearing down’ the other class.” 133 This feature of
church is most clearly unfurled in the next feature.
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Changing the Situation
The fourth feature of filiación-fraternidad as a needed metaphor for the church is
the church’s mission to concretely advance human life and dignity by improving the
living standards of the poor and by fomenting greater social participation for the
marginalized of society. González Faus makes the claim that there is an inseparable
relationship between the promotion of human existence (i.e., human progress, but not
progress to the detriment of the environment or particular groups of people) and Christian
evangelization. That is, he argues that there is an inseparable relationship between
human liberation and salvation. As he makes the case, the two notions are “inseparable.”
However, the two cannot be “formally identified” nor are they indistinguishable. 134 He
continues by arguing that even though the concrete work to advance human life and
dignity and of the spreading of the gospel message can be formally distinguished, “they
can be seen as ‘hypostatically’ united by the dignity of the human person” as a “child and
creature of God.”135 Therefore, for González Faus, working for social justice and the
message of Jesus is intimately united as one human act.
This relationship between human progress and evangelization, and the
relationship between historical liberation and transcendent salvation is analogous to the
intimate relationship between God’s action and human action that was presented in
Chapter Four of this dissertation. In other words, González Faus argues that this real, but
distinguishable, identity between human liberation and human flourishing, and the gospel
message of salvation is rooted in the relationship between God’s action in the world and
134
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human action through the work of God’s Spirit. Therefore, this radical union between
God’s action and human action through the Spirit establishes a real relationship between
“human progress (promoción humana) and God’s salvation, or the development of the
world and the eschatological completion.” 136 This last quote points out that even though
historical liberation and human progress, and salvation and evangelization are one
inseparable reality for González Faus, he clearly points out that human liberation is an
eschatological event. In other words, “historical liberation does not undermine nor
negate transcendent salvation. Rather, it constitutes its mediation, its sacrament and its
historical anticipation. Just as Jesus’ humanity does not negate nor reduce his divinity
but rather it constitutes the only true mediation of it.” 137
One essential component of evangelization and the promotion of human progress
is the preaching of the Word of God. As he states, “the content of preaching (i.e., the life
of God in human existence) demands the promotion of human existence” and “the work
to promote human existence can be, in some cases, authentic preaching.” 138 He sees this
relationship between authentic preaching and the promotion of human existence in the
first council of Mexican bishops in 1555. As stated in a document from that council, an
authentic act of preaching is when the individual Spaniard acknowledges the dignity of
the indigenous and empowers them to become active members in society. 139
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González Faus continues with a defense of the bishops against any critique of
reductionism. He argues that those bishops understood that the church must first take
care of the physical needs of the people (viz., the indigenous who were the oppressed)
and then care for the spiritual and interior life. In other words, quoting from one bishop’s
letter to the King of Spain, how can “the poor Indian listen to the word of God and come
to know the Christian doctrine if all day long the encomendero is mistreating and
overworking him…” 140 Again, careful to avoid any misunderstanding, González Faus
argues that this priority of the physical needs of the people is a temporal priority and not
a causal primacy. Evangelization and the proclamation of the gospels have causal and
essential primacy, whereas the promotion and the advancement of human life have
temporal priority. 141

Building Local Communities
The final feature of the root metaphor of filiación-fraternidad is the church as the
people of God, which is fundamentally a church of concrete persons working towards
building a community of filiación-fraternidad. This final feature for González Faus can
be seen as arising from his own personal experience as a young Jesuit in Spain. As
pointed out in Chapter Two, after his theological studies in Tübingen, Innsbruck, and
Rome, González Faus became a member of a base community in a poor neighborhood
outside of the city of Barcelona. This connection to base ecclesial communities
140
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continued with his travels to Latin America. It was in these base communities that he
formed his theological and ecclesiological projects.
As pointed out earlier, this notion of church as constituting an actively faithful
people of God has its roots in the ecclesiology of Vatican II. For González Faus, this
notion of local church is best characterized by the numerous ecclesial base communities
found throughout impoverished regions of the world; however, for González Faus,
authentic local ecclesial communities are not limited to these regions. Though González
Faus uses the notion “base communities” in many of his works, he does not limit the
possibilities of various forms of local ecclesial communities.
Filiación-fraternidad envisions the church as a concrete and particular reality “in
the world,” and as comprising a concrete mediating role towards the fullness of Christ on
earth. 142 Local ecclesial communities, then, “explicitly maintain the mediation of the
faith of the church” through the radical relationship of filiación-fraternidad. 143 They do
this by creating a new way of being church, which is, in the words of Leonardo Boff,
“reinventing the church” and, in the words of Jon Sobrino, “resurrecting the true
church.” 144 This new way of being church, therefore, confronts the power of
globalization through concrete personal and communal witness of Christ’s transformative
power through the Spirit of God. The person, in unity with the whole community and
through the power of the grace of filiación-fraternidad, can now challenge the
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assumptions, norms, and idolatry of the current trajectory of globalization and live as a
community in a new way.
The basic form of the church in this model shifts from the binomial clerical-lay to
“communion in service.” 145 In addition, the church leaders will shift from concern for
the purely spiritual to concern for the concrete needs of the people of this world, from
self concern to concern for others, and from the vertical to the collegial. 146 In line with
Rahner’s understanding of the juridical relationship of base communities to the global
church, this form of church does not eliminate the global institutional dimension of the
church with its unique Petrine and episcopal (i.e., bishops’) ministries. Rather, local
communities challenge the hierarchical church to become a servant church of the poor
rather than a church of the powerful. 147
Furthermore, as González Faus argues, “Each local church is the whole church
(i.e., ‘the catholic 148 church’)” 149 For him, this claim is clearly found in the New
Testament. As he states, “[t]he New Testament teaches that the church as people of God
is not a type of religious multinational, but rather that each particular church is the whole
catholic church.” 150 In addition, to be catholic the local church needs “to be
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integral”(holistic)…and it also needs to be, in essence, open to communion with other
local churches.” 151
At this point, a few concerns can be raised with regard to the model of local
ecclesial communities. In the conclusion to his book Ecclesiology for a Global Church.
Richard Gaillardetz points out a few possible concerns with regard to local ecclesial
communities. He sees that the model of local church can possibly lose its identity amidst
a postmodern “hybridization of cultures.” 152 In addition, Gaillardetz argues that local
communities may be conceived of as possibly being situated in “virtual reality,” that is,
via the Internet. This diminishing of a concrete space may “deprive members of a vital
sense of place, rootedness, and the personal vulnerability that is so often the by-product
of face-to-face communal interaction.” 153 Lastly, Gaillardetz sees the potential problem
of insularity. In other words, a local church may have no sense of connectedness to the
larger church and become too myopic in its vision of the world and salvation, which
ultimately would undermine the catholicity of the church. 154
Gaillardetz raises very important concerns for this feature of the metaphor of
church as filiación-fraternidad. However, I believe that each of these concerns can be
allayed through serious consideration into the features of local communities that I
presented earlier. For example, the concern about a local church’s disconnect to the
global church and its insularity can be addressed by cultivating a local community’s
151
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concern for global injustices and for cultivating solidarity with other local communities in
order to address global injustices. In addition, an option for the poor and oppressed may
in fact facilitate the rootedness of place and may obligate the local church to be
committed to communal interaction with other communities.
A second set of concerns arises in light of the structural changes that are taking
place due to globalization. The important question here is: Can a multiplicity of local
ecclesial communities that may in fact be structured differently and have a plurality of
cultural traditions and expressions better address a global reality such as global disparity?
In other words, is not a global problem best addressed by a global institution that can
offer a global response? More specifically to the current argument, would not an
institutional model of church be a more adequate model in the case of global disparity
and an anthropology of radical egoism and individualism? González Faus offers three
reasons why the model of local communities is better than an institutional, hierarchical
model of the church. The first reason deals with the very structure of local communities.
Local communities as structures and institutions are fundamentally at the service of the
church’s mission of salvation and the task of building up the kingdom of God rather than
the self-interest of the institution. As González Faus sees, a real weakness of the
institutional model of church is that the institution itself may be overly concerned with its
own existence as the means to the solutions of problems that its own survival and
interests may subordinate the mission of the institution.
The second reason that local communities offer a more radical, and therefore
better, model of the church is because of the notion of service. Local communities
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understand the notion of service as directed outwards toward the world and not strictly
directed inward to the members of the church. For González Faus, the church ought to
see service as an offer of grace and salvation to a world that is constantly threatened by
sin rather than understanding service as the commitment of one’s self to the church’s
battle in a war against the world.
The last reason offered by González Faus is the authentically communal
characteristic of local ecclesial communities. Authentic local communities that are
oriented towards the kingdom of God offer a real experience of fraternidad. Local
communities do not reject authority and hierarchy; rather, they transform them and point
to the true authority of the gospel message. 155 This real experience of fraternidad
transforms the church into the real “sacrament” of salvation and becomes the true witness
to the world of this salvation. The world then will see the church as an authentic
community of fraternidad (i.e., liberation, in this case) rather than as an authoritative
figure in the world concerned only about individual morality and the survival of the
institution.
Fundamentally, ecclesial local communities help the church to become more
structured as a divine and human community rather than a perfect society or a moralistic
institution. This concern for the creation of local communities is not only a moral
imperative for González Faus, but it is, as has been pointed out in Chapter Four, the very
desire of the human heart and the fulfillment of what it truly means to be human.
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Incarnating Filiación-Fraternidad in the World Today
In Chapter One, I raised the concern that we are currently living in a world that is
rapidly and radically changing due to the phenomenon of globalization and that many
communities are not benefiting from the current form of human interaction, human
organization, and human power. In addition, due to the current trajectory of globalization
the number of people living in extreme poverty is increasing. More concretely, I argue
that the current economic system of liberal capitalism and an anthropology of rationalistic
and mechanistic individualism dominate the current trajectory of globalization that not
only affects the economic sphere but also all other spheres of human existence (e.g.,
culture, politics, education). Furthermore, the structures and systems formed by this
economic system and anthropology shape, in one way or another, the ideas, feelings,
desires and hopes of all persons and communities in the world. Given the concrete
realities of this current misdirection of globalization and global disparity, a closer look at
how González Faus’ binomial ecclesial metaphor filiación-fraternidad can concretely
offer a more engaged ecclesiology is in order.
As illustrated above, filiación-fraternidad consists of five specific features (i.e.,
unmasking idolatry and experiencing God, denouncing injustice, taking sides, changing
the situation, and building local communities). Though each one of these five features
can be abstracted, isolated and explored independently of the others through conceptual
analysis, in the world of concrete experiences and practical attempts to respond to these
experiences all five features constitute one inseparable reality. For example, it would be
hard to imagine the first two features as not being dependent upon each other. A church
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that unmasks social idolatries will necessarily denounce those idolatries and the social
practices that arise because of them. Again, taking the side of the poor cannot be done
without a real effort to attempt to transform their socio-economic situation. In addition,
the task and project of local ecclesial communities will consist of the first four features.
The incarnation of the church as filiación-fraternidad within the current global
situation depends on various factors. One important factor is the differing economic
contexts. For example, the unfurling of the church as filiación-fraternidad within the rich
and powerful regions of the world is clearly one that must exist in ambiguity. In other
words, the members of the church within a first world context and in a context that may
be contributing to the misdirection of globalization will attempt to unmask and denounce
global injustice from the side of the rich and powerful. This context makes the
unmasking and denouncing difficult because of the possibility of contributing to the
unjust structures in which it lives. For example, a local ecclesial community within a
wealthy and powerful region of the world whose task and project is the grace of filiaciónfraternidad must establish concrete relationships with local ecclesial communities in
impoverished regions or with marginalized persons found in the context of power.
Furthermore, the local community, in solidarity with other local communities, must
constantly discern its role in society and must be perpetually self-critical.
At the same time, the unfurling of the church as filiación-fraternidad within the
disparaging regions of the world is not one of ambiguity but rather is clearly defined.
That is, the members of the church as filiación-fraternidad in these regions will attempt
to unmask and denounce global injustice in and through their suffering and oppression.
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For example, a local ecclesial community within this context will struggle for justice as a
unified community and will struggle for justice by reaching deep into its own wealth of
non-material resources. The community will find within itself the grace that it needs to
be liberated.
In addition to the distinct economic contexts, another factor determining how
filiación-fraternidad will be incarnated in the world is the unique relationship that a
particular local community may have with other local communities. This relationship
may be based on a particular charism or established through a particular network of
communities. An example of this is the international network of the Society of Jesus
(Jesuits) and the many groups associated with the Jesuits who are oftentimes referred to
as “colleagues” or “companions” of Jesuits. 156 I argue that this international religious
order and its network of local communities already embody this task and goal of
filiación-fraternidad in a number of ways. In 1974-75 the Jesuits convened their Thirty
Second General Congregation (GC 32). Decree 4 of this Congregation clearly lays out
the nature and task of the mission of the Jesuits, which are namely “the service of faith
and the promotion of justice.” 157 In 1995, the Jesuits held the Thirty Fourth General
Congregation (GC 34) which reaffirmed their mission of faith and justice. 158 Out of
these congregations arose various works of social action and centers for social research,
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analysis and training. 159 As already mentioned, these works include both the Jesuit order
and the colleagues of the Jesuits. Other concrete examples of filiación-fraternidad within
this particular ecclesial body are the networking website www.jesuitsocialapostolate.org,
the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), Jesuit Volunteer Corps (JVC), Jesuit Secondary
Education Association (JSEA), and the Centre d’Estudis Cristianisme i Justícia which
González Faus is the director.

Concluding Remarks: Filiación-Fraternidad as the Transformation of Globalization
At the outset of this dissertation, I introduced what I believe is the most important
problem facing our globalizing world today, namely, global disparity. I also raised four
concerns that I believe should be at the forefront of the thoughts of every Christian in
light of the massive changes occurring in our globalizing world. I think it is helpful to
raise these concerns once again. First, is the increasing interaction and
interconnectedness of peoples throughout the world facilitating a greater sense of human
dignity, equality and solidarity? Second, how is the world going to be structured, with
greater equality and opportunity or less? Third, how will these structures define what it
means to be human? Finally, whose interests are being served, the global community or
only the particularly strong and competitive communities? In other words, how will
human power be used, to enter into the struggle for justice with those in society who
suffer from powerlessness, or to dominate and exploit those who are powerless?
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My claim in that chapter was that a Catholic theological anthropology that can
present an account of human existence through social and structural categories can be
beneficial as a constructive and productive response to the current problem of extreme
poverty and the social ills that accompany that form of poverty due to a particular
egocentric individualistic anthropology. I have argued that González Faus’ use of
contemporary social sciences (e.g., Frankfurt School of Social Theory) in conjunction
with biblical typology (e.g., covenant language), his use of social categories to describe
sin and grace, his claim that the drive, project and purpose of human existence is
necessarily the socio-communal life of God, and his binomial filiación-fraternidad as a
metaphor for church offers a constructive theological anthropology that can be employed
as a relatively adequate response to the problem at hand.
As argued in Chapter Four of this dissertation, González Faus sees the salvation
of human existence as being initiated and brought to completion by God through the
project and task of restructuring (reconstrucción) and empowering (potenciación) human
existence. This gift of restructuring and empowering human existence is made a reality
through the restructured and empowered local communities of faith. As the visible sign
of God’s saving grace in human history, the task of the church, as servant and local
community, is to make visible and embody this gift of salvation. In other words, as a
visible sign of salvation, the church becomes the project and embodiment of filiaciónfraternidad.
Taking up the challenge of Jon Sobrino, which is to re-envision the church as the
church of the poor, I believe that a church of the poor would best be illustrated in the
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binomial root metaphor of filiación-fraternidad as articulated in the thought of González
Faus. This binomial root metaphor illustrates both the covenantal and communal aspects
of the church. As the church embodies the project of fraternización, and understands its
eschatological goal as fraternidad (i.e., the vision of the human family as brothers and
sisters of one another and the task of justice with a preferential option for the
marginalized and oppressed through the power of the Spirit of God), the more it works
towards the kingdom of the Trinitarian-Communal God. This metaphor also highlights
the unique familial and covenantal relationship between God the Father and God’s
children through the Son and with the Spirit. Through the project of fraternización, the
gift of filiación becomes more apparent and pronounced. It is through the radical gift of
fraternización that the unfurling of the radical gift of filiación ultimately takes place.

APPENDIX A:
LIFE CHRONOLOGIES OF KARL RAHNER AND
JOSÉ IGNACIO GONZÁLEZ FAUS
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Karl Rahner: A Life Chronology

1

Life:
1904
1922
1927-29
1932
1934-36
1939-44
1944
1962-65
1964-67
1969
1984

Born March 5 (Freiburg in Breisgau, Germany)
Entered the Jesuit novitiate (Feldkirch, Germany)
Taught Latin (Feldkirch, Austria)
Ordained (Munich)
Attended four semesters in Martin Heidegger’s seminar (Freiburg)
Work at the Diocesan Pastoral Institute (Vienna)
Pastoral work (Bavaria)
Theological consultant at Vatican II
Chair of Christianity and the Philosophy of Religion (Munich)
Member of International Theological Commission
Died March 30 (Innsbruck)

Education:
1922-24
1924-27
1929-33
1934-36
1936
1936

Jesuit formation in Ignatian spirituality
Philosophy Studies (Feldkirch, Austria and Pullach, Germany)
Theology Studies (Valkenburg, Holland)
Graduate Studies in Philosophy (Freiburg)
Doctoral Studies in Theology (Innsbruck)
Doctoral Dissertation Completed (on the typological meaning of John
19:34)

Theological Career:
1937-39
1938
1939
1941
1939-44
1944-45
1945-48
1949-64
1954
1962-65
1964-67
1967-71
1

Lecturer in Dogma and the History of Dogma (Innsbruck)
Encounters with Silence published
Spirit in the World published (was rejected as doctoral thesis in
philosophy)
Hearer of the Word pubished
Work at the Diocesan Pastoral Institute (Vienna)
Pastoral work (Bavaria)
Lecturer in Dogma (Pullach)
Professor and Lecturer in Dogma and the History of Dogma (Innsbruck)
First volume of Theological Studies published
Theological consultant at Vatican II
Chair of Christianity and the Philosophy of Religion (Munich)
Professor of Dogmatic Theology (Münster)

All biographical information on Rahner comes from CCKR, and Geffrey Kelly’s Karl Rahner:
Theologian of the Graced Search for Meaning.
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1971-81
1972
1976
1981-84
1984

Emeritus (Munich)
Honorary Professor of Dogma and the History of Dogma (Innsbruck)
Foundations of Christian Faith published
Emeritus (Innsbruck)
Last volume of Theological Studies published

José Ignacio González Faus: A Life Chronology 2
Life:
1933
1950
1956-60
1963
1966-68

1968

1968-78
1977/79
1998-02

Born December 27, (Valencia, Spain)
Entered the Jesuit novitiate
Taught catechism in immigrant neighborhood of Sabadell, Torre Romeu
Ordained
Chaplain to Spanish immigrants (Tübingen); wrote dissertation
(Tübingen); Attended two courses with Joseph Ratzinger – Christology
and Introduction to Christianity)
Witnessed the May ‘68 student revolt in Germany (was traveling
frequently b/w Tübingen and Innsbruck to meet with his dissertation
director)
Member of a base community (Sabadell, Torre Romeu, Spain)
First visits to Latin America
Worked with Fundación Arrels

Education:
1939-50
1950-52
1953-55
1956-60

1960-64
1965
1965-66
1966-68

1969

2

Jesuit colegio (San José in Valencia)
Jesuit formation in Ignatian spirituality
Jesuit Juniorate (humanity studies)
Philosophy Studies (Sant Cugat del Vallès and the Facultad Civil de
Barcelona)
Licentiate in Philosophy
Theology Studies (3 years at Sant Cugat del Vallès; 1 year at Innsbruck)
Third Probation
Biblical Studies in the P.Instituto Biblico (Rome)
Theological Studies (Tübingen & Innsbruck)
Doctoral Dissertation Completed (on the Christology of Irenaeus of
Lyons)
Introduced to the “Frankfurt School”

All biographical information on González Faus comes from my E-mail correspondence with González
Faus, Vitoria Cormenzana’s interview, and Bosch’s Notas Biográficas.
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Theological Career:
1960-64

Helped found Selecciones de Teología (in response to his professors and
Francoism)
1966-68
Chaplain to Spanish immigrants (Tübingen)
1969
Carne de Dios published
1968-2000
Professor of Systematic Theology at Facultat de Teología de Catalunya
(Barcelona)
1968-77
Director of Selecciones de Teología
1974
La Humanidad nueva publshed
1980-Present Professor of Systematic Theology: (El Salvador – la Universidad
Centroamericana; Mexico; Brazil; Bolivia
Brief Courses or Conferences: Argentina, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Uruguay,
Peru, Columbia
1981-Present Director of Centro de Estudios ‘Cristianisme i justicia’ (Barcelona)
1997
Proyecto de hermano published
2000-Present Emeritus at Facultat de Teologia de Catalunya (Barcelona)
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